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This dissertation defends realist views in ethics against arguments advanced by 
ethical constructivists. Realists think that ethical truth obtains independently of any 
preferred perspective. That is, it is at bottom independent of whatever beliefs, desires, 
or other forms of commitment we have. Constructivists, in contrast, deny this. But this 
could mean different things, and there is currently no consensus on what 
constructivism involves exactly or how we ought to understand this dispute. 
Consequently, it has been difficult to evaluate the merits of constructivist arguments. 
This work attempts to remedy these deficiencies by developing a framework for both 
interpreting and evaluating the nature and scope of the constructivist’s challenge. 
In the first two chapters, I address some of the larger interpretative disputes. In 
Chapter 1, I argue that there are two main ways of understanding constructivism. Each 
of these corresponds to the rejection of a particular commitment of realism. In Chapter 
2, however, I argue that neither of these should be understood as representing a free-
standing view in metaethics. Rather, each takes aim at a narrower target: viz., the 
realist’s conception of ethical objectivity. The first type of constructivist challenge 
rejects realist claims about the nature of ethical objectivity; the second type accepts 
 these but rejects claims about it scope. 
 In the final three chapters, I evaluate these two versions of the challenge. In 
Chapter 3, I argue that if the constructivist rejects all stance-independent ethical truth, 
she commits herself to absurd results within ethical theory. This prompts me to 
consider more modest constructivist theses, ones that allow for some stance-
independent ethical truths but that also significantly restrict the scope that such truths 
play within an ethical theory. In Chapters 4 and 5, however, I argue that the best 
arguments for this more modest constructivism also fail because the ethical 
considerations they appeal to – i.e., moral rationalism and autonomy – can be equally 
accommodated by a robust moral realism. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST’S CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Human beings do all kinds of things. While some of these activities are trivial or 
accidental to our nature, others are central to our understanding of what it is to be 
human. Ethical practice is arguably one of these. As ethical creatures, we engage in 
certain characteristic activities: We value things. We take some actions to be wrong 
and some to be right. We also take some things to count as reasons for acting. There 
may be much debate about what the proper objects of these activities are, but it is not 
controversial that we engage the world in these ways. Human beings might have 
evolved to value quite different things or take different kinds of actions to be wrong or 
right or take slightly different features of the world to count as reasons for action. But 
a mature, healthy human being who failed to engage in any of these characteristic 
activities in any way would be a very strange creature indeed. The central question of 
this dissertation will be how we are to understand the relation between these activities 
and the nature of what ethical terms and expressions stand for.1  
Although contemporary moral philosophy has generated a flourish of literature 
on this topic recently, the question is a very old one. It is arguably a version of the one 
that Plato entertains in his presentation of a dialogue between Socrates and 
                                                
1 Here and throughout I use “ethical” to refer to a broad range of topics that are the concern of practical 
philosophy – including morality, value, and practical reason. 
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Euthyphro.2  There the topic is piety. Specifically, is something pious because the gods 
love it? Or do the gods love it because it is pious? Plato’s brief arguments in the 
dialogue have been interpreted in different ways and done little to quiet interest in 
these questions. In order to broaden the terms of the discussion, we may recast 
Euthyphro’s question in a “rough, secular paraphrase”.3 
 
(i) Do we value things because they are valuable? Or do things have value 
because we value them?  
(ii) Do we take certain actions to be wrong (or right) because they are wrong (or 
right)? Or are these actions wrong (or right) because we take them to be so?  
(iii) Do we take certain features of the world to count as reasons for action because 
they are reasons? Or do these features count as reasons for action because we 
take them to be so?  
 
These are metaphysical questions. How we answer them will say something 
about the kinds of facts or properties that exist and what they are like – for example, 
whether an account of these facts and properties must make essential reference to 
these activities or the standpoints that characterize them.4 Ethical constructivists 
answer “no” to the first of these pairs of questions and “yes” to the second. Ethical 
Realists answer “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second.5  
                                                
2 Plato (1997), 1-16. 
3 This expression comes from Street (2010), 370. 
4 What exactly a standpoint is will be discussed a bit later. 
5 Things are actually more complicated here. Neither constructivism nor realism may be alone in taking 
these particular stances, depending on how one defines each view. For example, one might object that 
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Although these questions help to provide an intuitive grasp of what is at issue, 
they do not shed any real light on what distinguishes constructivism from realism. My 
task in this dissertation will be to explore different ways of understanding 
constructivism as well as the arguments that support them.  
Many philosophers have shown an interest in these questions – either 
presenting (Onora O’Neill, Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton), or 
defending (John Rawls, Ronald Milo, Christine Korsgaard, T.M. Scanlon, Sharon 
Street, Aaron James), or critiquing (David Brink, Mark Timmons, Allan Gibbard, 
William Fitzpatrick, Nadeem Hussain and Nishi Shah, Philip Pettit, Russ Shafer-
Landau, David Enoch, Michael Ridge) versions of constructivism.6 But there is 
currently no consensus on what constructivism about any of these topics is supposed 
to be or how exactly it differs from realism or other available metaethical positions, 
like response-dependence theories or expressivism.7 This lack of consensus is in part 
spurred by the fact that one may be a constructivist about one area of ethical discourse 
                                                                                                                                       
the distinction is not merely between constructivists and realists but between constructivists and realists 
or quasi-realists. Defenders of quasi-realism, like Simon Blackburn (1984), explicitly claim that they 
side with realists on this issue. However, it is controversial whether they are entitled to this claim (in 
Blackburn’s terms, whether they have really earned the right to such a response). Similarly, one may 
object that a response-dependence theorist or a speaker subjectivist, more generally, would respond to 
these questions in the same way as the constructivist does. I will have more to say about how 
constructivism contrasts with these views in the next chapter. My claim here is just that these questions 
provide one helpful way of highlighting what is at issue in debates between constructivists and realists, 
even if this distinction captures broader families of views under which constructivism and realism each 
respectively fall. 
6 See O’Neill (2003), Darwall, Gibbard, Railton (1992), Rawls (1980), Milo (1995), Korsgaard (1996), 
(2003), (2009), Scanlon (1982), (1998), (2003), Street (2008), (2009), (2010), James (2007), Brink 
(1989), Timmons (2003), Gibbard (1999), Fitzpatrick (2005), Hussain and Shah (2006), Parfit 
(forthcoming), Pettit (2000), Shafer-Landau (2003), Enoch (2009), Ridge (forthcoming).  
7 Street (2010): 
 
 It should be emphasized at the outset that the question -- ‘What is constructivism in ethics and 
metaethics?’ -- has no uncontroversial answer at the present time. (p.364) 
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while maintaining a realist, or expressivist, etc., view about others.8 For example, one 
may be a constructivist about morality but a realist about practical reason,9 or a 
constructivist about value but a realist about morality, or a constructivist about 
practical reason and a realist about value and morality. But one may also be a 
constructivist, or realist, about all three.10 It may turn out that there are different 
motivations and arguments for constructivism depending on whether one is concerned 
with value, morality, or practical reason. What’s more, there may turn out to be some 
differences in the metaphysics depending on which area is at issue.  
In order to set aside some of these complications, I will take as my target 
ethical constructivism most generally. Whatever differences in motivation and 
argument one may find for each of these specific views, there is also a lot that each 
view has in common. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that an evaluation of 
                                                
8 Each of the three positions is independent of the other two. But this independence is won at the price 
of rejecting what are often taken to be plausible views about the relations between reasons, morality, 
and value. For example, many people think that there is some internal connection between having a 
reason to perform some action and that action’s moral or evaluative status, such that an action’s 
rightness necessarily provides some reason to perform it or that an object’s or state-of-affair’s goodness 
necessarily provides some reason to pursue or promote it. But if this is true, it might appear as if our 
best story about what a reason is will take the same form as our best story about what rightness or 
goodness is. If reasons are constructed, then so is the right, or the good. Otherwise, it would appear 
difficult to explain the necessity of the above relationship. For, as Humeans are wont to point out, it is 
difficult to explain a necessary connection between distinct existences. However, if one rejects the 
claim that these things are necessarily related there is no pressure to account for them in similar terms. 
Rejecting the thesis arguably bears some costs. But it illustrates how accounts of reasons might be 
thought to come apart from accounts of morality and value. Of course, this does not explain how 
constructivism about value and morality are independent from each other. In this case, the relevant view 
that must be rejected is consequentialism. Consequentialists think that moral claims reduce in some way 
to claims about value. If this is right, it follows that a constructivism about value entails constructivism 
about morality. However, if one rejects consequentialism, there is little pressure to account for morality 
and value in similar terms. Depending on one’s views about the plausibility of consequentialism, 
however, rejecting the view might involve a significant cost. Nevertheless, one can see how 
constructivism about value might come apart from constructivism about morals. 
9 Scanlon (1998). 
10 Those who claim to defend a comprehensive constructivism include, e.g., Korsgaard (1996) and 
Street (2008) [NB Street appears to have rejected constructivism about morality in more recent work; 
see Street (2010)]. Comprehensive realists include, e.g., Enoch (2007), Fitzpatrick (2008), Parfit 
(forthcoming), Shafer-Landau (2003).   
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this common ground will suffice for evaluating the plausibility of any version of 
constructivism. In other words, if the general arguments for constructivism succeed, 
this should provide good reason for thinking that a particular version of constructivism 
succeeds. Alternatively, if these general arguments fail, this should provide good 
reason for discounting versions of these arguments that support a particular type of 
constructivism.11 This assumption finds support across the constructivist literature and 
is borne out by (what I will show to be) the general nature of constructivist arguments. 
Although I will sometimes take issue with a particular form of constructivism, this is 
only because I am concerned to respond to the specific terms of the arguments I am 
addressing. Nevertheless, my target throughout should be understood as ethical 
constructivism most generally. 
In this first chapter, my aim is to present some of the basic motivations for 
constructivism, as well as my own motivation for evaluating the view, and outline the 
constructivist’s basic argumentative strategy. This approach will draw our attention to 
the central themes and questions I will address in the course of this work as well as 
give us a sense for the structure of the discussion that follows in subsequent chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 In other words, the positions themselves are logically independent of one another, but the arguments 
that support one version or another supports them all. This is because the arguments are general. They 
do not discriminate between value, morality, or practical reason.   
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1.2 Understanding Constructivism Against The Backdrop of Realism  
 
One standard way of framing constructivism is to present it as a response to the 
putative failings of ethical realism.12 But how we are to understand realism, or anti-
realism, in ethics is itself contested. This, of course, complicates things. If 
constructivism is presented as a response to realism, but the commitments of realism 
are themselves contested, it would not appear as if we are starting with the clearest 
framework for understanding constructivism. Despite this complication, however, I 
think the framework can be a useful one. The situation just requires that we be explicit 
about how we are to understand the term realism in this context. 
It is fairly uncontroversial to take ethical realism to include at least the 
following two conditions: 
 
(1) Atomic ethical statements are the kinds of things that may be literally true 
or false. 
(2) At least some of them, literally construed, are true.13  
 
                                                
12 This is certainly not an uncontroversial way of framing the view. Some might argue that this gets 
things exactly backwards. For example, Korsgaard (1996), and especially (2003) – see p. 101 – argues 
that we should understand realism in moral philosophy as a series of historical reactions to every 
ambitious positive view about the nature of morality that has been proposed (including, e.g., 
constructivism and its close relatives). This historical claim is extremely contentious. But evaluation of 
it is beyond the scope of this work. Regardless of whether realism has been a reactive view or the 
default position in the history of moral philosophy, my claim is that we may still learn something about 
what constructivism is and why its proponents defend it by contrasting it with the commitments and 
putative failings of realism.  
13 See, e.g., Sayre-McCord (1988). NB It is interesting that this kind of definition, quite controversially, 
ends up counting certain views as versions of realism – e.g., those advanced respectively by Foot 
(1983), Railton (1986), and Smith (1989), (1993) – despite the fact that they are not always categorized 
this way. 
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These conditions look promising insofar as they serve to contrast realism with 
two commonly recognized anti-realist competitors. The first condition contrasts the 
view with non-cognitivism or expressivism.14 Defenders of these views deny that 
ethical statements are straightforwardly or literally fact stating; rather, they claim that 
we use ethical language to express some non-belief-like state of mind. The second 
condition contrasts the view with an error theory. Defenders of this kind of view 
accept that we use ethical language to report beliefs but claim that all of these beliefs 
are systematically false because ethical terms and expressions fail to refer to anything. 
Again, both types of views are framed in opposition to realism. Insofar as (1) and (2) 
achieve this contrast, they provide a helpful way of understanding realism’s 
commitments.   
These two conditions also appear sufficient to distinguish realism from some 
statements of constructivism. For example, Christine Korsgaard has described 
constructivism in ways that look incompatible with (1).15 On her account, atomic 
ethical statements are not made true by facts that we may come to know and apply in 
deliberation; rather, they express practical problems that agents must solve. The details 
of this proposal are not completely clear, but some have argued that Korsgaard’s view 
                                                
14 Some philosophers would claim that these two positions amount to the same thing, or perhaps that the 
latter is species of the former. Other philosophers have voiced objection to such conflation. For 
example, Simon Blackburn (1984) defends expressivism but rejects the label “non-cognitivism” for his 
view. This is because this label is usually applied to views that rule out the possibility of moral beliefs 
and moral knowledge. However, Blackburn argues that expressivists can earn the right to talk about 
moral belief and knowledge. The strategy of accommodating this kind of realist talk within a non-realist 
metaphysical framework is what he calls “quasi-realism”. 
15 See Korsgaard (2003). In her most recent work, Sharon Street also describes constructivism in ways 
that make it unclear whether the view satisfies (1). See, especially, her discussion of the similarities 
between constructivism and expressivism in (2010), 375ff. I will have more to say about Street’s 
proposal later in the discussion. 
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does not construe moral truth literally.16 If this were indeed the case, the first two 
conditions alone would suffice for distinguishing realism from constructivism. But 
even if some statements of constructivism might be ruled out by these conditions, 
others are not. In fact, part of what many take to be attractive about constructivism is 
that it does satisfy these two conditions. By taking on board some of the features of 
realism and rejecting others, constructivists claim to capture all that is attractive about 
realism while avoiding standard objections against it. If constructivism failed to satisfy 
(1) or (2), a defender of the view could not claim any such advantage – for without 
them there is nothing of realism to speak of. This means that we need to add some 
other condition(s) to our account of realism, one or another that captures the 
distinction that these other constructivists have in mind.  
Russ Shafer-Landau has proposed the following candidate:  
 
(3) There are moral truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, 
in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true 
by virtue of their ratification from within any actual or hypothetical 
perspective.17  
 
                                                
16 See Fitzpatrick (2008), 161-2 for discussion. 
17 Shafer-Landau (2003), 15. In his characterization of a robust ethical realism, Fitzpatrick (2008) 
averts to this condition and later proposes his own modification (p. 166).  
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This condition is used to describe what is sometimes referred to as the stance-
independence of ethical facts and properties.18 This is because it makes at least some 
instances of moral truth independent of “any preferred perspective”, actual or 
hypothetical. A perspective, or standpoint (as I will later refer to it), is a complex 
system of intentional psychological states (i.e., stances), such as beliefs, desires, 
commitments, reactive attitudes, etc.  
According to (3), even if some ethical standards come into existence because 
they figure as the objects of our desires, or choices, or beliefs, etc. (e.g., traffic laws, 
rules of etiquette), there are some that exist independently of our intentional stances. 
In other words, these standards would exist even if we (or idealized versions of 
ourselves) desired, wished, or believed that they did not, or decided to ignore them. I 
will soon have occasion to say more about what a perspective, or standpoint, is. For 
now, however, it is just important to note how this third condition serves to contrast 
realism with constructivism. Unlike the first two conditions, this one does appear to 
get at the distinction many constructivists have in mind.  
Specifically, it would appear to give some substance to the intuitive sense of 
dependence implicit in the questions stated earlier. These questions suggest that 
constructivism differs from realism insofar as it makes ethical facts and properties 
depend on our ethical practice in some essential way. However, it is important to note 
that this third condition does not entirely rule out the characterization of ethical facts 
                                                
18 For coinage of this expression, see Milo (1995), 182, 192. Both Shafer-Landau (2003) and Street 
(2008) follow Milo in describing realism as committed to a stance-independent view of moral truth. 
Fitzpatrick (2008) introduces this term in discussing Shafer-Landau’s view. 
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and properties in terms of psychological facts about the agent. For there are different 
ways in which ethical facts and properties might depend on an agent’s psychology.  
Let us distinguish two types of mind dependence.19 On the one hand, let us say 
that ethical facts and properties are weakly mind dependent if they are constituted by 
mental states in some essential way. For example, a hedonistic utilitarianism that 
characterizes ethical facts and properties in terms of an agent’s experiences of pleasure 
and pain might count as mind dependent in just this way. One the other hand, let us 
say that ethical facts and properties are strongly mind dependent if their ethical status 
depends in some essential way on their being made the object of an agent’s intentional 
psychological state (e.g., a belief, desire, wish, etc.). In short: this distinction does not 
concern whether ethical facts and properties are characterized psychologically – since 
both views allow for this much. Rather, it concerns how the status of these facts and 
properties gets routed through an agent’s psychology.   
Importantly, the stance-independence condition in (3) only rules out that 
ethical facts and properties are strongly mind dependent; it is compatible with their 
being weakly mind dependent. The reason for this is that realists are keen to preserve a 
particular, and arguably intuitive, sense of objectivity – one according to which the 
matter of ethical truth is not “up to us”.  If ethical facts and properties were strongly 
mind dependent, the truth of ethical statements would be up to us in the sense that we 
would make them true on the basis of our desiring, believing, or willing it to be the 
case. By contrast, if the truth-making facts are merely weakly mind dependent, this is 
not so. Although a hedonistic utilitarianism, for example, makes ethical truth depend 
                                                
19 Here I am closely following the distinction introduced by Milo (1995), 191. 
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on facts about an agent’s psychology, it does not leave it up to the agent (actual or 
hypothetical) to make it the case that a particular ethical truth obtains. 
If we accept that realism offers a stance-independent view of ethical facts and 
properties, constructivism, by contrast, ought to be understood as a species of a 
stance-dependent view. On this account, there are no moral, or ethical, truths that 
obtain entirely independently of any preferred perspective. The standards that fix the 
relevant class of ethical facts are always made true by virtue of their ratification from 
within some actual or hypothetical perspective. Constructivists offer various 
characterizations of the relevant status-conferring perspective or standpoint, as well as 
the kind of ratification that is required. Some of these differences will be discussed 
shortly; others will arise in the course of discussions in subsequent chapters. 
 Many constructivists are happy to accept (1) and (2), but they argue that 
realists go too far in positing (3). Again, this condition constitutes, in large part, the 
realist notion of ethical objectivity.  For this reason, we might take constructivists to 
be rejecting the idea that ethical facts and properties are objective in the realist’s sense 
– while leaving open the possibility that they might count as objective in some other 
sense. Some constructivists argue that, by incorporating (3), realists fail to 
accommodate deeply held philosophical commitments.20  
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 But, as I will argue later, not all constructivists reject (3). See discussion in sections 4-6.  
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1.3 Naturalistic Motivations 
 
The objection is that realism fails to accommodate our broader metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments. Here the concern is generally that realism about value, 
or morality, or practical reason is incompatible with philosophical naturalism. Very 
roughly, this is the view that the only kinds of facts and properties that exist are 
natural ones – i.e., those facts and properties that (could) figure as the objects of 
investigation of our best scientific practices. The alleged problem is that ethical facts 
and properties could only satisfy condition (3) if naturalism were false. 
There are different versions of this argument in the literature. According to one 
popular version of the objection, ethical facts and properties exhibit certain regular 
connections with our motivational capacities, such that, for example, anyone 
acquainted with an action’s wrongness is thereby motivated to avoid it.  If these 
motivational connections are understood naturalistically (e.g., as necessary 
connections between ethical properties and an agent’s desires or dispositions to 
choose), it is hard to see how ethical facts and properties could enjoy the independence 
described in condition (3). They would have to be stance-independent by nature yet 
necessarily connected with certain motivational stances. The worry is that this would 
suggest, in the words of John Mackie, that ethical facts and properties were “utterly 
different from anything else in the universe.”21  The conclusion here is that realism 
commits one to a kind of metaphysical queerness.  
                                                
21 Mackie (1977), 38. 
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The claim of metaphysical queerness gives rise to a related concern about 
epistemological queerness. Recently, Sharon Street has advanced a version of this kind 
of naturalistic argument.22 She claims that ethical realism is incompatible with our best 
evolutionary account of how we came to make the ethical judgments we do. 
According to this argument, if realism were true, we would have no good explanation 
for how our ethical judgments have succeeded in matching (or “tracking”) stance-
independent ethical truths; rather, the truth of these judgments would have to be 
entirely a matter of unlikely coincidence. 
Constructivism, by contrast, is supposed to avoid these problems. By 
grounding ethical truths in features of intentional states, constructivists claim that their 
views only makes use of naturalistic materials, e.g., ones that can be accounted for by 
empirical psychology. These are features that may be appealed to in order to explain 
the apparent connection between ethical facts or properties and motivation. They also 
help constructivists avoid Street’s skeptical situation. Simply stated, there is no gap 
between ethical judgment and truth that the skeptic may exploit.23 But no matter how 
                                                
22 See Street (2006). She also presents shorter versions of this kind of argument in (2008), (2009), and 
(2010). Mackie (1977) also presents his own version of the epistemological argument. Street’s is 
different in that it incorporates evolutionary considerations. It also differs from Mackie’s in that it is 
intended to support constructivism as an alternative to realism (or quasi-realist expressivism) or an 
errory theory. Mackie’s argument is employed to support error theory, but it has also been appealed to 
in a different way to support expressivism. Street thinks that she must accept error if constructivism 
fails. This is because she thinks that her argument cuts equally well against quasi-realist expressivism as 
it does against realism. 
23 This point needs qualification. As I will explain in Chapter 2, it would appear as if we must 
distinguish between different orders of stances if we are to make sense of the constructivist’s apparatus. 
On the one hand, there are the stances that constitute a particular ethical standpoint (what such a 
standpoint is and how we are to understand the nature of the stances that constitute them is 
controversial; again, see Chapter 2 for discussion). On the other, there are beliefs about what follows 
from within these ethical standpoints. These beliefs are what gets expressed when we voice an ethical 
judgment. For example, on this view, we might understand the moral statement “stealing is wrong” – 
when sincerely uttered by a competent English speaker – to express a belief that certain outcomes 
follow from within the complex family of stances that constitute her moral standpoint. Different 
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well one thinks constructivism fares with respect to these naturalistic considerations, 
this will not be enough to secure it as the preferred alternative to realism. Two 
problems present themselves. 
First, these types of naturalistic concern alone do little to distinguish the 
constructivist challenge from others, such as the one mounted against realism by error-
theorists and expressivists. In fact, it would appear as if every major challenge to 
realism incorporates some version of this worry.24 So a commitment to naturalism 
alone would not appear to be enough to force one to accept constructivism as opposed 
to these other anti-realist alternatives. 
Second, the constructivist’s specific approach to accommodating naturalism 
would appear to bring its own costs. Condition (3) implies that there are at least some 
stance-independent ethical standards. Hence, if constructivists reject (3) they are 
committed to the view that there are no stance-independent ethical standards – i.e., 
that all ethical standards are determined by their ratification from within some actual 
or hypothetical perspective. In other words, all ethical standards would be up to us. 
Some might worry that this incurs the cost of making the view into an implausible 
                                                                                                                                       
constructivists present different ways of construing such a standpoint. Some of these will be discussed 
later. Now, one might worry that this kind of view still allows for skeptical worries to arise because it 
leaves a gap between an appraiser’s beliefs (one kind of stance) and facts about the agent’s ethical 
standpoint (a separate class of stances). In other words, how can we be guaranteed that our ethical 
beliefs are reliable guides to what is going on amongst our other ethical stances? This picture is 
complicated further if we consider cases in which the appraiser is not identical to the agent. If – as I will 
later argue – constructivism is best construed as a version of an agent’s group relativism, it turns out 
that our ethical judgments sometimes concern other people’s ethical stances. In these cases, skeptical 
worries will turn out to be even more pronounced. 
24 Here I am putting to one side the question of whether a divine command view in metaethics should be 
counted as a realist view. Insofar as such a view makes morality, value, or practical reason dependent 
on God’s willing or commanding, one might argue that it too falls into the constructivist camp – or 
some other camp of non-realist views. However, on most understandings of the natural (Moore’s 
excluded), the supernatural is not natural. Hence, we would have a challenge to metaethical realism that 
would not appeal to realism’s putative failure to accommodate naturalism.   
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form of relativism. Although some recent defenders of constructivism are willing to 
bite this bullet (in part because they think we can distinguish between objectionable 
and non-objectionable forms of relativism),25 it is not clear that the naturalistic 
advantages outweigh this particular cost.  
In fact, this kind of tradeoff would appear to be at odds with some of the other 
motivations that have been offered on behalf of constructivism. For example, early 
defenders of constructivism argue that their view does a better job of accommodating 
our deeply-help ethical commitments than realism does. These arguments are often 
offered as a second type of motivation for rejecting realism. 
 
1.4 Motivations From Within Ethical Theory 
 
In this case, the objection is that realism purportedly fails to accommodate deep 
features of our ethical thinking. These include the putative connection between moral 
requirements and reasons for action as well as the importance of autonomy. Unlike the 
first type of objection, which appeals to our broader philosophical commitments, this 
one comes from within ethical theory itself.  
Some constructivists maintain a rationalist view of ethics, according to which, 
for example, an action’s rightness necessarily provides some reason to perform it; 
alternatively, an object’s or state-of-affairs’ goodness necessarily provides some 
reason to pursue or promote it.  These kinds of considerations arguably come from 
                                                
25 Street (2009) is perhaps most explicit in her acceptance of this potential cost. 
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within ethical theory, since the relata (i.e., rightness or goodness, on the one hand; 
reasons for action, on the other) are the proper objects of ethical investigation.  
Rationalism per se is not incompatible with ethical realism. In fact, defenders 
of non-naturalist realist views in ethics – like David Enoch, William Fitzpatrick, 
Derek Parfit, and Russ Shafer-Landau – also accept something like this view. These 
philosophers defend a comprehensive metaethical realism (i.e., realism about morality, 
value, and practical reason). In order to secure an anti-realist conclusion, 
constructivists combine an appeal to rationalism with a rejection of realism about 
practical reason. This rejection together with a commitment to rationalism puts 
pressure on one to accept a stance-dependent account of morality and value, as well. 
Again, their rejection of realism about practical reason in turn either rests on an appeal 
to broader philosophical commitments, like naturalism (which the just mentioned 
realists reject),26 or other deeply entrenched moral convictions, like the role of 
autonomy (which arguably a realist should also be concerned to preserve). 
As with the argument from rationalism, the argument from autonomy appeals 
to a feature from within ethical theory. The claim is that autonomy is an essential 
feature of moral, or ethical, agency and that such autonomy requires a kind of control 
that is at odds with a realist account of ethical objectivity. Insofar as constructivism is 
designed to accommodate these features, a defender may claim an advantage for her 
view over realism. 
                                                
26 Again, some argue on naturalistic grounds that reasons must reduce to something like our 
motivational states or some other possible objects of scientific investigation. 
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I devote extended discussion to each of these arguments later in this work.27 
But even before we get into the details, one might worry that such arguments will in 
principle fail to secure their desired conclusions. The problem, in this case, is that no 
matter how well standard presentations of constructivism fare with respect to these 
ethical considerations, it is not clear how they show that constructivism enjoys an 
advantage over realism. In short: by appealing to particular, substantive considerations 
from within ethical theory, constructivists themselves appear committed to condition 
(3). These ethical starting points are not subjected to scrutiny from within some actual 
or hypothetical perspective; their status is independent of construction. Hence, it 
would appear as though these views allow that some ethical truths are stance-
independent (i.e., the starting points), while others are not (i.e., what follows from 
these starting points via construction). If this is correct, it is not clear what the 
difference between constructivism and realism is supposed to be in the first place. 
Consequently, it is not clear what there is to be gained by claiming an advantage for 
constructivism over realism. 
One may draw different lessons from this objection. One would be that 
traditional arguments miss the mark and that constructivists ought to restrict 
themselves to the naturalistically motivated arguments sketched earlier. The other, by 
contrast, would be that there are still other ways of drawing the contrast between 
constructivism and realism that we have not yet explored. In the following section, I 
will introduce a fourth condition for realism that should help to situate some of the 
traditional arguments for constructivism. 
                                                
27 See Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
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1.5 Preserving the Challenge of Substantive Constructivism 
 
It has now become common for both critics and defenders of ethical constructivism to 
distinguish between substantive and formal versions of the view.28 A substantive 
ethical constructivism is one that characterizes the relevant standpoint for ethical truth 
in terms of particular ethical claims or judgments (e.g., in terms of what free and 
equal, or reasonable, persons would agree to, or what would be consistent with valuing 
humanity in ourselves and others).29 A formal ethical constructivism, in contrast, is 
one that attempts to characterize this standpoint without privileging any particular 
ethical claims or judgments.30 If formal ethical constructivism is true, then (3) is false. 
The contrast with realism is straightforward. But the cost, again, is potentially an 
objectionable form of relativism. I will evaluate formal views against this objection in 
Chapter 3. The question I will pursue in the remainder of this section is whether there 
is some condition that distinguishes substantive constructivism from realism. 
In the first twenty-five years after its introduction, constructivism in ethics was 
primarily construed in substantive terms.31 For example, Rawls’s original position 
determines what is just for a society by privileging substantive ethical judgments 
about the value of freedom and equality; Scanlon’s contractualist procedure 
determines what is right and wrong by privileging judgments about what is 
                                                
28 The terms for this distinction originate in the work of Sharon Street (2008), (2010). 
29 On this taxonomy, most of the standard presentations of constructivism count as substantive – e.g., 
those one finds in Rawls (1980), Scanlon (1982), (1998), Korsgaard (1996). 
30 Defenders of formal views include Sharon Street (2008), (2010) and Aaron James (2007). 
31 It is generally accepted that constructivism in ethics first receives expression in John Rawls’s Locke 
Lectures, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980). 
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reasonable; Korsgaard’s first-person standpoint determines what reasons agents have 
by privileging the judgment that we have reason to value our own humanity. These 
views make different classes of ethical truths (those concerning justice, what we owe 
to each other, reasons for action) dependent on some special class of ethical 
judgments. 
Substantive constructivist views are attractive because of the way they are 
designed to accommodate central features of our moral thinking. They tap into what 
are alleged to be some of our deepest-help ethical convictions – e.g., that freedom, 
equality, and autonomy are valuable; that there is a tight connection between morality 
and reasons for action; and that these reasons matter.32 Although a realist might deny 
that these considerations are in fact part of our everyday moral thinking and practice, 
they have appeared plausible and important to many. From the standpoint of 
substantive ethical theory, the substantive versions of constructivism appear to have a 
lot going for them.33 
But, again, it is not clear how these views challenge realism. This is because 
they allow that there are at least some stance-independent ethical truths. They concede 
(1), (2), and (3). According to the current consensus, this means that formal 
                                                
32 Cf. Cuneo (2007). Cuneo proposes that we understand ethical non-naturalism as a theoretical stance 
that gives primacy to the project of internal accommodation (he takes this term from Timmons). Here, I 
am suggesting that substantive versions of constructivism share this feature. In this light, it is interesting 
that the major defenders of substantive constructivism (e.g., Rawls and Korsgaard ) employ rationalism 
intuitionism as a foil for the exposition and defense of their own respective views. Rational 
intuitionism, of course, is one historically prominent example of a non-naturalist moral realism.  
33 However, one may object that substantive views also appear to get things very wrong within in moral 
theory. For example, these views look as if they will be intensionally inadequate. This is clearest when 
the constructivist tries to account for certain types of moral judgments – e.g. the judgment that it is 
wrong to cause gratuitous animal suffering.  I will discuss this kind of objection later in the chapter. 
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constructivism represents the only plausible constructivist challenge to realism. I think 
the current consensus is mistaken. 
The objection that a substantive constructivism cannot challenge realism rests 
on a dubious assumption. It is that only a thoroughgoing constructivism can challenge 
realism – one that involves the rejection of (3) and, with it, all stance-independent 
ethical truth.34 This assumption can be taken to serve as the first premise in an 
argument against substantive constructivism.35 The second premise of this argument 
would be the claim that substantive constructivism is not thoroughgoing; rather, as we 
have seen, it would appear to involve some combination of stance-independent and 
stance-dependent ethical truths. From these two premises one must infer that a 
substantive constructivism cannot challenge realism. But this argument is not sound. 
This is because the first premise of the argument is false. We should not assume that 
the only kind of constructivism that can challenge realism is a thoroughgoing one.  
The tension between formal constructivism and realism is easy to see. Formal 
constructivism states that all ethical truth is stance-dependent. Realism, by contrast, is 
compatible with some stance-independent ethical truths. Hence, the one position 
simply commits one to rejecting a constitutive commitment of the other. But the 
relationship between substantive constructivism and realism is more complicated. This 
is because both views appear to share certain features. This makes the contrast less 
                                                
34 Thoroughgoing Constructivism is a technical term for Street (2008). My usage is loose and not 
intended to capture all of the detail that Street assigns to this term. Nevertheless, I take it that what I 
have to say conforms broadly to her usage. 
35 Clarification: The assumption is not that constructivism is the only view that may challenge realism. 
Presumably the constructivist allows that there are other ways of challenging realism. Rather, the claim 
is just that if constructivism is to have any chance of undermining realism, it must be thoroughgoing. 
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apparent. In order to see how these views might conflict, it is first important to 
acknowledge the features that make them similar. 
First of all, realism is perfectly compatible with the view that there are some 
stance-dependent ethical truths to go along with the stance-independent ones. It does 
not commit one to a thoroughgoing stance-independence.36 For example, a realist will 
accept that what gives a person an obligation to keep a promise is in some way 
dependent on that person’s being the one who made the promise. This is an obligation 
that depends on something about the promisor’s intentions – e.g., what she has 
committed herself to do. She would not have an obligation, had she not made a 
promise.  
Furthermore, the realist of course also thinks that there are some stance-
independent ethical truths and that these truths bear important relations to the stance-
dependent ones. For example, in the case of promise making, the truth of a claim 
about whether an agent has an obligation to keep her promise on a particular occasion 
will be stance-dependent. It will depend on what exactly she has committed herself to. 
But, according to the realist, the truth of the general claim that one ought to keep one’s 
promises is arguably not stance-dependent. It is a claim that holds true, if it does, 
regardless of whether it is entailed from within an agent’s ethical standpoint.  
Substantive constructivism shares both of these features with realism. It allows 
that there are both stance-dependent and stance-independent ethical truths and that 
                                                
36 Insofar as realism allows that some ethical judgments are stance-dependent in this way, the view also 
differs from a formal constructivism. Formal constructivism is thoroughgoing. It states that all ethical 
truth is stance-dependence. Realism, by contrast, is not thoroughgoing; it does not commit one to a 
thoroughgoing stance-independence. Again the assumption underlying the objection to substantive 
constructivism is that one needs at least one thoroughgoing view to generate a conflict. Since both 
realism and substantive constructivism are mixed, there can be no conflict between the two. Both allow 
that there are some stance-dependent ethical truths to go along with the stance-independent ones. 
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standpoints are structured so that the stance-dependent truths are grounded in the 
stance-independent ones. For example, on Korsgaard’s view, whether we have a 
reason to do something depends on whether the judgment that we have such reason 
follows from within the first-person perspective. But the first-person perspective is 
constituted by certain judgments that are stance-independently true – viz., the 
judgment that we have reason to value our own humanity. These similarities might 
appear to support the objection that substantive views cannot stand to challenge 
realism.  
But even if we allow that the two views are similar in this way, there still turns 
out to be an important difference between them. Although a realist may admit of some 
stance-dependent ethical truths, there is a limit. In other words, realism does not 
appear compatible with certain stance-dependent truths, regardless of whether they 
eventually bottom out in stance-independent ones.37  
Let us focus on the case of morality since this is arguably the domain in which 
realist intuitions are most strained by stance-dependent truths. The idea of at least 
some part of morality being the result of what we will or desire or value is one that is 
perfectly compatible with moral realism. This much is unproblematic, as the example 
of promise making illustrates. However, a tension begins to appear when too much of 
morality is made to depend on the stances one holds. I think this may be illustrated if 
                                                
37 One might wonder why should we care about this distinction. Even if substantive constructivism is in 
some sense distinct from realism, it still shares that feature that allegedly makes realism vulnerable to 
criticism: viz., stance-independent ethical truth. But then won’t substantive constructivism be similarly 
vulnerable to criticism? In short: substantive constructivism might turn out to be distinct from realism in 
some sense but it cannot challenge realism on the basis of those considerations that constructivists have 
traditionally brought to bear against realism.  This is an important worry, but I think that the substantive 
constructivist still has grounds to press the challenge. I will explain how this is possible in what follows. 
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we look at the continuum of substantive constructivisms presented by Rawls, Scanlon, 
and Korsgaard. 
Rawls, Scanlon, and Korsgaard each present different substantive versions of 
constructivism that occupy varying degrees of the ethical spectrum. Rawls restricts his 
constructivism to the topic of political and social justice. Scanlon expands 
constructivism to account for that part of our moral thinking that concerns what we 
owe to each other – i.e., claims about what is right, wrong, or permissible. Although 
Scanlon’s view also includes a constructivist account of political morality, it allows 
space for realism about what our reasons are. Korsgaard presents a constructivism 
about reasons for action. But in virtue of other commitments she makes, her view 
turns out to take the widest scope, one that expands to include the moral and political, 
as well.  
Korsgaard takes claims about reasons to ground claims about morality (and 
presumably also political morality). Hence, we may understand her view as assigning 
a very wide scope to constructivism. However, as I have already argued, it would not 
appear as if Korsgaard succeeds in capturing all of the ethical. For, she must allow that 
construction bottoms out somewhere. On her view, it is the claim that we have reason 
to perform an action if it conforms to principles that would be accepted by a rational 
agent deliberating from the first-person perspective in ways that are consistent with 
the demands of agency itself.38 Contra Korsgaard, this is a claim whose truth would 
                                                
38 Korsgaard presents a transcendental argument that is supposed to ground this fundamental normative 
claim without appealing to stance-independent normative reality. However, commentators are divided 
on this point. Some, like Hussain and Shah (2006), have argued that this kind of bootstrapping does not 
preclude the truth of traditional metaethical views like realism or expressivism. Street (2010), by 
contrast, appears to read Korsgaard as arguing for a formal version of constructivism (i.e., one that is 
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not appear to result from construction. But even if we allow that this one stance-
independent truth grounds all other claims about reasons, value, and morality, this 
should not satisfy a defender of realism – or, specifically, what we might call robust 
moral realism.  
Let us take robust moral realism to be the class of views constituted by the 
satisfaction of (1)-(3) with the addition of one further condition: 
 
(4) The moral standards that fix our moral principles are not made true by virtue 
of their ratification from within any actual or hypothetical perspective. 
 
A moral principle is any general moral statement by which one might judge the moral 
status of particular actions or states-of-affairs. According to this last condition, the 
truth of a moral principle is never stance-independent. As I will soon explain, this 
condition would appear to rule out the substantive constructivisms proposed by 
Korsgaard and Scanlon, while still allowing some particular moral truths to count as 
stance-dependent (e.g., it allows that one may create obligations to perform particular 
actions through acts of promise making).39 Hence, it should provide a way of framing 
the debate between constructivists and a particular kind of realist – viz., a robust moral 
realist. 
 Substantive constructivisms fail to satisfy condition (4).  Although these views 
bottom out in stance-independent ethical truths, they allow the content of less basic 
                                                                                                                                       
thoroughly metaethical and a competitor to realism). Fitzpatrick (2005) appears to accept a similar 
interpretation but goes on to argue at length that Korsgaard’s view fails on its own terms. 
39 Whether this condition is compatible with Rawls’s justice as fairness is considerably more 
complicated and would require more interpretative work than I am in a position to engage in here. 
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moral principles to be determined by ratification from within some actual or 
hypothetical perspective.  These “intermediate” stance-dependent moral principles, in 
turn, provide the criteria by which one might judge the moral status of a particular 
action or state-of-affairs. For example, on Scanlon’s view, the moral principle 
torturing babies for fun is wrong is true (if true at all) because it would form part of a 
set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that could not be reasonably 
rejected by persons complying with the contractualist procedure. Scanlon allows that 
there are stance-independent truths about what is reasonable. But they do not 
determine the specific content of less basic moral principles like this one. If they did, 
the contractualist procedure would prove otiose.  The same can be said of Korsgaard’s 
view. On her view, what makes it the case that this moral principle is true (if true at 
all) is just that it would be accepted by a rational agent deliberating from the first-
person perspective in ways that are consistent with the demands of agency itself. 
Korsgaard allows that there is a single stance-independent truth about what our 
reasons are – viz., that we have reason to value our own humanity. But this truth does 
not determine the specific content of less basic moral principles like this one 
prohibiting baby torture. If it did, talk of first-person deliberation from within 
standpoint of humanity would prove otiose. So these paradigmatic versions of 
substantive constructivism appear incompatible with (4). 
 However, this condition does allow for some stance-dependent moral truths. 
Again, it was noted that realism is generally taken to allow that, e.g., an agent creates 
special responsibilities, or obligations, in virtue of her specific commitments. Any 
condition that ruled out this possibility from the start would be too strong; it would not 
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pick out a feature of realism per se. But (4) does not. Consider, again, the case of 
promise making. This last condition allows the content of a particular moral statement 
to be stance-dependent, but it does not allow the content of a general ethical statement 
to be such. For example, my promising to return you your lawnmower next Thursday 
(i.e., an intentional act) might make it true that it is wrong for me not to return your 
lawnmower to you by next Thursday. But this statement is not a moral principle; it 
does not provide any general criteria by which we can judge the moral status of any 
particular action or states-of-affairs other than the one described. Of course, it 
provides a particular criterion. But a particular criterion arguably does not make a 
principle. So it is not ruled out by condition (4).  
Hence, we would appear to have found a condition that allows us to 
characterize the debate between substantive constructivists and realists while still 
capturing the ways in which realism is compatible with some moral truths being 
stance-dependent. But even if this condition does the trick, one might wonder what 
motivates it. On the one hand, why does realism presuppose the existence of 
principles? Doesn’t this condition beg the question against particularist versions of 
realism? On the other, why think that a robust realism about morality requires (4)? 
What is this notion of robustness supposed to capture? Why should we care? I will 
quickly say something in response to the first set of questions before turning to the 
second set of questions in the next section. 
One obvious disadvantage of formulating realism in terms of condition (4) is 
that it rules out moral particularism from the start – i.e., views which allow that there 
are moral truths yet no true moral principles. Condition (4), however, would appear to 
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presuppose that there are true moral principles, in which case I am begging the 
question against those who would defend a particularist realism. Although I find this 
regrettable (since I do not wish to take sides in this debate), it would not appear as if 
there is a principled way of making the distinction between realism and substantive 
constructivism without appealing to moral principles (no pun intended). The 
alternative would be to accept that both classes of views allow for some combination 
of stance-independent and stance-dependent truths but that substantive constructivism 
allows for more stance-dependent truths than realism. This way of drawing the 
distinction may still be intuitive – in fact, I will soon argue that our intuitions about 
particular cases provide some independent support for (4) – but its lack of precision is 
unsatisfying. What’s more, it would not indicate how the dispute might be resolved. 
How many more stance-dependent truths does one have to accept to count as a 
defender of a substantive constructivism, and not realism? One advantage of the 
current framework is that it sets a clear line between the two classes of views. Robust 
realists accept (4); substantive constructivists reject it.  
The next set of questions concern whether there is some independent 
motivation for (4)? If the only reason for thinking that realists are committed to this 
condition is that it allows them to distinguish their views from substantive 
constructivism, (4) would be ad hoc. In the next section, I will try to provide some 
independent reasons for its acceptance. 
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1.6 Offending Realist Intuitions 
 
Realism is defined by certain theoretical commitments.40 But these commitments do 
not just support themselves. Rather the realist accepts them in part because of the way 
they appear to support particular ethical judgments in reflective equilibrium.41  If this 
is the right way to understand theory building in ethics, we might stand to learn 
something about the realist’s commitments by looking at particular cases.42 
Specifically, we might learn something about the differences between realism and 
substantive constructivism by looking at the kinds of particular ethical judgments that 
each view supports. Even if both views allow for some combination of stance-
dependent and stance-independent truths, we still might take them to give different 
verdicts on just which particular truths we are to count as stance-dependent. 
There is a deep and persistent disagreement amongst philosophical ethicists 
about which ethical truths are plausibly considered stance-dependent. For example, let 
us suppose that the following judgment is true: it is wrong to cause gratuitous animal 
suffering.43 I think it is fair to say that this would count as a considered judgment for 
many, including both realists and constructivists. But people disagree about whether 
the truth of this judgment is stance-dependent or stance-independent.  
                                                
40 As we have already seen, there is a disagreement about just which commitments realism involves – 
i.e., whether it involves just (1) and (2), or these and also (3) and (4). 
41 I say in part since someone might be inclined to accept certain parts of realism based on her other 
philosophical or theoretical commitments. 
42 It is fair to assume that my opponents do think this is right. As I will explain in Chapter 3, every 
defender of constructivism assigns reflective equilibrium some role in their theory building. 
43 Korsgaard (1996) spends a good deal of her final lecture trying to explain how the constructivist can 
account for norms concerning the treatment of animals. I think this is telling. For it would appear to 
indicate that she is exercised by this kind of objection. 
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One could argue that Korsgaard’s view, for example, supports the truth of this 
judgment. But, in this case, the truth of this judgment turns out to be stance-
dependent.44 Again, according to Korsgaard’s view, the truth of this claim and all 
others, save the one about the reason to value of humanity, are generated by our 
judgments – what follows from within our first-person ethical standpoint. Facts about 
the animal’s pain play no direct role in determining ethical truth. At best, the 
judgments that constitute an agent’s ethical standpoint might take facts like these as 
their objects. But in this case, again, what makes it the case that such actions are 
wrong is at bottom something about us, not something about the animal or the kinds of 
experience our actions cause it. 
But to some this just does not appear to get things right. These people would 
argue that what seems to matter most in this case is something about the animal – viz., 
the fact that the animal experiences pain, something that is bad independently of 
whatever we value, or believe, or desire, etc.45 Facts about what we value, or believe, 
or desire may end up weighing against this concern. But, ultimately, it would appear 
                                                
44 Korsgaard makes this argument in Lecture IV of (1996), esp., 149ff. The argument goes something 
like this. If this action is wrong then there is some reason for an agent not to perform it. This follows 
from moral rationalism. If there is some reason for an agent not to perform it, this is because the 
judgment that one has reason not to is entailed from within the first-person perspective of anyone who 
values their own humanity. This follows from Korsgaard’s substantive constructivist view of reasons. 
One might question here why a humanity-valuing agent is committed to this judgment. For Korsgaard 
the answer is supposed to be something to the effect that we share reasons with animals in virtue of our 
shared animal nature. Any self-respecting human being will respect such reasons for herself and since 
such reasons are public, she will respect these reasons in the case of animals. 
45 This point enjoys support from defenders of views from across the metaethical spectrum, including, 
e.g., expressivists like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard as well as metaethical quietists like Ronald 
Dworkin.  
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as if the wrongness of such actions is to be explained by facts that are independent of 
facts about deliberation.46  
People will disagree about this case and others like it. But the point here is not 
that this shows Korsgaard’s view to be wrong; rather, it is that this kind of 
disagreement highlights a fault line that exists between constructivists and realists. 
Realism may be compatible with the stance-dependence of some ethical truths, but 
examples like this one illustrate that there is a limit, one that would appear to find 
expression in condition (4).  
This last condition presents a way of explaining and classifying realist 
intuitions about this case and others like it. It states that there are no moral principles 
whose truth depends on stance-dependent standards. It follows from this that the moral 
principle expressed by the statement it is wrong to cause gratuitous animal suffering 
(if true at all) is not made true by stance-dependent standards.  In other words, in order 
to accept (4) one must reject the substantive constructivist accounts advanced by 
Korsgaard and Scanlon, respectively. Substantive constructivists like Korgaard and 
Scanlon are happy to make all moral truths – including true moral principles – stance-
dependent. But many moral realists would not be.47 My proposal is that this is because 
these realists accept something like (4). This condition both captures realist intuitions 
                                                
46 In other words, there is still a problem with the intensional adequacy of this kind of substantive 
constructivism. What’s more, one might also ask whether such a view ends up capturing the right 
extension. For example, Korsgaard’s single stance-independent normative truth (that we have reason to 
value our own humanity and everything that is entailed by this) appears too thin to guarantee the right 
results.  
47 Perhaps there are committed realists who will be unmoved by these considerations. If so, this is fine. I 
restrict my claims to those who wish to distinguish themselves from substantive constructivists. These 
are people who wish to defend what I am calling robust moral realism. 
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about particular cases and provides a clear target for substantive constructivists, 
making the substantive constructivist’s challenge to realism intelligible.48  
 
1.7 The General Argumentative Strategy 
 
As we have seen, constructivists are motivated by two broad classes of considerations 
– some of these relate to a general commitment to philosophical naturalism, others 
from commitments within the narrower confines of ethical theory. Defenders of 
constructivism appeal to these features in different ways. However, as my remarks 
here illustrate, the arguments they advance conform to a general strategy: first, there is 
an appeal to a feature from one of the two categories; second, ethical realism is 
presented as failing to adequately account for this particular feature; finally, 
constructivism is presented as possessing superior resources for explaining it.  In 
short, the constructivist claims a series of explanatory advantages over realism. 
Although one might reject one or another of the constructivist’s arguments, the 
constructivist contends that her view wins out on holistic grounds.49 Even if realism 
can accommodate some of these considerations to some extent, the constructivist 
argues that her view does a better job on the whole.  
My dissertation starts out from the point of view of a realist who accepts (1)-
(4) and is confronted with the constructivist’s challenge. On the one hand, the 
constructivist claims to capture everything the realist truly cares about. As a version of 
                                                
48 If this is right, the next question to ask is what arguments support the rejection of (4)? What kinds of 
considerations would favor substantive constructivism over realism? These are questions I defer until 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
49 See, e.g., Street (2009), 275, 294. 
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cognitivism, constructivism avoids objections that have traditionally been leveled 
against views, like expressivism, that deny that ethical claims are the kinds of things 
that can be literally true or false. As a view that affirms our knowledge of some ethical 
facts, it avoids the deeply unattractive consequences of an error theory.  
On the other hand, constructivism is supposed to get us things that a realist 
might agree are important but which are difficult to accommodate within a realist 
theory: It is claimed to provide an account of moral objectivity that is compatible with 
the best naturalistic theories of reference, epistemology, and ontology. It is supposed 
to explain the tight connection between morality, or value, and reasons for action. It is 
also alleged to be the only view that is compatible with our moral autonomy. 
On balance, the constructivist claims that her view bears a comparative 
advantage over realism. Hence, we have the constructivist’s challenge to realism: if 
constructivism accommodates everything good about realism and more while avoiding 
standard objections, what more could the realist’s extensive commitment to stance-
independent ethical facts have to add to the picture, except additional problems? It is 
its proximity to realism that makes constructivism a serious challenger.  
I count myself as someone who is sympathetic to commitments (1)-(4) but also 
to the kinds of considerations that constructivists marshal in their challenge to realism. 
In order to stand firm in these commitments, it is important to see how a realist might 
respond. It is with this motivation that I embark on a defense of ethical realism.  
As constructivist arguments make claims against realism and on behalf of 
constructivism, my defense of realism also involves both positive and negative 
arguments. On the one hand, I argue that realism is able to accommodate some of the 
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appealed to considerations better than constructivists claim it can; on the other, that 
constructivism does worse than advertised. In the end, my approach is also holistic. 
But my conclusion is that constructivists provide no good reason for thinking their 
views bear an advantage on balance over ethical realism.  
One may dispute whether the commitments enumerated by the constructivist 
match our actual thinking and practice. This would be one way of meeting the 
constructivist’s challenge. However, this approach represents the road not taken here. 
Instead, I proceed by first granting the constructivist these starting points and then 
arguing that the constructivist’s conclusions do not follow from them. 
The discussion of realism and constructivism in this introduction provides a 
framework for the chapters to come.  Conditions (3) and (4) have to do with the nature 
and extent of ethical objectivity. In Chapter 3, I will evaluate the position maintained 
by those formal constructivists who reject (3). In Chapters 4 and 5, I turn to some of 
the traditional arguments that have been advanced by substantive constructivists who 
reject (4). These three chapters contain my evaluation of the constructivist’s challenge.  
However, before we begin with this, it is important that we address a few remaining 
interpretative issues. In Chapter 2, I will examine the question whether either version 
of constructivism – formal or constructivism – should be considered a free-standing 
metaethical alternative to already familiar positions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IS CONSTRUCTIVISM A FREE-STANDING METAETHICAL VIEW? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
For all that I have said thus far, one might still wonder what is supposed to make the 
constructivist’s challenge a special one. There are a couple of worries here. First, 
regardless of which view (realism or constructivism) provides the better account of 
these various considerations (naturalistic and ethical), mightn’t there be other views 
out there that do just as well as (or better than) either (or both) constructivism or (and) 
realism? This is surely an important question. But its scope is beyond what I could 
hope to achieve in this work. As I already started to explain in the last chapter and will 
further specify in the current one, constructivism poses an interesting and important 
challenge to realism that deserves its own attention. If I can show that realism can 
stand up to this challenge, this will contribute something important to our 
understanding of metaethical debates, the comparative success or failure of other 
views notwithstanding.  
Second, one might worry that ‘constructivism’ is merely a new label for 
another well-established view, one whose virtues and defects have already received 
much attention. Specifically, much of what I have said thus far about constructivism 
(both formal and substantive) appears as if it applies to a family of views that are 
sometimes referred to as response-dependence theories. More recently, both 
constructivists and non-constructivists alike have questioned constructivism’s 
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cognitivist credentials and pressed for details as to how such a view might contrast 
with expressivism. Furthermore, one might worry that constructivists only succeed at 
distinguishing their views from expressivism (or response-dependence theories) to the 
extent that they construe them as a form of simple subjectivism such a desire-
satisfaction theory, i.e. a naturalistically reductive view that make ethical facts a 
function of an agent’s desires. How is ethical constructivism different from such 
views? Is constructivism a distinct, or free-standing, alternative to response-
dependence theories, expressivism, or simple subjectivism? Or does it perhaps 
represent a species of one of them? Alternatively, might we take constructivism to be 
the family or genus under which these other views fall?   
If constructivism merely turned out to be a version of one of these other views, 
this would arguably detract from its importance.  Part of what is supposed to make the 
constructivist challenge to realism an interesting one is that it has not received the 
attention it deserves. This would arguably not be true if it turned out to be a version of 
a response-dependence theory, or expressivism, or simple subjectivism. Although the 
commitments of these other views are still controversial, they have each commanded a 
lot of discussion already. In light of this, the strengths and vulnerabilities of each type 
of view are fairly well established. What’s more, it is difficult to see how 
constructivism might serve as an improvement on any of these views – since the 
objections to each, respectively, are general enough that they would appear to extend 
to any of their species, constructivist or otherwise. For this reason, it is important to 
ask whether there is a sense in which constructivism might count as a free-standing 
metaethical alternative to these views.  
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In this chapter, I set out to address this question and show just how difficult it 
is to fashion a metaethical version of constructivism that remains distinct from 
familiar positions. In sections 2 and 3, I review standard proceduralist 
characterizations of constructivism and argue that they are best understood as just 
another version of a response-dependence theory. In sections 4 and 5, I present recent 
attempts to characterize moral truth as the outcome of non-procedural standpoints and 
show that these fold into realism, expressivism, or a desire-satisfaction view – none of 
which would mark a new position. Furthermore, I argue, there is no reason to think 
that constructivism improves on these other views in ways that make for a more 
formidable challenge to realism. In short: constructivism does not turn out to represent 
a free-standing metaethical alternative to realism. This conclusion prompts me to 
consider other ways in which constructivism might challenge ethical realism. I 
consider these alternatives in section 6. 
 
2.2 The Proceduralist Characterization 
 
Constructivism has typically been understood as the view that ethical truth is 
determined by the outcomes of certain “suitably described” procedures. A view that 
characterizes constructivism in terms of procedures easily lends itself to formulation in 
terms of a response-dependence theory. As such, constructivism would appear to 
represent a species of such views and, consequently, be subject to the same 
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objections.50 The proceduralist characterization is in large part due to the influence of 
John Rawls.51 In the course of developing a foundation for debates about political 
justice that could be divorced from what he considered deep and irreconcilable 
metaphysical disagreements, Rawls (1980) introduced a conception of constructivism 
in moral theory.52  
  
[Moral] constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in 
terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart 
from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral 
facts. Whether certain facts are to be recognized as reasons of right and justice, 
or how much they are to count, can be ascertained only from within the 
constructivist procedure, that is, from the undertakings of rational agents of 
construction when suitably represented as free and equal moral persons.53 
 
On this view, ethical truth is determined by procedures in the sense that the ethical 
standards that fix the relevant class of ethical facts are constituted by their emergence 
                                                
50  Both David Enoch (2009) and Michael Ridge (forthcoming) argue, for this reason, that 
constructivism cannot be a free-standing position. Both James (2007) and Street (2010) recognize the 
problems with the procedural characterization and work to establish a formulation of constructivism 
that avoids this. I discuss Street’s alternative characterization shortly. 
51 I take this label and that of its alternative – the standpoint characterization – from Street (2010), 364. 
52 Rawls’s first presentation of constructivism in (1980) is arguably to be understood as a 
comprehensive ethical outlook – one that describes the nature of ultimate ethical reality (including the 
political). As such, it does not represent Rawls’s considered view of political justice. In contrast, 
Rawls’s later work is characterized by his defense of a position he called political constructivism (see, 
e.g., Rawls (1996)). This view, in contrast with his earlier constructivism, is explicitly intended to be 
neutral with respect to one’s deeper religious and metaethical commitments (i.e., what Rawls calls 
comprehensive doctrines). According to Rawls, it is this neutrality that is central to any view that is to 
have a chance of providing a foundation for stability in a political society of reasonable citizens who yet 
fundamentally disagree on issues of religion and metaphysics. For a discussion of Rawls’s development 
see Samuel Freeman’s “Introduction” to Rawls (1999). 
53 Rawls (1980), 519. 
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from special procedures. It is these facts that make our ethical assertions true or false. 
It is not the case that these standards merely coincide with such outcomes or that the 
procedures may be used to discover what the relevant standards are. For example, 
Rawls famously argues that facts about justice are fixed by principles that would be 
agreed to in the original position, a procedure in which free and equal citizens agree to 
terms of social cooperation under the condition that they do not know facts about who 
they are or what they deeply care about.54 Apart from such a procedure, Rawls claims 
that there are no facts about justice.  
The proceduralist characterization of constructivism has been accepted both by 
advocates, like Milo (1995) and Korsgaard (1996), and by critics, like Darwall, 
Gibbard, Railton (1992), Enoch (2009), and Ridge (forthcoming).55 Again, this has led 
many to doubt whether constructivism represents a free-standing metaethical position. 
In particular, it is natural to think that constructivism’s reliance on procedures makes it 
a version of a response dependence view in metaethics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
54 This condition on choice is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. See Rawls (1971). 
55 See, e.g., Milo (1995), 186. Korsgaard (1996) even refers to constructivism as procedural moral 
realism: 
 
Procedural moral realism is the view that there are answers to moral questions; that is, that 
there are right and wrong ways to answer them. Substantive moral realism is the view that 
there are answers to moral questions because there are moral facts or truths, which those 
questions ask about. (p. 35) 
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2.3 Constructivism as a Response Dependence View  
 
Response-dependent views have been described in different ways, and many debates 
about them are still open.56 Some have defended a response-dependence view of 
ethical properties. We might take such views to provide the following schematic 
account of the essence of ethical properties: 
 
 x is C iff (and because) x is such as to produce R in Ss under conditions K 
 
where C stands in for some ethical property (e.g., the property of goodness, 
wrongness, being a reason), S the subject, K the relevant conditions, and R the 
response.57 In order for this equation to pick out a response-dependent property, there 
are other conditions that must also obtain.58 But, sidestepping the controversies 
involved in specifying such conditions, it is already apparent why one might take 
constructivism to represent a species of such views. The proceduralist characterization 
lends itself to formulation in terms of subjects, responses, and conditions. For 
example, Rawls’s statement of a constructivist view of justice might be made to fit the 
response-dependence schema in the following way. 
                                                
56 See, e.g., Mark Johnston (1989), (1993), David Lewis (1989), Michael Smith (1989), Crispin Wright 
(1988), and Philip Pettit (1991).  
57 This formulation of response-dependence is loosely based on the view presented in Johnston (1989). 
There are a couple of differences. Perhaps the main one is that Johnston’s view is a theory of concepts 
not properties. It is unclear what such a view of concepts commits one to metaphysically. As I am 
ultimately interested in constructivism, a view about the metaphysics of ethical facts and properties, I 
have gone ahead and re-formulated Johnston’s schema to provide a response-dependent account of 
ethical properties. 
58 For example, the bi-conditional cannot obtain trivially in virtue of S, K, and R specifying a “whatever 
it takes” condition.  
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A policy/institution, x, is just iff (and because) x conforms to principles that 
would be agreed to by free and equal citizens under the conditions represented 
in the original position.   
 
Here, C is the property of being just. R is the disposition to produce agreement, a 
volitional response. S is a free and equal citizen of a society. K is the conditions 
described in the original position. There may be renderings of Kantian constructivism 
about justice that better capture Rawls’s view.59 My point is just to illustrate how a 
view that focuses on procedures lends itself to an interpretation in response-
dependence terms. In fact, Rawls’s statement of constructivism is not unique. The 
constructivist proposals of T.M. Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard are also amenable to 
a response-dependence formulation. For example, Scanlon’s moral constructivism 
(“what we owe each other”), might be captured thusly: 
 
Φ-ing is wrong iff (and because) Φ-ing is disallowed by any set of principles 
for the general regulation of behavior that could not be reasonably rejected by 
persons complying with the contractualist procedure.  
 
Here, C is the property of wrongness. R is being unable to be reject a set of principles 
for the regulation of behavior, again (arguably) a volitional response. S is a person 
                                                
59 One may argue, e.g., that Rawls intends the conditions of freedom and equality to be “modeled” by 
the original position, in which case they should be taken to specify K – not S; or that S should include a 
description of the citizen’s motivations – i.e., that they are motivated to find terms of agreement that 
other, similarly motivated citizens, can reasonably be expected to uphold in good faith. 
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motivated to comply with outcomes of the contractualist procedure. K includes the 
conditions that make up such a procedure – i.e., that the agreement reached be 
informed and unforced and that others similarly motivated could also not reasonably 
reject it.60 Similarly, Christine Korsgaard’s constructivism about practical reason 
might take the following response-dependent formulation: 
 
A feature of an action, or a situation, x, counts as a reason for acting iff (and 
because) x conforms to a principle that would be accepted by a rational agent 
deliberating from the first-person perspective in ways that are consistent with 
the demands of agency itself. 
 
In this case, C is being a reason to act. R is the disposition to accept a principle. S is a 
rational agent. K is the conditions required to maintain agency within the first-person 
perspective. 
But if ethical constructivism is best understood as a response-dependence 
view, as these examples suggest, it would not represent a free-standing metaethical 
view. What’s more, it would appear to be subject to the same objections that have 
been leveled against these views. Different philosophers have recognized a dilemma 
for response-dependence theories.61 It is this.  We may understand a response-
dependence account as providing either a non-reductive or a reductive account of 
                                                
60 Scanlon (1998), 153-4. 
61 See, e.g., Blackburn (1993b), (1998), Cuneo (2001), Wright (1988), and Zangwill (2003). As I 
mentioned earlier, Darwall, Gibbard, Railton (1992) understand constructivism to be a kind of 
hypothetical proceduralism. Consequently, they argue that the view is subject to this kind of dilemma 
(see esp., p. 143). For a collection of articles on response-dependence views, see Casati and Tappolet 
(1998). 
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some class of ethical properties. If it is non-reductive (i.e., it includes some ethical 
terms on the right-hand side of the equation), the account will leave traditional 
metaethical questions unresolved. Specifically, it will not tell us how we are to 
understand the ethical terms employed in the account, leaving open the possibility that 
they may take a realist, or expressivist, or error-theoretic, etc., interpretation. If it is 
reductive (i.e., it includes no ethical terms of the right-hand side), the account runs the 
risk of being extensionally inadequate. In other words, the outcomes of the reductively 
specified procedure will not match our considered ethical convictions. In the case of 
constructivism, this might be expressed as the worry that the subjects of the relevant 
procedures, actual or hypothetical, could get things wrong.62 In fact, this particular 
worry may also apply to non-reductive accounts as well, especially if one is careful to 
avoid “whatever it takes conditions” in specifying the procedure.63  
 A defender of the proceduralist characterization might argue that 
constructivism provides some new way of navigating around this dilemma. But it 
difficult to see how it could. The features of a response-dependence view that make it 
vulnerable to the dilemma are general and appear, as such, to apply equally to a 
proceduralist interpretation of constructivism. A more promising response, perhaps, 
                                                
62 What’s more, reductive accounts are also subject to the worry that they are intensionally inadequate. 
In other words, they do not accurately express what ethical thought and practice is intuitively about. 
However, this kind of objection generalizes to just about any substantive account of the nature of ethical 
properties and facts. It is for this reason that I will focus on the extensional worry. Here the worry is not 
just that the account commits one to outcomes that might diverge from common sense (again, such a 
worry might apply to any reductive account); rather, it is that the way in which response-dependence 
theories route correct outcomes through a subject’s intentions opens these views up to error in a special 
way.  
63 For example, if right actions are those that conform to standards decided on by paradigmatically good 
agents (e.g. Pericles, Jesus, Gandhi, King, etc.), we might still ask whether such agents could get things 
wrong.  And, in fact, to the extent that these figures are mere men, it would appear as though some error 
is inevitable.  
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would be for the constructivist to accept one of the horns but argue that the associated 
objection is not as bad as one might think. But this type of response is also available to 
defenders of response-dependence views more generally. It still would not provide us 
with any reason for thinking that constructivism was a free-standing metaethical view; 
rather, it would appear as if constructivism and response-dependence theories (in 
general) stand or fall together. If constructivism is to represent a free-standing view it 
cannot be construed in terms of procedures. This has led more recent defenders of the 
view to reject the proceduralist characterization and emphasize the ways in which 
constructivism differs from response-dependence theories.  
 
2.4 The Standpoint Characterization 
 
Sharon Street (2010) takes constructivism to represent a distinct and superior 
alternative to response-dependence views in metaethics. On her most recent account, 
she describes metaethical constructivism as the view that  
 
…the truth of a normative claim consists in that claim’s being entailed from 
within the practical point of view, where the practical point of view is given a 
formal characterization.64  
 
                                                
64 Street (2010), 369.  NB Street appears to use the term ‘normative’ in different ways. Sometimes she 
uses it to refer to a general category that captures morality, values, and reasons (what I am calling the 
ethical). Other times she appears to use it in a restricted sense to refer to reasons for action alone. 
 44 
Street’s account explicitly avoids any kind of procedural specification. Again, if 
constructivism specifies a procedure, this leaves the view open to the dilemma just 
sketched. From this one might infer that the solution is to avoid specification.65  So, 
the constructivist retreats from talk of procedural outcomes to what is alleged to be the 
less problematic, talk of points of view, or standpoints.66 According to this kind of 
view, when we are evaluating the truth of an ethical judgment, we are not concerned 
with any particular subject’s responses (hypothetical or actual); rather, we are 
concerned with what follows from within a particular framework for engaging the 
world. This framework is not an agent. Consequently, the worry that a subject’s 
responses might get things wrong is not supposed to not apply. 
But what is a standpoint? Although many philosophers appeal to standpoints 
(especially, those working in the Kantian tradition), there is very little detailed 
discussion of what they are. For example, Street describes the practical point of view 
as 
 
…the point of view occupied by any creature who takes at least some things in 
the world to be good or bad, better or worse, required or optional, worthy or 
                                                
65 James (2007) makes the same adjustment in light of this objection. The main difference between the 
formal view he proposes and the one described by Street concerns whether one can expect a 
convergence between various agent’s standpoints.  This difference is discussed in more detail below. 
66 Street illustrates the difference by appeal to an example about baseball and how response-dependence 
and constructivist views would differ in their response to the question What is it for Jeter to be safe? 
Whereas the former would state the conditions for Jeter’s being safe in terms of the responses of an 
umpire (e.g., a good umpire would judge him to be safe), the latter states the conditions in terms of what 
would be entailed by the rules of baseball in combination with the non-normative facts. Street argues 
that this formally-construed constructivist alternative is immune to the standard objections that befall 
response-dependence accounts. On the one hand, it yields the right results; it is extensionally adequate. 
Unlike the response-dependence view it leaves no room for errors of judgment. On the other, it would 
appear to capture the sense of what it is for Jeter to be safe; it is also, on Street’s view, intensionally 
adequate.  
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worthless, and so on – the standpoint of a being who judges, whether at a 
reflective or unreflective level that some things call for, demand, or provide 
reasons for others.67 
 
This description presupposes that we already start out with some sense of what such a 
standpoint is. It is not informative. Other descriptions of standpoints appeal to 
metaphor or invoke a distinction between the practical and the theoretical, each of 
which is supposed to represent a distinct and familiar way of experiencing the world.68 
The idea appears to be that we all occupy these standpoints and have some intuitive 
sense of what they are.69 But surely there is more to say. In what follows, I sketch out 
in my own way what I take a standpoint to be and how the constructivist might 
employ it to account for ethical truth. This account is based on the ones given by 
Street, James, and Korsgaard. However, as each of these constructivists describe 
things in different ways, emphasizing certain aspects and neglecting others, I find it 
necessary to present the view in my own terms, smoothing out the contours and filling 
in the gaps that characterize these other accounts. 
                                                
67 Street (2010), 366. This description is consistent with the way that she has described things in earlier 
work. For example, compare this with her description of a practical standpoint in (2008):  
 
A practical standpoint is the standpoint of one who makes normative judgments. One occupies 
the practical standpoint whenever one judges that some things provide practical reasons, or are 
valuable, good, bad, required, worthwhile, and so on. (p. 209n) 
 
68 For this approach see, e.g. Wallace (2008). 
69 The operative principle here is something like “you’ll know it when you see it.” One reason that these 
accounts may be lacking in detail is that a standpoint is presumably a primitive structuring of 
experience and, as such, hard to get “outside of” and describe. The point of the metaphors is to help us 
attend to the features that make up a particular perspective “from the inside”. But, even if a standpoint 
is a primitive structure that informs our most basic experience of the world, there must be more that we 
can say about it. If it is indeed structured, we should at least be able to say something about what this 
structure is like.  
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Let us assume that a standpoint is constituted by a complex system of 
intentional psychological states (i.e., stances), such as beliefs, desires, commitments, 
reactive attitudes, etc. In other words, it is a set of individual stances that hang 
together in a certain way. This much would appear safe if we are correct in 
understanding the distinction between realism and constructivism in terms of stance-
dependence. But if we are to avoid the response-dependence dilemma, it is important 
that these stances not be described as issuing from any particular type of subject under 
specific conditions. Again, the worry about extensional inadequacy would appear 
related to the idea that our subject could get things wrong. Alternatively, one might 
focus on the kinds of activities associated with various practical standpoints. Here the 
idea is that we first look to those familiar activities of, e.g., valuing, taking something 
to be wrong, taking something to be a reason for acting, in order to identify the 
relevant practical standpoint and then ask what it is to engage in them as such.  
Korsgaard (2003), James (2007), and Street (2010) describe the constructivist 
project as one of working out the constitutive commitments of various practical 
standpoints. This involves the task of specifying the various ways in which particular 
types of stances must hang together so that one may count as genuinely engaging in a 
particular practical activity. For example, stances can presumably either support or 
conflict with one another. Conflicting stances are ones that are in some sense 
inconsistent with each other.70 Although Katie may consistently take herself to have 
both some reason to attend the concert and some reason not to, one might think that 
                                                
70 The sense depends on how one is to understand the nature of the stance’s content. As I will soon 
explain, some have argued that once the nature of this content is specified constructivism reveals itself 
to be merely a species of already well-known metaethical views – either realism or expressivism. 
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she may not consistently take herself to have both an all-things-considered reason to 
attend and an all-things-considered reason not to.71 Someone who simultaneously 
maintains these stances arguably fails to meet the basic requirements for taking 
something to be an all-things-considered reason for acting. This kind of conflict 
illustrates perhaps the most straightforward sense in which practical stances may count 
as inconsistent. But there are other ways, too. Consider someone who takes herself to 
have an all-things-considered reason to save her own life, believes that in order to do 
so it is necessary that she see a doctor immediately, but takes herself to have no reason 
whatsoever to see a doctor. These stances are also in some sense inconsistent with one 
another. Like in the earlier example, someone who simultaneously maintains these 
stances arguably fails to meet the basic requirements for taking something to be an all-
things-considered reason for acting. A standpoint constructivist might claim that this 
is because the activity as such is in part constituted by a norm of instrumental 
consistency, one that requires that one take oneself to have at least some reason to take 
the necessary means to one’s ends. As both Street and Korsgaard are wont to point 
out, someone who fails in these ways is not making a mistake about what her reasons 
are; rather, she does not genuinely count as taking herself to have an all-things-
considered reason at all.72 But consistency is not the only kind of relation that one 
might take to matter. 
                                                
71 Some may wish to contest this since it would appear to preclude the possibility of genuine dilemmas 
in practical reason. But this need not matter here. I only intend to provide an example of the kinds of 
things that constructivists could mean when they talk about a formal constraint of consistency. What’s 
more, this particular kind of example is one that Street, James, and Korsgaard all appeal to. 
72 Street (2008), 228-229; (2010), 374. Korsgaard defends this claim across a number of works, 
including, e.g., (1997) and (2009). 
 48 
Those stances that do not conflict may stand in various degrees of support to 
each other. Amongst a set of mutually consistent stances, some will be more central to 
a particular standpoint, others more peripheral. The extent to which stances, on 
balance, exhibit support of one another is a measure of their coherence. By 
comparison with consistency, it is more difficult to say how coherence might figure as 
a constitutive requirement for a particular standpoint. Presumably, one counts as 
occupying a standpoint or one doesn’t. It is an all or nothing affair. But coherence 
comes in degrees. Surely one may count as genuinely engaging various practical 
standpoints even if the relations amongst one’s set of stances falls short of maximal 
coherence. But what if they fell short of minimal coherence?   
Coherence might figure as a threshold requirement. Consider someone who is 
deliberating about whether to attend a party. She considers who will be there, whether 
there will be dancing, how she will feel the next morning, how this might affect her 
work schedule, etc… After much reflection she concludes “I have an all-things-
considered reason to attend the APA this year!” Although there is nothing apparently 
inconsistent with her taking up this stance, it does not mesh in any way (let us assume) 
with the considerations she has been entertaining. It is wildly incoherent with them. 
Someone who takes up this stance in the present situation arguably fails to count as 
taking herself to have an all-things-considered reason. Here we might say that the 
relation this stance bears to the background of the agent’s other stances exhibits a 
degree of coherence that falls below the threshold that is constitutively required to be 
counted as engaging in the activity as such.  
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Coherence might not be the only relation that matters in this way. 
Alternatively, there may be different constitutive norms whose satisfaction contributes 
to a standpoint’s overall coherence. Part of the constructivist project will involve 
describing what other types of norms or relations are constitutive of various practical 
standpoints. For example, James (2007) has claimed that standpoints of practical 
reason are constituted by certain general norms which govern, amongst other things, 
which facts one is to attend to in deliberation (a “norm of attention direction”), which 
to disregard (a “norm of disregard”), which to count as favoring a particular response 
(a “norm of favoring”), and which to assign more or less importance (a “norm of 
balancing”).73  Like the norm of coherence, but unlike the norm of instrumental 
consistency, these norms would also appear to allow satisfaction to various degrees.74  
Once the constructivist has an account of these various constitutive 
commitments in hand, she can then appeal to them to explain the truth, or falsity, of a 
particular ethical judgment. According to the standpoint characterization of 
constructivism, the truth of an ethical judgment is a function of what follows from 
                                                
73 James (2007), 315-19. For James it would be appropriate to speak of the standpoint of practical 
reason because he thinks that there is a necessary convergence in ethical truth, regardless of the stances 
one starts out with. One might also say the same of Korsgaard’s view - though her view counts as a 
substantive constructivism, by contrast with James’s formal view. However, for Humean 
constructivist’s like Street it is more appropriate to speak of a particular standpoint since, on her view, 
the entailments from a standpoint are largely determined by an agent’s starting points, and these (she 
allows) may differ significantly across agents. In fact, Street is explicit about the relativistic 
implications of her view. See, e.g., Street (2008), 224. But she argues that whatever relativism is 
involved is not objectionable. For an extended argument, see Street (2009). 
74 For example, one may succeed, or fail, to attend to the right features of a situation to greater or lesser 
extents. Someone who is trying to decide whether or not knowledge has intrinsic value might be said to 
attend to the wrong kinds of facts if she devotes all of her attention to facts about the practice of 
astrology or wizardry. But she arguably does better if she does this than if she attends solely to the 
perceived redness of an apple. Astrology and wizardry might be pseudo-sciences but they bear a closer 
relation to the topic of knowledge than the redness of an apple. Cf. Street (2008), 235. There Street 
claims that the truth of a particular normative judgment “…is a function of how strongly [an agent] 
holds the normative judgment in question and how close to the center of her total web of normative 
judgments they lie” (p. 235). 
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within a particular practical standpoint. Given a particular collection of stances and the 
norms governing a particular standpoint, certain stances will follow, others will be 
ruled out, and yet others will fall somewhere in between, enjoying some degree of 
support but falling short of “entailment”. 
We might ask whether constructivism, on this view, counts as a kind of ethical 
relativism – one that relativizes ethical truth to the features of the standpoint of the 
agent performing the action, or confronted with a particular state-of-affairs. The 
answer will depend on how one characterizes the standpoint as well as the view we are 
calling relativism. For example, there are some defenders of this view who also think 
that the constitutive features of a standpoint guarantee convergence on a single ethical 
class of ethical truths. This version would appear to speak against the way in which 
some have interpreted relativism.75 The charge of relativism notwithstanding, this 
sketch allows us to see how constructivists, like Street, might appeal to a standpoint 
                                                
75 Cf. Harman (2001). This brief sketch leaves this and many other questions unanswered. Here are just 
a few other questions: (1) Are all three ethical standpoints commensurable or do they express different 
states of mind? If they are necessarily connected – as rationalism claims they are – it would seem that 
they must express the same kind of state of mind. The basic story will be about the attitude of taking 
something to be a reason. Accounts of the other ethical attitudes will be built up out of this. If you 
reject rationalism, as Street does (see Chapter Two), there is no pressure to account for them to express 
the same kind of state. (2) Will the constitutive commitments of one kind of attitude provide enough 
guidance for determining the correctness of more than a handful of judgments? Won’t there be 
indeterminacy all over the place at a certain stage of development? Suppose that I start out with a 
quorum of stances, i.e., whatever number suffices to constitute a standpoint. As I acquire new stances it 
would seem that the constitution of the standpoint could go in any number of directions. Suppose I am 
entertaining the stance P. Perhaps P cleaves my current set of stances in a way that previously was not 
apparent – because I hadn’t thought about the kinds of issues that P relates to. Suppose that half of my 
current stances support P; the other half conflicts. Do we accept P or not P as a stance? Whichever one 
is chosen will end up affecting the constitutive entailments of the standpoint going forward. But the 
worry is that the choice is indeterminate. What’s more, the objection is not merely that there will be 
indeterminacy at some points. It is that we are faced with these kinds of choice points from the very 
beginning. How ought we to go about acquiring new stances if this is the case? (3) Must one assume 
that a standpoint will be constituted by just one type of stance? Couldn’t, e.g., the moral standpoint by 
constituted by a complex system of beliefs, desires and other attitudes? 
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characterization to distinguish their views from the family of response-dependence 
theories. 
Our judgments about a particular practical standpoint, importantly, are not 
about how some subject – actual or hypothetical – would respond. The dilemma for 
response-dependence views is a result of the way in which these views describe ethical 
truths indirectly. On these views, the truth of an ethical judgment is described in terms 
of how some suitably described agent would respond. This allows for a gap between 
our intuitive ethical judgments and our judgments about how such agents would 
respond. On the one hand, the agent could get things wrong; on the other, our ethical 
judgments themselves (the direct ones) might not appear to be about such agents and 
their judgments. The move to standpoints is supposed to close this gap. 
According to the standpoint characterization of constructivism, an ethical 
judgment isn’t about what some suitably described agent would judge or choose.76 
Rather, it is about what follows from within a particular ethical standpoint. In contrast 
with response-dependence views, there is no intuitive gap between what follows from 
within the standpoint and ethical truth. The standpoint does not represent an agent. 
Hence, there is no one who could get things wrong. What’s more, such a standpoint 
                                                
76 Cf. Street (2008): 
 
We are not asking what A or anyone else thinks withstands scrutiny from that standpoint. 
Rather, we are asking whether, as determined by the standards set by A’s other normative 
judgments in combination with the non-normative facts, the judgment that X is a reason to Y 
(for A) does withstand scrutiny from that standpoint. (p. 231) 
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does not reduce ethical judgments to anything else; this is supposed to make it 
immune “open question” worries about the accounts intensional adequacy.77 
 
2.5 Problems for the Standpoint Characterization 
 
One might worry that the extent to which the standpoint characterization succeeds in 
distinguishing constructivism from response-dependence views is also the extent to 
which the view starts to look like other existing metaethical alternatives, viz. realism, 
expressivism, or a simple subjectivism. Suppose that what distinguishes 
constructivism from response-dependence views is that on the former view ethical 
judgments are about what follows from within a particular standpoint and not how a 
certain type of subject would respond under suitable conditions. For example, compare 
how the two views would characterize the moral statement stealing is wrong. 
According to a response-dependence view, the statement means something about a 
particular type of subject’s responses; according to the standpoint view, the statement 
means something about what follows from within a standpoint constituted by certain 
attitudes and formal constraints.78 The standpoint view makes it is clear how 
constructivism might still count as a version of cognitivism. Ethical judgments are a 
species of belief, ones that report facts about what follows from within a particular 
ethical standpoint. But how are we to understand the nature of the relevant stances that 
                                                
77 The standpoint account leaves many questions unanswered about the nature of ethical facts and 
properties. Is the standpoint account supposed to support our everyday moral practice, or undermine it 
and prompt revision? What kind of epistemology is required on such an account? Can such an account 
be accommodated within a naturalistic framework? These are the kinds of questions that one might 
have thought constructivism was supposed to provide answers to.  
78 Again, different constructivists characterize the role of initial attitudes as well as the kinds of 
constitutive conditions that make up a particular kind of standpoint in different ways. 
 53 
make up these standpoints? So far, all that we have been told is that they are not about 
a subject’s responses. 
According to the standpoint view, we might say that ethical judgments involve 
different orders of stances. On the one hand, when a competent English speaker utters 
an ethical statement (like stealing is wrong), she is expressing a belief. This belief is 
about what follows from within a particular agent’s ethical standpoint. There are two 
orders of stances. On the one hand, there are the stances that make up the relevant 
standpoint. These belong to the agent. On the other, you have the appraiser’s belief (a 
type of stance) about this standpoint. This means that we must distinguish between 
two types of cases. In the first kind, the appraiser is herself the agent, in which case 
her beliefs are about her own ethical standpoint. In the second kind, the appraiser is 
not the agent, in which case the appraiser’s ethical judgment expresses a belief about 
someone else’s standpoint. Importantly, on this kind of view, ethical truth is always 
relative to a standpoint. However, whether there will be divergence in ethical truth 
across agents depends on how one characterizes such standpoints.79 
On this view, it is clear that the appraiser’s ethical judgments express beliefs 
about what follows from within the agent’s ethical standpoint. But how are we to 
understand the agent’s stances – the ones that make up a standpoint? What are they? 
Are they belief-like states with their own representational content? Or are they non-
belief-like states? These questions are crucial for determining whether constructivism 
represents a free-standing view. However it is not clear that the standpoint 
                                                
79 I’ll say a bit more about this later in this discussion. For a fuller discussion, see Chapter 3. 
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constructivist can answer them in a way that succeeds in distinguishing her view from 
familiar alternatives.80 
Suppose that the stances that make up an agent’s ethical standpoint also have 
representational content and a belief-like direction of fit. That is, we aim to conform 
these attitudes to information we receive about the world.81 We might call these 
standpoint beliefs to help us to distinguish them from the beliefs expressed by the 
appraiser in her ethical judgments. What is the content of such beliefs? Alternatively, 
what would have to be the case for these standpoint beliefs to be true?  
If they are made true by features of the world that obtain independently of our 
stances, the view just turns out to be version of realism. For, in this case, there are at 
least some ethical judgments whose truth does not ultimately depend on the relations 
they bear to other stances within a particular ethical standpoint; rather, some will 
ultimately depend on the relation they bear to the world. For all I have said, the 
constructivist apparatus may still be able to contribute something novel and interesting 
within such a framework. For example, even if constructivism turns out to be 
compatible with realism in some ways it may serve to undermine it in others.82 I 
devote extended discussion to this possibility in Chapter Three. On the other hand, one 
may argue that this objection overlooks the possibility that the content of a first-tier 
belief involves essential reference to other beliefs that constitute the standpoint. Such a 
                                                
80 My thinking on these issues has been influenced and (to my mind) benefited from some, as yet 
unpublished, work that Michael Ridge has done on this topic. See Ridge (forthcoming). 
81  Anscombe (1957) 
82 This is a possibility that I sketched out in Chapter 1 when discussing substantive constructivism. See 
Chapters 4 and 5 for an evaluation of arguments to this effect. 
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view may avoid realism. But, in this case, the cost is that this makes the view either 
vacuous or objectionably circular.83  
According to this second proposal, we are to take every basic belief that 
constitutes a standpoint to have content that makes essential reference to other beliefs 
constituting the standpoint.84 This means that no standpoint belief will be true simply 
in virtue of stance-independent features of the world. It also means that the content of 
many of our everyday ethical beliefs will turn out to be a bit different from what they 
might appear. For example, on such a view, we never merely have the belief that 
stealing is wrong; rather, ethical beliefs are always relative to a standpoint. Explicitly 
or implicitly, the content of an ethical belief must make essential reference to the other 
beliefs that constitute the relevant agent’s moral standpoint. For example, it would 
have to be something like the belief that the claim that stealing is wrong enjoys 
support from the beliefs that make up the agent’s moral standpoint. One problem here 
is that it is hard to see how this says anything about morality. On this view, someone 
who sincerely utters the statement “Stealing is wrong” is expressing her belief that the 
belief that the claim that stealing is wrong enjoys support from the beliefs that make 
up the agent’s moral standpoint. This account appears vacuous. It says that basic 
ethical beliefs are about other beliefs, but it doesn’t say anything more about what the 
content of those beliefs are. What would it be for the other beliefs that make up the 
agent’s moral standpoint to support the claim that stealing is wrong? Presumably, 
these other beliefs will in turn reference the support of other beliefs that constitute a 
                                                
83 See Ridge (forthcoming) for the circularity objection. James (2007) also recognizes and responds to 
something like this objection. 
84 Cf., Brink (1989) on Rawls’s presentation of Kantian constructivism. 
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particular standpoint, and so on. Perhaps, at some point, these further beliefs will end 
up referencing the one we started out with. But, in this case, the account is circular 
(and vacuous).85 There may be more that can be said here on behalf of such a view. 
But the prospects look dim. To the extent that this kind of view offers any substantive 
account of the content of these standpoint beliefs it opens itself to the first kind of 
objection – viz., that such beliefs (covertly) make reference to some belief-
independent ethical truth. So far, we have been supposing that the stances that make 
up an agent’s standpoint are something like beliefs. But, what if they are some kind of 
non-belief-like state? How should we understand the states of mind that these basic 
ethical stances embody?  
Suppose now that standpoints are composed of stances that embody some non-
belief-like state of mind. Considering some of the motivations that constructivists 
appeal to, one might assume that these basic stances embody a form of pro-attitude, 
like desires, with a different direction of fit – one according to which we aim to 
conform the world to the content of our attitudes. But if one is able to work out the 
constitutive relations amongst this class of non-belief-like pro-attitudes, one will have 
arguably succeeded in one of the projects that expressivists are engaged in.  
One of the big challenges for expressivists is to explain how ethical discourse 
exhibits standard logical inference patterns when, on their view, ethical language is 
not fact-stating. Standard logical inference is truth preserving. But expressivists don’t 
think that ethical language is used to express truth-evaluable content. So, expressivists 
must come up with an alternative “practical logic” which accounts for why it is 
                                                
85 See Ridge (forthcoming) for a similar objection. 
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nonetheless legitimate to use ethical language in these ways. Although different 
proposals have been made and developed, they remain extremely controversial.86  
Constructivism is usually understood as a version of cognitivism. This is 
because it makes ethical judgment, at some level, a species of belief. As I have 
presented it thus far, the standpoint constructivist takes it that sincerely uttered ethical 
statements generally express beliefs – viz., ones about what follows from within a 
particular agent’s ethical standpoint. They have truth-evaluable content and, as such, 
should figure unproblematically in contexts which require such content (belief reports, 
truth-preserving inferences, etc.). This might create the impression that constructivism 
will be immune to the kinds of objections that expressivists face. But if the stances 
that constitute these standpoints are themselves non-belief-like, it would appear as if 
the constructivist is saddled with the same project that the expressivist is, at least at the 
level of the lower-tiered ethical stances.  
Constructivists must explain what they mean when they say that certain stances 
must follow from others in a way that does not rely on the notion of truth-preservation. 
We might say that the project of explaining this involves devising a kind of practical 
logic – in contrast with standard logic, which explains inference on the basis of truth-
preservation.87 If certain non-belief-like stances are supposed to follow from within a 
particular standpoint constituted by other non-belief-like stances, we must suppose 
that the relations amongst these stances constitute a structure with its own non-truth-
preserving practical logic. For example, one might characterize this structure in terms 
                                                
86 For an extended critique of expressivist attempts to meet this challenge, see Schroeder (2008). 
87 It is perhaps for this reason that Gibbard (1999) reads Korsgaard’s constructivism as a species of 
expressivism. He takes her to be engaged in a project of working out a “practical logic”. I take this 
expression from him. 
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of consistency, or coherence, in attitude. But such a project will take considerable 
work if it is to succeed in accounting for all of the standard patterns of inference 
exhibited in everyday ethical discourse. What’s more, whether it succeeds or not will 
likely be extremely controversial. However, it is only once this logic is worked out 
that a constructivist will be able to explain why a particular ethical judgment is true or 
not. If this is indeed the way to understand the standpoint constructivist’s apparatus, 
one might object that the view does no better, or even perhaps worse than 
expressivism.88 In fact, an expressivist might argue that the constructivist ought to 
avoid the complication that comes with taking ethical language to express beliefs and 
simply abandon cognitivism altogether; instead, she should take ethical statements to 
directly express the non-belief-like states of mind that constitute the various ethical 
standpoints. This would in effect make the view a species of expressivism.89 
This is a line that has become increasing popular recently with several 
defenders of expressivism arguing, in various ways, that constructivism is best 
understood as a species of, or supplement to, their view – see, e.g., Gibbard (1999), 
Lenman (2010), Ridge (forthcoming). It has even been encouraged by some 
constructivists – e.g., Korsgaard (2003) and, to a lesser extent, Street (2008), (2010).90 
                                                
88 For example, it may be objected that it does worse at accommodating the putative necessary 
connection between ethical judgments and motivation. If the constructivist maintains that ethical 
judgments are beliefs what follows from within a class of non-belief-like stances, she will still have a 
problem explaining the allegedly necessary connection between these “distinct existences”. 
Expressivists claim to avoid this objection by doing away with the idea that ethical judgments express 
beliefs; rather, they claim that an ethical judgment directly expresses a state-of-mind that is, perhaps 
amongst other things, intrinsically motivating. 
89 Street appears to flirt with this idea. See, e.g., Street (2008), 230; (2010), 375ff. 
90 Korsgaard (2003): “Expressivism, I believe, is like realism also true after all, and also in a way that 
makes it boring” (p. 122n49). 
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But if constructivism is indeed best understood in this way it arguably loses in 
importance as a challenger to realism. The expressivist challenge to realism is both 
familiar and fairly well understood. Moreover, a constructivist-expressivism would 
represent an even less palatable version of this challenge than the existing “quasi-
realist” versions advanced by expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard.91 Not only 
would a defender of constructivist-expressivism be giving up on cognitivism, she 
would also be giving up on even the appearance that ethical discourse is stance-
independent. Quasi-realist expressivists are at least concerned to accommodate realist 
ways of talking and thinking about objectivity in ethics. Someone who defends this 
kind of constructivism could not claim to get you everything the realist wants without 
the problems. Such a view arguably fails to get you anything the realist wants. 
Although such a view might represent an interesting internal challenge for 
expressivists, it is not the kind of challenger that I am setting out to evaluate in this 
work. But the only apparent way around this objection risks making constructivism 
into a version of another well-known metaethical position. 
Any version of constructivism that characterizes ethical standpoints in terms of 
non-belief-like stances will have a problem distinguishing itself as a free-standing 
view.  Suppose that the constructivist denies that an ethical standpoint involves a level 
of structure that would require a practical logic. For example, a constructivist might 
deny that the truth of one’s ethical judgments follows in any interesting way from the 
relations which an agent’s ethical stances bear to one another – though the truth of 
such judgments would still follow from facts about these stances taken together, along 
                                                
91 See, e.g., Blackburn (1984), 197; Gibbard (2003), 18ff. 
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with facts about the world. This would position the view closer to a form of simple 
subjectivism – e.g., a view that takes moral judgments to express beliefs about which 
actions would maximally satisfy an agent’s actual desires.  
One might also describe this desire-satisfaction view as providing a similarly 
ordered account of ethical judgments. At the level of the agent’s ethical standpoint 
there are desires, a kind of non-belief-like stance; at the level of ethical judgment there 
are beliefs about these desires. Furthermore, one might argue that such a view, like a 
standpoint constructivism, is distinct from the family of response-dependence theories. 
Ethical judgment on the desire-satisfaction view is not about how certain subjects 
would respond; rather, it is about whether an action satisfies one’s actual desires, and 
how many.  
Importantly, however, the desire-satisfaction theorist does not take ethical 
judgments to be about what follows amongst an agent’s desires; our ethical judgments, 
on this view, are not beliefs about the relations that an agent’s desires bear to one 
another. Rather, they express beliefs about how many desires on balance would be 
satisfied, or frustrated, by a particular course of action. Such a view arguably does not 
require any logic. Although an agent’s set of desires may exhibit some structure – e.g., 
with some desires taking other desires as their objects, or some desires being more 
general and others specifications of them – it does not involve a level of sophistication 
that would support “entailment” claims. Consequently, the challenges associated with 
expressivism do not arise.  
The desire-satisfaction theory provides a model for how a constructivist might 
avoid the kind of difficulties associated with the expressivist’s project. Of course, the 
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problem with this approach is that it requires that the constructivist explain how her 
view represents a novel and interesting advance on the desire-satisfaction theory, or 
other common versions of simple subjectivism. One might have thought that the 
extent to which constructivism represents an improvement on such theories is the 
extent to which the view incorporates structure at the level of the agent’s ethical 
standpoint.92  
There would appear to be a dilemma for a constructivist who insists that ethical 
standpoints are composed of non-belief-like stances. Either these stances combine to 
create a structure within which some stances may be said to follow from others, in 
which case the view involves the same difficulties that expressivism does. Or a 
standpoint is to be understood as a mere collection of stances without any 
sophisticated structure, in which case the view starts to look like a version of simple 
subjectivism, with all the virtues and vices that such views carry.  
 
2.6 Reframing the Challenge 
 
The prospect of a freestanding metaethical constructivism is looking dim. The 
standard proceduralist characterizations give the appearance that constructivism is best 
understood as a version of a response-dependence theory. This might make the 
                                                
92 For example, Street (2008) describes the difference in this way: 
 
Yet normative judgments are different from desires in virtue of the kinds of constitutive 
involvments I’ve been sketching. For example, whereas taking oneself to have a reason to live 
constitutively involves taking oneself to have reason to undergo the leg amputation that one 
knows is necessary, the attitude of desire is characterized by no analogous constitutive 
involvement: one can desire to live while having no desire whatsoever to under the leg 
amputation. (pp. 230-1). 
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standpoint characterization appear more promising. But if an ethical standpoint is 
constituted by beliefs, constructivism either folds into realism or turns out to be 
vacuous. If it is constituted by non-belief-like stances, it is best interpreted as a species 
of, or supplement to, expressivism or a version of a simple subjectivism. Unless 
constructivism can be shown to represent an advance on one of these alternatives, the 
view would appear to lack in motivation. Nothing I’ve said thus far rules out this 
possibility. But even if constructivism represented an improvement on response-
dependence theories or expressivism or simple subjectivism, it may still fail to 
represent any new or interesting challenge to realism. One would have to show that 
constructivism improves on these other views in ways that also makes for a more 
formidable challenge to realism.93 Perhaps the more promising option would be to 
give up on the claim that constructivism represents a free-standing metaethical view 
and argue that the challenge for realism is of a different sort. 
 If the arguments in this chapter are sound, it would not appear as if any version 
of constructivism – formal or substantive – counts as a free-standing metaethical 
alternative to already familiar views.  Nevertheless, I think constructivist arguments 
still pose an interesting, though somewhat more restricted, challenge to realist 
commitments.  
Specifically, constructivists may be seen as targeting realist views of ethical 
objectivity – a mere part of the realist’s total metaethical package but, nevertheless, an 
essential one. Realists might not be alone in accepting conditions (3) and (4). For 
example, representative quietists, error-theorists, and quasi-realist expressivists have 
                                                
93 This is because each of these views has their own motivations and challenges. How a view stacks up 
to realism is only one metric of evaluation. 
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each laid claim to the view of ethical objectivity expressed by these two conditions. 
But, as I have argued, these conditions also represent constitutive commitments of any 
(robustly) realist view in ethics.  
There are two ways in which constructivists might challenge the realist’s view 
of ethical objectivity, one corresponding to each of the two conditions. Formal 
constructivists take aim at condition (3). They reject the realist’s view of the nature of 
ethical objectivity. If they are correct, all ethical truth is stance-dependent. One of the 
questions that we must ask then is whether we lose anything important if they are 
right. I address this question in Chapter 3. Substantive constructivists take aim at 
condition (4). Although they accept that some part of the ethical enjoys the kind of 
objectivity expressed in (3), they reject the realist’s view on the extent of this kind of 
objectivity. If they are correct, the truth of at least some of our moral principles is 
stance-dependent. Here one of the questions that we might ask is why we should think 
that the realist’s notion of objectivity should extend to as much of the ethical domain 
as (4) would imply. Mightn’t there be other ethical considerations that undermine (4)? 
I address this question in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FORMAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Although current consensus has it that formal views offer the only coherent and 
defensible constructivist challenge to a stance-independent realism, I argue in this 
chapter that these views are also the most vulnerable to challenge from within ethical 
theory. This is because, as formal views, they lack the resources to account for certain 
widely and deeply held substantive moral convictions – ones, it turns out, that formal 
constructivists themselves acknowledge and accept. What’s more, these constructivists 
accept a method of theory-building that commits them to providing some account of 
these judgments. They must show that a formal constructivism either supports these 
judgments or provides some way of revising or explaining them away. 
Every defender of constructivism, both formal and substantive, assigns 
reflective equilibrium some role in their theory building.94 Very roughly, this method 
involves comparing, revising, and pruning our ethical judgments with the aim of 
reaching a coherence, or equilibrium, amongst them. This process of reflection starts 
with our considered judgments. These are deeply held ethical judgments at all levels 
of generality, both judgments about particular cases and theoretical considerations that 
might bear on them. From these starting points, we then proceed to work back and 
                                                
94 The role may vary. Some assign reflective equilibrium a constitutive role. On this view, ethical truth 
just is that a judgment stands in reflective equilibrium with an agent’s other judgments. Others assign it 
a heuristic role. On this kind of view, that a judgment stands in reflective equilibrium provides good 
reason to believe that it is true. See Street (2008) for discussion of these differences. 
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forth between general principles and particular judgments, modifying them according 
to norms of consistency and coherence, until we reach a state of equilibrium in which 
considered judgments at all levels of generality exhibit an acceptable degree of 
support for one another.  
Since constructivists all accept this method, it is fair to ask whether the specific 
versions of constructivism they defend can offer support to our considered judgments 
in reflective equilibrium. I argue, however, that despite defenders’ best efforts formal 
versions of constructivism cannot.  This deficiency, together with the importance that 
constructivists themselves assign these judgments, makes for a serious objection to 
formal views. What’s more, since realism provides a way of accounting for them, one 
may speak of a comparative advantage for realists.  
In section 2, I explain in more detail what makes a version of constructivism 
formal and what considerations are taken to support this kind of view. In section 3, I 
present a challenge to formal constructivism from within ethical theory. In section 4, I 
draw a further distinction between two types of formal views. Although both types 
turn out to be compatible (in some sense) with the considered judgment at the heart of 
my challenge, only one bears any chance of being able to justify it. In section 5, I 
argue however that even this more promising type of formal constructivism fails to 
account for the judgment at issue. In sections 6 and 7, I entertain rejoinders. In section 
8, I conclude with a few remarks on how the results of this chapter motivate the 
remaining two. 
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3.2 What is Formal Constructivism? 
 
The distinction between formal and substantive versions of constructivism is one 
about how we are to characterize an ethical standpoint. Specifically, it concerns what 
kind of materials we may appeal to in these characterizations. Again, a version of 
constructivism is formal if it characterizes an ethical standpoint by appeal to strictly 
formal norms (e.g., consistency, coherence, instrumentality). Formal norms apply to 
the structure of an agent’s ethical judgments taken together. They specify the way in 
which judgments, irrespective of their particular contents, must hang together in order 
to make a standpoint what it is. In other words, these norms do not presuppose the 
truth of any ethical judgment – general or particular. Rather, according to such views, 
an ethical judgment is true just in case (and because) it follows from within an ethical 
standpoint, where this standpoint is characterized formally. On a formal view, there 
are no ethical judgments that are excluded from this requirement. 
Formal versions of constructivism are a recent development. They have been 
proposed in response to objections against standard substantive presentations of the 
view (e.g., those one finds in the work of John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Christine 
Korsgaard). Since substantive views do nothing to justify the class of basic, status-
conferring ethical judgments (i.e., they do nothing to explain why this class of 
judgments should play this kind of foundational role), they are compatible with a 
stance-independent account of the truth of these judgments. If this is correct, it would 
appear as if these constructivists accept (3) and with it at least part of the realist’s 
account of the nature of ethical objectivity.  
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Some constructivists, like Sharon Street, appear to think that only a 
thoroughgoing constructivism could challenge realism – that is, one according to 
which all ethical truth is entailed from within the ethical standpoint. Formal versions 
of constructivism are thoroughgoing and, hence, supposed to avoid this objection. On 
these accounts, there is no privileged class of ethical judgments; rather, every 
judgment is subject to scrutiny from within the standpoint. In slogan form: ethical 
truth is constructed “all the way down”. Hence, these constructivists reject the realist’s 
condition (3). 
Formal constructivists claim that someone who accepts their view does better 
at accommodating other deeply held first-order ethical judgments. The defense is 
holistic, meaning that formal constructivism must be evaluated against a host of 
considerations. The claim is not that the view succeeds in accommodating every 
consideration; rather it is that the view does the best job on balance of any relevant 
alternative. In other words, the claim is that formal constructivism, not a stance-
independent realism, stands in reflective equilibrium with our considered judgments. 
 
3.3 An Internal Challenge for Formal Constructivism 
 
Are there particular ethical claims that formal constructivism fails to accommodate? 
And, if so, does this failure constitute a significant cost for the view on the whole? I 
argue yes and yes. 
Consider the moral claim that torturing children for fun would be wrong even 
if no one ever took it to be such. This claim arguably expresses a considered moral 
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judgment, not only one that many would accept but also one that any good moral 
theory should be in a position to justify to some extent. That is, the success of a moral 
theory will depend in part on whether it is able to provide some good reason for 
thinking that this claim is true. 
At the very least, an ethical view must be compatible with this claim 
(henceforth, “the torture claim”) if it is to be plausible. That is, it should provide no 
good reason for thinking that this claim is false. This point is not trivial. Some views 
are incompatible with it. Consider, for example, the view that an action is wrong just 
in case we all decide that it is. Let us call this view morality by consensus. It can allow 
that torturing children for fun is wrong and might even provide resources for justifying 
this claim. Perhaps under normal circumstances we would all decide that this kind of 
action is wrong. But it is incompatible with the last clause – even if no one ever took it 
to be such. According to morality by consensus, torturing children for fun is wrong if 
and only if we decide that it is. This means that it would not be wrong if we all 
decided that this kind of torture was permissible. Results like this lead many to reject 
this kind of view as objectionably relativistic and deeply implausible. Other 
considerations might count in favor of such a view, but it is hard to see these 
competing considerations ever outweighing the costs. Again, if formal constructivism 
is to stand a chance it must at least be compatible with the torture claim. But even if it 
is compatible, one may still ask how well it does at justifying this claim.  
Although formal constructivism is compatible with the torture claim, I argue 
that it lacks the resources to justify it.  This result represents a serious defect of the 
view – one that undermines the claim that constructivism, on balance, is a superior 
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alternative to realism, or other views that are in part constituted by the claim that 
ethical truth is stance-independent.95 In fact, realists would appear to enjoy a 
comparative advantage. According to realism, whether or not torturing children for fun 
is wrong will depend on features of the world; it does not depend on our taking such 
actions to be wrong.  
Is this a fair challenge for the constructivist? One might worry that my 
challenge begs the question. If the constructivist thesis entails that the torture claim is 
false, my challenge would merely assert what constructivists deny. This would not 
represent a fair or productive way of evaluating the view. But as it turns out formal 
constructivism does not entail that the torture claim is false. In fact, defenders of 
formal constructivism recognize this kind of objection and appear concerned to 
address it. 
 According to formal constructivism, our taking something to be wrong is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for its being wrong; rather, in order to be wrong, the 
judgment that it is so must follow from within an agent’s moral standpoint.96 This 
standpoint is constituted by certain (formal) norms together with the other moral 
judgments that an agent holds.  Arguably this means that the constructivist may 
maintain that a particular judgment follows from within an ethical standpoint without 
someone’s actually making this judgment.97 The judgments entailed from within this 
                                                
95 Here I have in mind a quasi-realist expressivism like the one defended by Simon Blackburn (1984), 
(1993) or Allan Gibbard (2003), as well as the kind of “realist” quietism one finds presented in the work 
of Ronald Dworkin (1996) and Thomas Nagel (1989). 
96 Street (2010), 367n. 16. 
97 I specify actually here because it turns out that hypothetical judgment is trickier. Could the judgment 
count as true for a formal constructivist even if no one would make this judgment under idealized, 
hypothetical circumstances? Here it really depends on the idealization one employs.  If one specifies the 
idealization so that one has “whatever it takes” for one’s judgment to line up with what is entailed from 
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ethical standpoint are the ones we ought to maintain. But we can be mistaken. Perhaps 
on this view it is even possible that everyone is always mistaken about certain 
judgments.98 All the constructivist is committed to saying is that the correctness of this 
judgment depends on a person’s taking something or other to be wrong or right or 
permissible; not that this person takes the very action in question to be wrong. So it 
looks as if constructivism is at least compatible with the torture claim.  
The next question is whether a formal constructivism has the resources to 
justify this claim. In what follows, I will argue that it cannot. My evaluation will 
involve looking at different kinds of formal constructivism and the various responses 
that their defenders have proposed to the kind of objection I am presenting. 
 
3.4 Two Kinds of Formal Constructivism 
 
Formal constructivism comes in two flavors. Some defenders of formal constructivism 
claim that no matter what judgments one starts out with there will necessarily be a 
convergence on a single class of correct ethical judgments.99 Others deny this.100 
                                                                                                                                       
within the standpoint, it turns out that such a judgment would not count as true for the constructivist. 
Note, however, that idealized judgment does not constitute truth for the constructivist. Formal 
constructivism is formulated in terms of standpoints in order to avoid the problems with a hypothetical 
proceduralism. Although a defender of the standpoint characterization claims that ethical truth is 
existentially dependent on an agent’s making some ethical judgments or other, she denies that it is 
constituted by the judgments of a suitable described agent under special conditions.  This means that the 
truth of particular ethical judgment may outstrip an agent’s ever making the judgment, actually or 
hypothetically. 
98  There must be a limit on this, however, since constructivists level skeptical arguments against 
realists. For example Street (2006), (2008), (2009a) argues against realism on the grounds that it fails to 
provide any good explanation of why our actual ethical judgments turned out to be the true ones. It does 
not appear as if the constructivist would want to admit that her own view was compatible with 
everyone’s being mistaken about all of our ethical judgments. 
99 See James (2007). Alternatively, we might say that there will be a convergence on a core of ethical 
truths, even if there are differences at the periphery. 
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Although they allow that there may be convergence, they deny that it is necessary. On 
their view, correct ethical judgment is always a function of the judgments one starts 
out with. Let us follow recent convention and call this second kind of view a formal 
Humean constructivism and the first kind a formal Kantian constructivism.101 Of the 
two types, the Kantian view appears to present the better chance of justifying the 
torture claim and, consequently, the stronger challenge to realism. 
A formal Humean constructivism is compatible with the torture claim. But it 
does not provide any support for it. That is, it provides no reason to think that the 
torture claim is true. Again, according to this view, what is entailed by an ethical 
standpoint depends on what judgments one starts out with. Although the formal, 
constitutive commitments of an ethical standpoint might constrain outcomes to some 
extent, as formal commitments they will only do so much. They do not contribute 
anything of content to the outcome. Presumably this means that two agents who start 
out with radically divergent judgments might end up with some divergence in the class 
of output judgments.  
Consider the case of what Street (2009) calls an ideally-coherent eccentric 
[ICE]. ICEs are hypothetical characters who possess two main features: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
100 See Street (2008), (2010). 
101 NB I am following Street’s terminology here. However, it is important to note that on this usage the 
class of formal Kantian views is quite narrow. For example, it does not cover the kind of Kantian 
constructivism that Rawls (1980) discusses. This view, as I have noted earlier, would count as a 
substantive, not formal, constructivism. There is some interpretive dispute as to whether the view in 
Korsgaard (1996), (2003) ought to count as a formal Kantian view. Street (2008), (2010) interprets 
Korsgaard in this way. But I think Korsgaard’s view is better seen as a substantive version of 
constructivism. For discussion, see Chapter 1, sections 5 and 6. 
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First, they accept some value that is utterly unheard of, morally repugnant, or 
both. Second, their acceptance of this value coheres perfectly, as a logical and 
instrumental matter, with all of their other values in combination with the non-
normative facts.102 
 
These characters are marched out as counterexamples to the claim that merely formal 
criteria, like those described in the second feature, are sufficient to generate an account 
of reasons, values, or morality that coheres with our considered judgments.103  
A Humean might claim that in a society like ours, one with the typical beliefs 
and attitudes that people have, it is likely that an agent’s moral standpoint will entail 
the torture claim. But in the case of ICEs, it is at least conceivable that it will not. The 
result, according to the Humean view, would be that the torture claim was not true for 
them. But importantly the torture claim is not supposed to be true for us, or people like 
us. It is supposed to be true for everyone, regardless of the judgments they actually 
hold. We do not simply withdraw our claim that such people morally ought not to 
torture if we find out that such actions are compatible with the judgments entailed 
from within their own respective ethical standpoints.  Let us try to identify exactly 
what claim these counterexamples are meant to target. 
                                                
102 Street (2009), 273. 
103 For example, Gilbert Harman’s (1975) Hitler, whose moral repugnance is infamous, and Allan 
Gibbard’s (1999) Caligula, who “aims solely to maximize the suffering of others”, are stipulated to 
possess both of these features. Here it is more appropriate to speak of an idealized Hitler. For, as 
Harman himself notes, the actual Hitler in all likelihood did not satisfy the second feature that Street 
describes. The same should be said of the Caligula case. 
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Although a formal Humean view is compatible with the torture claim, it is 
incompatible with a closely related claim that many would also accept. Consider 
Torture Plus: 
 
It’s not just that torturing children for fun would be wrong even if no one took 
it be such; rather that it would be wrong regardless of whatever actual 
judgments one starts out with. 
 
A formal Kantian constructivist can accept the second part of this claim, but a Humean 
cannot. On the Humean view, torture’s wrongness is independent of what we actually 
think of it but it is not independent of the set of our actual moral judgments taken 
together. And if these other judgments are deviant enough, as in the case of ICEs, it is 
possible that torturing children fun turns out to be permissible.  That is, even if the 
view does not make (in this case) moral truth dependent on our, or anyone’s, actually 
taking the particular action to be wrong, it makes it dependent on one’s other ethical 
judgments and allows that they may wield a considerable influence over whether it 
turns out that torturing children for fun is wrong. The result is that the Humean view is 
compatible with an objectionable relativism. This makes the view deeply implausible.   
But is it fair to evaluate formal Humean constructivism against Torture Plus? If 
Torture Plus is true, Humean constructivism is false. If we merely stipulated Torture 
Plus, this would be unfair. But there is a quick argument from the torture claim to 
Torture Plus.  If it is sound, it will provide independent reason to accept Torture Plus 
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and reject the Humean view. That is, Torture Plus is controversial but it can be shown 
to follow from the torture claim itself, a claim that all parties can agree on. 
Torture Plus can be shown to follow from the simple torture claim, a 
considered judgment that we have independent reason to accept. Consider two 
counterfactuals.  
 
C1: If I took torturing children for fun to be permissible, it would be. 
 
C2: There is a set of ethical judgments very different from the ones I actually 
hold, such that if I started out with this set, torturing children for fun 
would turn out to be permissible. 
 
I will argue that we should reject both counterfactuals. This is more controversial in 
the case of C2 than C1. For example, a defender of the Humean view can reject C1 but 
she cannot reject C2. Why is this? The Humean allows that the formal norms 
constituting an ethical standpoint may constrain what judgments ultimately count as 
true. So, just holding a particular judgment doesn’t suffice for its truth. But the 
Humean does make ethical truth contingent on one’s actual judgments taken together. 
This commits the Humean to C2. But if one rejects C1 there is also good reason to 
reject C2. Consider this little argument. 
Suppose we reject C1. So there is at least one case where one’s actually taking 
something to be permissible is not sufficient for its being so. But this case is not 
unique. According to formal constructivism, a judgment is never true merely in virtue 
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of the fact that someone actually makes it. Rather, it is true if and only if it follows 
from within the agent’s ethical standpoint as such, where this standpoint is constituted 
by the agent’s actual judgments taken together in accordance with certain formal 
norms (e.g., consistency, coherence, instrumentality). But if any particular case of 
taking something to be wrong does not suffice for its being wrong, why should we 
think that our actual judgments taken together suffice to make it the case that any 
particular action is wrong? If my actually taking torture to be permissible does not 
suffice to make it permissible, and my taking any other particular action to be 
permissible does not suffice to make it permissible, then it is hard to see how these 
judgments taken together should suffice. Even if all of my particular judgments were 
very different, together they still would not make it the case that torturing children for 
fun was permissible. So, we should reject C2 as well as C1. Since a Humean view 
commits one to C2, such a view would be mistaken. In this respect, versions of formal 
constructivism that include a claim about necessary convergence appear to have the 
upper hand. 
A defender of a Kantian view might claim that the torture claim is supported 
by a judgment that falls into the convergence class. That is, no matter what judgments 
one starts out with, an ethical standpoint is guaranteed to entail certain outcomes as 
correct. Furthermore one might claim that, on this view, it turns out that the torture 
claim is amongst these (alternatively, there is some ethical judgment in this class that 
supports the torture claim). If all this were true, a defender of a formal constructivism 
could claim to neutralize the challenge I have presented. But, as I will soon argue, it is 
not true; or rather there is no good reason to think that it is true. Insofar as a 
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constructivism remains formal, it lacks the resources to fend off the challenge I have 
presented. It will not be able to justify the torture claim, or many other claims that 
match our considered judgments. 
 
3.5 The Failure of Formal Kantian Views 
 
The defender of formal Kantian constructivism makes a couple of different claims. 
Hence, there are different ways in which her view might fail. Let us distinguish two 
claims: 
 
(i) Formal constraints guarantee convergence on some class of correct ethical 
judgments. 
(ii) Formal constraints guarantee convergence on some class of correct ethical 
judgments that includes the torture claim itself (or at least others that 
support its truth). 
 
One way in which the Kantian could fail would be if she could not justify the truth of 
(i). This claim defines what it is to be a formal Kantian constructivism. If this claim 
were false, there would be no alternative to Humean views to speak of. What’s more, 
claim (ii) entails (i). So, if (i) were false, (ii) would also be false. If formal Kantian 
constructivism fails with respect to (i), the alternative is for the constructivist to adopt 
a formal Humean view. And, as I have just argued, such views are especially 
vulnerable to the challenge I am presenting.  
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Another way in which the Kantian could fail would be if should could justify 
the truth of (i) but not (ii). This result might mark an improvement over Humean 
views to some extent. At the very least, it would show that there is a formal 
constructivist alternative to Humean views. But failure to justify the torture claim 
would still count as a serious defect of the view. The challenge for the Kantian is to 
provide some good reason for thinking that a purely formal characterization of an 
ethical standpoint provides any reason for maintaining both (i) and (ii).  
As I will soon argue, a formal constructivist may succeed in defending (i), but 
she lacks the resources to defend (ii). This result generalizes. To the extent that the 
view fails to accommodate (ii) it will also fail to accommodate many of our particular 
moral judgments.104 Hence, the Kantian may present a genuine alternative to formal 
Humean views. But she fails to accommodate our considered moral judgments.  Let us 
first consider the best formal constructivist defense of (i) and then ask whether it 
might be extended to support (ii). 
A formal constructivist might try to defend (i) by appealing to a norm of 
universality. This kind of norm has appeared plausible to many, especially those 
working in the Kantian tradition. But we can take universality in different ways. On 
the one hand, we might take it to affect the scope of a moral judgment. For example, a 
norm of universality might require that any correct moral judgment be derivable from 
principles that one can take to apply to everyone in the same way. On the other hand, 
we might take it to require that a judgment be derivable from principles that would be 
                                                
104 *Many* but not all, since it might succeed in securing the truth of very general judgments. 
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accepted by everyone.105 But it is not clear that either norm would help the formal 
convergence constructivist defend (i) and (ii). The first does not secure convergence 
across agents. The latter does, but it does not appear to be formal.  
The first candidate constrains the scope of moral judgments.  In order to count 
as genuinely engaging the moral standpoint one’s judgments must apply universally. 
According to such a norm, if one takes some action to be wrong (for example) one 
commits oneself to applying the same standard to all particular judgments involving 
similar circumstances, regardless of whom the judgment concerns. Failure to commit 
oneself in this way would mean that one would not genuinely count as taking an 
action to be wrong. Such a norm would count (along with instrumentality, coherence, 
consistency, etc.) as a constitutive commitment of the moral standpoint as such. 
But such a norm does not guarantee convergence across agents.  That is, it 
does not guarantee that different agents will be committed to the same class of 
judgments; rather, it only commits a particular agent to applying her own judgments in 
a particular way. It will constrain outcomes to some extent. For example, if I judge 
that what Tammo does in circumstances C is wrong, I am committed to judging that 
Timmy is wrong when he performs the same action type in circumstances qualitatively 
indistinguishable from C.106 But this kind of universality does not guarantee the 
relevant sense of convergence across agents. For example, if Gonzo judges that what 
Tammo does in circumstances C is permissible, he is committed to judging that it is 
also permissible for Timmy to act this way in qualitatively indistinguishable 
                                                
105 Thanks to Nicholas Sturgeon for helping me see this distinction.  
106 I am assuming that we might include a description of the agent’s intentions and other relevant 
features of an agent in C. 
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circumstances. In short: this norm of universality will yield different sets of outcomes 
depending on the judgments one starts out with. It does not generate a single class of 
correct ethical judgments regardless of an agent’s starting points. If a formal 
constructivism is to guarantee convergence in outcome (i.e., in the ethical judgments 
that every particular agent is committed to), it must include a stronger norm. 
The second candidate norm involves an agreement constraint. It requires that 
the judgments one make conform to principles that would be accepted by all agents to 
the extent that they meet certain other conditions.107 Alternatively, we might 
understand this requirement in terms of universal commitment across agents. That all 
agents would accept (or be committed to) principles grounding a judgment is to say 
that there would be convergence on the truth of this judgment across agents. In other 
words, a condition for my judgment’s counting as correct would be that everyone else 
would make (or be committed to) the same judgment. The problem with this kind of 
norm is that it is not formal. This is because the norm requires that a relation obtain 
between an agent’s stances and those held by others; it is external to an individual 
standpoint.  
A formal norm specifies the relations that must obtain amongst a set of stances 
so that they hang together in the right way to constitute a standpoint. Arguably these 
relations are all internal to the set of judgments that an agent makes. That is, they only 
involve relations that obtain amongst the agent’s own judgments. But this second 
formulation of universality relates one agent’s set of judgments to the judgments that 
                                                
107 There is also the related problem of cashing out “certain other conditions” in a way that does not rely 
on stance-independent notion of ethical truth. I set this worry aside for now and focus on what is 
arguably a deeper objection to a formal norm of unversailty. But I will revisit it later in the discussion.  
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other agents make (or those that they are committed to by their own standpoints). Such 
a norm involves external relations.  
It sounds odd to claim that a structural requirement for my set of judgments’ 
constituting a standpoint is that they bear certain relations to the judgments that other 
agents make. Compare the case of belief. It would be odd to claim that one of the 
constitutive commitments of belief is that other people share this attitude with me. 
Although we may speak of the truth or, more controversially, the content of one’s 
belief being determined by external features of the world (including, perhaps, what 
other people think), it is odd to think that my belief’s genuinely counting as the type of 
attitude it is depends on such external features.108 Similarly, it is odd to think that my 
moral judgment’s genuinely counting as the kind of attitude it is depends on such 
external features, even if the content or truth of this judgment depended on them in 
some way.109 Rather, it would appear as if a formal norm must only involve internal 
relations.  In this case, universality still doesn’t get the formal constructivist (i) 
because the norm involves external relations and a norm that involves external 
relations is not formal. But even if this is wrong (i.e., it turns out that a formal norm 
may involve external relations), this particular norm will not do the job. The second 
kind of universality norm may secure (i). But it still won’t be enough to justify (ii). 
                                                
108 I do not wish to take a stand on these controversial topics. My point is simply that these kinds of 
external views (i.e., ones about content and truth-conditions) are open to debate. An external view of 
the formal constitutive requirements for moral judgment, by contrast, is not. 
109 What’s more, if constitutive norms included such external features, a formal constructivist would 
undermine some of the claims she takes to motivate her view. Specifically, it would undermine the 
constructivist’s claim that her view enjoys an epistemological advantage over realism. For example, 
what reason do we have to believe that our moral judgments in fact meet this requirement? How could 
we ever know this? 
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Suppose that it is legitimate to speak of formal norms that include external 
relations. In this case, formal constructivists might characterize a moral standpoint in 
part by appeal to a universal norm of agreement or commitment amongst others. Is 
there now some reason to think that the torture claim will be a member of the 
convergence class entailed by such a standpoint, or supported by other members that 
are? The answer would appear to be no.  
Let us assume that such a norm yields necessary convergence on some class of 
judgments. That is, no matter what judgments you start off with, the norm of 
universality leads to convergence on some non-empty class of correct judgments.110 
Will this class include or support the torture claim? There is no good reason to think it 
will. 
The second version of the universality norm does not support the torture claim. 
The problem is that this norm appears consistent with the contradictory of the torture 
claim: viz. torturing children for fun is permissible even if no one takes it to be 
such.111 All that the norm requires is that a judgment conform to principles that would 
be accepted by all agents who meet certain other conditions (or principles that all such 
agents would be committed to). Until we specify these conditions, there doesn’t seem 
to be any reason to think that all other agents wouldn’t agree to this contradictory 
principle. Surely they could all agree to it (or be committed to it). If they did, this 
would be a case where the ethical standpoint entails that the torture claim is false. This 
would, of course, be a bad result for the defender of a formal Kantian constructivism. 
                                                
110 Presumably there are at least some moral judgments that satisfy this norm. That is, the standpoint in 
part constituted by universality is not *empty*; it entails that some judgments are correct. 
111  Assumption: not (torture claim) = torturing children for fun is permissible. 
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There are ways of supplementing the norm so that it rules out such a result. But 
the obvious candidates involve appeal to substantive, ethical considerations. Consider, 
for example, the norm that a judgment must conform to a principle that would be 
agreed upon by all agents who are concerned to respect humanity in their own person 
and all others. 112  Torturing children for fun (I think it is safe to assume) does not 
respect their humanity. Hence, there is good reason to believe that any set of 
judgments that conform to this supplemented norm of universality will rule out 
torturing children for fun. But the supplemented norm involves appeal to a substantive 
ethical consideration – viz., that humanity is valuable and worthy of respect. This 
means that any norm that rests on such a consideration will itself be substantive – not 
formal. 
Hence, even if we allow that formal views may appeal to universality to 
guarantee some convergence, appeal to this norm is not sufficient to guarantee the 
truth of the torture claim. Such a norm – though compatible with this claim – is 
equally compatible with its contradictory. This is a troubling result for the formal 
constructivist.  
                                                
112 Compare the way that Kantians supplement the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) with the Formula 
of Humanity (FH). Many worry that FUL – like the formal universality norm I’ve described – is 
insufficient to get us moral outcomes. FUL says “Act only according to that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (G 4:421). But, for example, it is not 
clear how this norm alone would rule out the contradictory of the torture claim. Surely it seems possible 
to will a universal law that would allow torturing children for fun. It is hard to see what kind of practical 
inconsistency would be involved in so willing. In response to this kind of worry, some defenders of 
Kant look to other formulations of the law of morality (i.e., the categorical imperative) that one finds in 
Kant’s writings. This includes FH, amongst others. FH says “So act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (G 
4:429). I cannot evaluate the success of this kind of move. But it does appear as if FH stands a better 
chance of securing the right extension. For example, torturing children for fun does not use their 
humanity as an end in itself. The problem with an appeal to FH, however, is that it involves appeal to a 
substantive ethical consideration – viz., that humanity is valuable. But a formal constructivism cannot 
appeal to such a substantive value without undermining itself. 
 83 
If formal constructivism is to claim an advantage, on balance, over realism (or 
other stance-independence views), it must not only be compatible with the torture 
claim; it must also justify it to some extent. Of the two kinds of formal views, only 
those that guarantee convergence on a class of correct ethical judgments stand to have 
a chance. Humean views reject necessary convergence. According to these views, 
whether the torture claim turns out to be correct is contingent on the judgments that an 
agent starts out with. The result is that in the case of certain idealized eccentrics the 
torture claim does not turn out to be correct.113 Kantian views, by contrast, state that 
no matter what judgments one starts out with there will necessarily be a convergence 
on a single class of correct ethical judgments. If the torture claim, or some other claim 
that supported it, could be shown to belong to this convergence class, defenders of this 
kind of formal constructivism could claim to meet our challenge. But, as I have just 
argued, there does not appear to be a merely formal norm that provides reason to think 
that the torture claim is true. The best candidate norms – e.g., norms of universality – 
are equally compatible with this claim’s contradictory. Standard supplements to this 
kind of norm appeal to substantive ethical judgments and, as such, are not available to 
defenders of formal views. Hence, it would appear as if no version of formal 
constructivism can justify the torture claim. This marks a serious defect of the view. 
Hence, formal constructivism appears to do worse than realism in at least one 
                                                
113 Even if we restrict ourselves to the actual world (one in which ICEs probably don’t exist) Humean 
views still have problems with the torture claim. Again, this claim states that torturing children for fun 
would be wrong even if no one ever took it to be such. As I argued in section III, someone who accepts 
this claim has good reason to reject C2. Importantly, C2 does not require postulating idealized 
eccentrics; rather, someone who accepts it thinks that the torture claim might have been false for them. 
Here I take it that the relevant possible worlds are still close ones. But the Humean is committed to C2. 
In fact, this counterfactual practically defines the view.  
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important respect. This undermines the constructivist’s claim that her view is superior, 
on balance, to realism.  
Defenders of formal constructivism acknowledge the kind of challenge I have 
been presenting. But some would disagree with the way that I have characterized their 
views. In fact, some would argue that formal constructivism, properly understood, 
avoids this objection. In the following sections, I entertain two possible responses and 
argue that they fail to neutralize the objection I have been presenting. 
 
 
3.6 Is the Challenge Too Strong? 
 
One might object that the challenge I am pressing does not just affect formal versions 
of constructivism; rather, some stance-independence views look to be equally 
deficient. If this is right, isn’t the challenge too strong? 
 Formal constructivism isn’t the only view that may have a problem justifying 
the torture claim. Some stance-independence views may have a problem, as well. 
Consider a simple hedonistic act utilitarianism.114 Very roughly, this view states that 
the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the balance of pleasure over pain 
that it produces in the whole world relative to that of the available alternatives. The 
experience of pleasure and pain are not intentional stances that agents take. Rather, on 
this view, an action’s wrongness will always be independent of an agent’s taking it to 
                                                
114 I take it that this view is compatible with a host of metaethical positions, including realism. 
However, as I will soon explain, it presents a stance-independent account of moral wrongness. Hence, it 
is incompatible with any formal constructivism. 
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be such.115 In the terms introduced in Chapter 1, the view provides a weakly – but not 
strongly – mind dependent account of moral truth. But if wrongness is contingent on 
facts about pleasure and pain, there is no guarantee that the torture claim will come out 
true. In fact, this is a standard objection against consequentialist views in general (of 
which hedonistic act utilitarianism is a species), i.e., that in principle they may yield 
results that diverge from our considered judgments about particular cases. If the 
challenge I am putting to the formal constructivist is merely a version of this 
objection, it would be unfair to appeal to it as a consideration that counts against it and 
in favor of stance-independent forms of realism, since not even all stance-
independence views can justify it. Does my challenge apply equally to hedonistic 
utilitarianism? No. 
  The challenge I have presented for formal views is that they cannot justify the 
torture claim, even if they turn out to be compatible with its truth. Hedonistic act 
utilitarianism, by contrast, can provide some good reason for thinking that the torture 
claim is true, even if it cannot guarantee its truth. According to this view, the claim’s 
truth depends on facts about pleasure and pain. It may turn out that once we 
investigate how such actions affect people we will see that they generally (if not 
always) produce a greater balance of pain over pleasure or less pleasure than the 
                                                
115 Of course, what we take to be wrong may affect the balance of pleasure and pain. For example, if we 
take torturing children for fun to be wrong, we may be more pained when witnessing such acts than if 
we took no stance on the issue. This might then contribute to the overall balance of pain produced by 
the action. But even in this case facts about pleasure and pain would still be independent of the stances 
we hold. Our stances might bear a causal relation to what we experience as painful or pleasurable, but 
facts about pleasure and pain still do not reduce to facts about stances; pleasure and pain are (arguably) 
not stances. 
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alternative actions available to an agent.116 Indeed this seems likely to be the case 
since torture is painful! Whatever pleasure one may derive from subjecting others to 
this treatment is very likely to be outweighed by the pain it creates (at least in worlds 
that are anything like the actual world). So, not only does hedonistic act utilitarianism 
provide a clear approach to justifying the torture claim, it appears likely, in a world 
like ours, to justify it to some extent. 
But can’t even the Humean get you this much? Isn’t it likely, in a world like 
ours, that agents start out with judgments that are likely to support the torture claim? It 
is true that the Humean may do as well as the utilitarian at justifying the claim that 
torturing children for fun is wrong. But this is not all that the torture claim involves. 
Recall, it says that this torture is wrong even if no one ever took it to be such. Neither 
the Humean nor the Kantian can justify this last bit.  
Humeans are committed to the counterfactual claim that if one started out with 
very different ethical judgments, torturing children for fun might turn out to be 
permissible. As I argued earlier, someone who accepts the torture claim has reason to 
reject this counterfactual. That is, if you accept the torture claim you have good reason 
to accept Torture Plus and this second claim is incompatible with a formal Humean 
constructivism. Importantly, Torture Plus does not involve appeal to far away possible 
worlds. Someone who rejects it thinks that the torture claim might have been false for 
them. Here I take it that the relevant possible worlds are still close-by ones.  
Kantians have a hard time establishing their view as a genuine alternative to 
Humean ones. But, even assuming that they succeed in this, they provide no reason to 
                                                
116 The fact that this is generally but not always the case might support an indirect version over a simple 
act utilitarianism. 
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think that the torture claim is supported by the convergence class. In other words, on 
such a view, it may turn out that some actions are wrong even if no one ever took them 
to be such. But the formal Kantian constructivist cannot justify the claim that torturing 
children for fun is one of these.  
So, the challenge I have presented is not too strong. It may pose a problem for 
formal versions of constructivism. But it poses no similar problem for stance-
independence views, like hedonistic act utilitarianism. On such a view, there is no 
guarantee that the torture claim is true. But, given what we know about torture and its 
effects, hedonistic act utilitarianism provides good reason for thinking that the claim 
that torturing children for fun is wrong even if no one took it to be such. By contrast, 
neither version of constructivism can justify the entire claim. In worlds like ours, 
Humean views may justify the claim that such torture is wrong, but it cannot justify 
the claim that it would be wrong even if no one took it to be such. Formal Kantian 
views, by contrast, may justify the claim that some actions are wrong even if no one 
took them to be such, but they cannot justify the claim that torturing children for fun is 
one of these. 
 
3.7 What if the Constructivist Rejects Moral Rationalism? 
 
A formal constructivist might argue that all my challenge has shown is that 
constructivism has defects when construed as a view about morality. But ethical 
constructivism need not be comprehensive. For example, Rawls, Scanlon, and 
(arguably) Korsgaard each present non-comprehensive versions of constructivism. My 
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opponent might claim that the lesson to draw from this objection is that constructivists 
should restrict their views to practical reason. On this revised view, constructivists are 
engaged in a project of explaining reasons for action, not what it is for some action to 
be right or wrong, or some object or state-of-affairs to be good or bad. The torture 
claim, as formulated, is a moral claim. It is not a claim about an agent’s reasons for 
action. This means that a failure to justify the torture claim should not be seen as a 
deficiency of constructivism per se.  
Although this is a line that a formal constructivist could take (in fact, it has 
been proposed by Sharon Street),117 it significantly weakens the challenge that 
constructivism presents to the realist. First, it involves rejecting a popular doctrine that 
some constructivists have thought provided a comparative advantage to their view: 
viz., moral rationalism.118 Second, once moral rationalism has been rejected it turns 
out that there is little reason for realists to worry about constructivism.  
According to the challenge I have presented, formal constructivism does not 
stand in reflective equilibrium with certain considered moral judgments. Specifically, 
it lacks the resources to justify the torture claim. In order to avoid this objection, it is 
not enough that a constructivist restrict her view to claims about reasons; she must 
also reject moral rationalism.  
Moral rationalism, very roughly, is the view that moral requirements 
necessarily provide us with reasons for action. For example, according to this view, it 
follows that it is morally wrong for an agent to do something, only if that agent has 
                                                
117 See Street (2009). 
118 Substantive constructivists like Rawls and Korsgaard take the alleged truth of moral rationalism to 
count in favour of their views and against moral realism. I present and evaluate their arguments in 
Chapter 4. 
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reason not to do it. A formal constructivist might insist that her view is merely 
intended to provide an account of reasons for action, but unless she also rejects moral 
rationalism she will not succeed in avoiding the objection. According to a formal 
constructivist account of reasons, it might turn out that certain idealized eccentrics, 
e.g., an idealized Hitler or Caligula, have no reason not to torture children for fun. 
Together with moral rationalism, it would follow that it is also not wrong of them to 
torture. If it were, they’d have reason not to. So, it is not enough for the formal 
constructivist to restrict herself to reasons for action. If she is to avoid my challenge, 
she must also reject moral rationalism. But some (including prominent substantive 
constructivists) would take this rejection itself to represent a significant cost of the 
view.119  
In response to this kind of worry, a formal constructivist might introduce a 
distinction between strong and weak versions of moral rationalism. Let us take strong 
moral rationalism to be the view that moral claims always provide us with all-things-
considered reason for action. By contrast, we may understand weak moral rationalism 
as the view that moral claims always provide us with some reason for action. A formal 
constructivist might only reject the strong version, not the weaker one. In this way, she 
might claim to accommodate enough of what is appealing about rationalism without 
committing herself to the troubling conclusion that, e.g., it would not be wrong of 
Caligula to torture children for fun. 
According to strong moral rationalism, if torturing children for fun is wrong, 
one has all-things-considered reason not to torture. But, per stipulation, we are 
                                                
119 For the attractions of moral rationalism, see the discussion in Chapter 4, section 2. 
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supposing that an idealized Caligula does not have all-things-considered reason not to 
torture. Although the formal constructivist accepts this outcome about Caligula’s 
reasons, she wants to avoid the conclusion that it is not wrong of Caligula to torture 
children for fun. So let us suppose that she rejects the strong thesis in favor of the 
weaker one. In this case, the torture claim may obtain without its also being the case 
that Caligula has an all-things-considered reason not to torture. All that the weak 
thesis requires in this case is that Caligula have some reason not to torture – and for all 
we have said it might turn out that he does.   
The weak thesis allows that one’s moral reasons come apart from one’s all-
things-considered reasons for acting. Of course, on this view, moral claims always 
provide one with moral reasons. But the weak thesis allows that moral reasons may 
fall short of what one has reason to do full stop. So, even if it is wrong of Caligula to 
torture children for fun, he may, nevertheless, still have all-things-considered reason to 
do this (perhaps because his moral reasons are silenced by other considerations, or 
outweighed on the whole).120  This response works well enough for an opponent who 
grants that Caligula would still have moral reasons not to torture. But why must her 
opponent grant this? 
If a formal constructivism is compatible with its being the case that Caligula 
has all-things-considered reason to torture, it would appear to be equally compatible 
with its being the case that Caligula has no reason not torture. Why couldn’t an 
opponent stipulate this, as well? On the Humean view, reasons of any kind are always 
                                                
120 Street (2009) has additional things to say to the person who would still take issue with this as result 
about Caligula’s reasons for action, but I would like to set this worry aside. Again, my concern here is 
primarily the consequences that Street’s formal Humean constructivism has as a view of the nature of 
morality. 
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a function of the attitudes and judgment an agent starts out with. Formal Kantian 
constructivists deny this. But, as I have argued, they lack the resources to back up this 
claim. So why not stipulate that the set of attitudes and judgments that Caligula starts 
out with, together with the non-normative facts, is such that his practical standpoint 
entails that he has no reason whatsoever not to torture? This would certainly make the 
case extreme, since it is hard to imagine there being no features of Caligula’s ethical 
standpoint, together with the non-normative facts, that would entail his having at least 
some reason not to torture. But formal constructivists like Street are happy to admit 
far-flung thought-experiments.121  What’s more, such a case would appear to be 
separated from the original presentation by degree, not kind. If this is correct, a formal 
constructivist must accept the challenge. But, in this case, we see that even weak 
moral rationalism is still too strong. On the weak view, if Caligula turns out to have no 
reason whatsoever not to torture, it still follows that it is not wrong of Caligula to do 
so. The initial challenge stands.  
                                                
121 Street (2009): 
  
I agree with those who think that the best overall theory of value must prove itself in its 
handling of hypothetical cases. Indeed, I would go farther than this: not only is it not silly to 
think about ideally coherent eccentrics, these characters haven’t gotten anywhere near enough 
philosophical attention. In my view, ICEs are where the action is if we want to get clear on the 
relation between our attitudes, value, and the world… It is only in cases where ideal coherence 
is stipulated that we can be sure the two views will generate different consequences…. (p.  
279)   
 
There is a sense in which nothing hinges on what we say about ICEs, and there is a sense in 
which everything does. Nothing hinges on these cases in the sense that none of us will ever 
actually encounter an ICE. But everything hinges on these cases in the sense that our whole 
conception of ourselves and what we’re doing when we engage in practical reasoning depends 
on the right thing to say about them. How should we understand the relationship between 
ourselves, and the world? When we face the deepest, toughest questions about how to conduct 
our lives, is the kind of fidelity we’re after fidelity to something independent or is it fidelity to 
ourselves? … we are forced by [the mere possibility of ICEs] to ask whether there is 
something they would be missing that we’re not. If we were like them rather than ourselves, in 
other words, would be in error about something, or would we just be different? (p. 294). 
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The only way for the formal constructivist to avoid this is to reject moral 
rationalism entirely – both strong and weak versions – accepting whatever costs this 
may bring. Some will be unmoved by the alleged costs of rejecting moral rationalism. 
But the costs to constructivism go beyond those that come with rejecting a popular 
doctrine.  
Once moral rationalism has been rejected there is little reason to think that 
constructivism still poses a serious challenge to realism.122 A formal constructivism 
about practical reason would still conflict with a comprehensive ethical realism – i.e., 
realism about morality, value, and practical reason. But if moral rationalism is false, it 
turns out that there is little motivation for the realist to be comprehensive. If one is 
convinced that morality is stance-independent and that moral claims necessarily 
provide one with reasons for action, one might infer that reasons for action must also 
be stance-independent. If they weren’t, the connection between morality and reasons 
for action would appear to be contingent. How could there be a necessary connection 
between things that are essentially distinct? Once moral rationalism is rejected, 
however, there is little pressure to account for morality and reasons in similar coin. In 
fact, this alleged difference is at the heart of a skeptical challenge to morality that 
many realists take seriously.  
                                                
122 Such a concession would appear to concede too much to realists. Recall that one of the motivations 
for constructivism involves appeal to naturalistic concerns. Constructivists, following Mackie (1977), 
argue that realism commits one to a queer ontology and epistemology. Arguably, the central premise in 
Mackie’s Queerness argument is that realists are committed to objective prescriptivity. This is supposed 
to result from taking moral rationalism together with a realist view of objectivity as stance-
independence. If the constructivist concedes rationalism, then it is far less clear why she should think 
that moral properties are queer. The charge of queerness would have to apply strictly to the idea that 
morality is stance-independent. But now the feature of morality that was supposed to make it so 
different from other stance-independent properties is missing. As the epistemological argument 
piggybacks on the metaphysical argument, it now turns out that neither objection goes through. 
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Some realists reject moral rationalism because they take morality and reasons 
for action to be so different.123 Although they think that realism presents the best 
account of morality, they deny that moral claims necessarily provide us with reasons 
for action. One of their motivations for rejecting the doctrine is that it does not take 
one popular and historically important type of skeptical challenge seriously enough.124 
Many think that it is an open question whether performing the morally right action is 
always or often in an agent’s best interests.  The worry is that reasons for action are 
plausibly considered egoistically. That is, what reasons an agent has are to be 
understood in terms of some function of her interests. Morality, by contrast, often 
requires that an agent sacrifice her interests for the sake of others. Since morality will 
sometimes require self-sacrifice, it would appear as if there is a conflict between 
morality and self-interest, or prudence. The moral skeptic challenges the realist to 
show that the nature of morality and the nature of reasons for action are such that we 
have reason to be moral.  
Far from undermining moral realism, a constructivist account of reasons might 
figure in a realist’s response to the skeptic.125 In this context, it is not clear that the 
kind of objections I have been pressing against constructivism turn out to matter 
                                                
123 See, e.g., Brink (1993). 
124 For example, this kind of sceptical challenge is voiced by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book ii of 
Plato’s Republic. 
125 Let us call rational egoism the view that one only has a reason if the action contributes to her 
interests. Since claims about reasons, on this view, make essential reference to the agent, we might also 
refer to this view as an agent-relative account of reasons for action. Now constructivism about practical 
reason also represents an agent-relative account of reasons for action. On this view, an agent’s reasons 
are understood as a function of her judgments or stances. So far, this says nothing about an agent’s 
interests. But, as an agent-relative view, there is no reason why such an account could not be made to 
conform to rational egoism and the terms of the challenge I have presented. In order to square egoism 
with constructivism, all one needs to do is take an agent’s interests to be a function of her judgments or 
stances. 
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much. For example, suppose that I am correct and it turns out that constructivism 
cannot morally justify the torture claim or rule out the possibility that ICEs like 
Caligula have no reason not to torture. Even if this is all true, constructivism might 
still put us in a position to show that we (or people like us) have reason to be moral. 
This would still arguably mark an advance over the view held by a skeptic like 
Thrasymachus who thinks morality is only for the deluded and the weak – those who 
cannot see what their true reasons are or who can but lack the courage or resources to 
act on them. If a constructivism achieves this much, a realist might appeal to a 
constructivist account of reasons in her response to the skeptic.    
A constructivist might avoid the kind of challenge I have presented if she 
restricts her view to practical reason. But in so doing she incurs new costs. Not only 
must she absorb the cost of rejecting moral rationalism; she also undermines her own 
claim to challenge realism. By rejecting moral rationalism, she changes the playing 
field. In this new context, realism and constructivism might better be seen as 
complimentary, rather than as opposing, views.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Current consensus has it that formal versions of constructivism offer the only coherent 
challenge to a stance-independent realism. But, as I have argued, formal views are the 
most vulnerable to challenges from within ethical theory. Insofar as they are formal, 
they lack the resources to justify our considered judgments. The torture claim may 
stand in as a stock example. But it is not unique. Arguably there are many considered 
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judgments that take a similar form. That is, we are committed to thinking that many 
different kinds of acts would be wrong (or permissible, or right, or just, or brave, or 
cruel, or wicked, etc.) even if no one ever took them to be such. Formal views fail to 
justify these considered judgments because they reject (3). 
Realism, by contrast, commits one to (3) and would, consequently, appear to 
do a better job of accommodating these considered judgments. Although they might 
not guarantee that any particular judgment is correct, there is no principled obstacle to 
justification for the realist. The realist’s success together with the constructivist’s 
failure counts as a comparative advantage for realism. According to the importance 
that constructivists themselves assign to considered judgments in their theory building, 
this deficiency significantly undermines the attractiveness of formal versions of 
constructivism. This result should prompt the constructivist to revisit the plausibility 
of substantive views.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, we will see two different arguments that constructivists 
have wielded against the realist’s condition (4). These would appear to support some 
version of a substantive constructivism. The first argument concerns moral rationalism 
and the force of reasons; the second concerns the significance of autonomy to our 
thinking about moral agency and action. Both arguments are supposed to address the 
scope of condition (3). In other words: what reason do we have to accept the realist’s 
condition (4)? 
 Realists might disagree with constructivists about particular cases. As I argued 
in Chapter 1, condition (4) provides a way of explaining this disagreement. But what 
are the grounds for thinking that one side or the other wins out in these disputes about 
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ethical objectivity? In other words, why should we accept (4) – viz., the claim that the 
objectivity characterized in condition (3) extends to all moral principles? 
Alternatively, are there any countervailing reasons for assigning stance-dependent 
ethical truths a wide scope in our theory (especially to the extent that Scanlon or 
Korsgaard suggest)? In the next two chapters, I lay out specific arguments that 
constructivists have presented in response to these questions. If they are sound, then 
there is good reason to reject (4) – even if (3) correctly characterizes some part of the 
ethical.  
Some constructivists, like Korsgaard, think that this claim follows if we accept 
moral rationalism, an independently plausible first-order view. They argue that there 
are certain features of practical reason that resist a realist characterization. That is, 
these features provide good reason to think that the truth of most reasons judgments is 
stance-dependent. But if moral rationalism is true, the result is that there is good 
reason to think that the truth of most moral judgments is also stance-dependent. I 
present and evaluate this argument in Chapter Four. 
In addition to moral rationalism, constructivists also appeal to a distinct, yet 
related, consideration about the role of autonomy in our thinking about morality and 
practical reason. They claim that if moral truth were stance-independent, as the realist 
maintains, we would lack the appropriate control over our actions and who we are. On 
their view, such a result would leave very little that is recognizable of our conception 
of morality and moral agency. Autonomy demands that we have control over the 
standards that govern our practical lives and whether our judgments about them count 
as true. The constructivist concludes from this that the wider the scope one assigns 
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stance-dependent ethical truth, the better this is for our autonomy. I present and 
evaluate this argument in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
NORMATIVE ALIENATION AND THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Morality can be difficult. It often seems to require that we sacrifice our own good for 
another’s. Such sacrifices may prove costly, perhaps requiring us, on occasion, to lay 
down our own lives. One of the main challenges for moral theory is to explain why we 
have reason to be moral, even when it is difficult or contrary to our own interest, and 
why these reasons should matter to us. In other words, the success of a moral theory 
will in part depend on its ability to accommodate the following three claims.126 
 
(i) Commonsense Morality: Moral requirements include universally 
applicable other-regarding duties (e.g., duties of forbearance, 
cooperation, and aid). 
(ii) Moral Rationalism: Moral requirements necessarily provide agents 
with some reason for action. 
(iii)  Rational Force: A conception of practical reason should be able to 
explain why these reasons matter. 
 
                                                
126 Cf., Brink (1992). 
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Although (i)-(iii) are each controversial, I will show that each also enjoys a good deal 
of intuitive support and that a moral theory that can accommodate all three is 
preferable, other things being equal.  
Christine Korsgaard argues that together these three claims provide her own 
brand of constructivism a significant comparative advantage over moral realism. In 
short: they figure in an argument for the rejection of the realist’s condition (4).127 If 
Korsgaard is right, all moral truth is stance-independent – including the truth of moral 
principles. 
Very roughly, Korsgaard’s own view is that (a) commonsense moral 
requirements are requirements of practical reason, (b) the requirements of practical 
reason are constituted by procedurally sound deliberation, and (c) deliberation counts 
as procedurally sound just in case it conforms to the requirements of agency itself.  
The first claim is supposed to explain (ii) or why the connection between moral 
requirements and reasons for action is a necessary one. It says that the moral truths are 
just a subset of the truths about practical reason. This means that anytime a moral 
requirement applies to an agent, this agent will also have at least some reason to 
perform the action that morality requires of her. The second claim makes Korsgaard’s 
view a species of constructivism. It says that the truths of practical reason (which 
according to the first claim include moral truths, as well) are in some sense 
constructed by us in deliberation. It is also supposed to explain (iii) or why we should 
care about rational demands. On this view, rational demands (and, hence, moral 
demands) command our assent because they are themselves the outcomes of our own 
                                                
127 See Chapter 1, section 5. 
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engaged deliberation – or, at least, what our deliberation ought to be, so long as we are 
deliberating well. The third claim about agency is supposed to explain (i) or why our 
actual moral requirements conform to common sense. How and whether this last claim 
in fact works is controversial.128 But in order to simplify things here, I will assume 
that this is true. I will also assume that the first claim works to satisfy (ii). My focus, 
rather, will be how the second claim secures (iii) and, to the extent it does, whether it 
in fact does a better job of this than moral realism, as Korsgaard contends.   
A robust moral realist, by contrast, is allegedly only able to accommodate two 
of the three claims at best. As I stated it in Chapter 1, robust moral realism involves an 
especially strong claim about objectivity. On this view, all moral principles are 
supposed to be objective in the sense that the matter of their truth is independent of the 
intentional stances (e.g., beliefs, desires, commitments) we bear toward morality. That 
is, whether a general moral statement is true or not (e.g., stealing is wrong) is 
independent of whether we believe it, or desire it, or would agree to it, etc. In other 
words, we don’t make these moral principles true just by believing that they are true or 
desiring or wishing that they were, or agreeing to act in accordance with the actions 
they propose. It is the notion of moral objectivity expressed in condition (4) that is 
supposed to cause a problem for realism, one that allegedly gives us reason to reject 
robust versions of the view. 
Whereas we might assume that any version of realism will account for (i), 
Korsgaard argues that the realist’s commitment to (what I have been calling) condition 
                                                
128 The difficulty that constructivists have in establishing this claim is illustrated in Chapter 3. Although 
the topic there was formal constructivism, it would appear as if similar problems may arise for 
defenders of substantive views. 
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(4) is incompatible with both (ii) and (iii). That is, she thinks a realist may account for 
either Moral Rationalism or Rational Force, but not both; she has to choose. If this is 
correct and constructivism is able to accommodate all three claims, this would count 
as a significant comparative advantage for Korsgaard’s view. For constructivism is 
supposed to secure a sense of moral objectivity without (4). 
For the sake of argument, I will assume that the considerations expressed by 
(i)-(iii) are plausible constraints on a moral theory. My approach in this paper will be 
to show that even if we accept this much, we have no good reason to accept 
Korsgaard’s constructivism. This is because a realist can exploit the same general 
strategy of accommodation that Korgaard’s constructivist employs. If I am right, (i)-
(iii) turn out to be at least as compatible with a robustly realist, stance-independent 
account of moral truth as they are with constructivism. 
In section 2, I will try to clarify and motivate each of our three initial claims. In 
section 3, I will then present Korsgaard’s argument for the claim that realism is 
incompatible with these considerations and show exactly how constructivism is 
supposed to avoid a similar conclusion. In sections 4 and 5, I will return to the topic of 
Rational Force. A more careful review of the things that Korsgaard has said about this 
condition will reveal some problems for her own view. Specifically, Korsgaard 
sometimes describes the requirement expressed by Rational Force in terms of 
motivation; other times, however, she describes it in terms of something that could 
serve to block a potential regress of practical justification. As I will argue, however, 
Korsgaard’s own view appears inadequate to satisfy the condition of Rational Force 
when it is understood in either of these ways.  This failure prompts me to ask whether 
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there might not be some third way of construing Rational Force, one that Korsgaard’s 
view in fact satisfies and yet which might still serve to contrast her view against (some 
versions of) realism. In section 6, I claim to have identified just such an account – one 
that appears to enjoy some independent plausibility. However, as I go on to show in 
section 7, even this characterization of Rational Force would only appear to give 
constructivism an advantage over some versions of moral realism, not all. If this is 
right, then Korsgaard is mistaken. These three considerations do not provide 
constructivism with a comparative advantage over realism per se. Even if they might 
show that constructivism is superior to some robustly realist views, constructivism 
does not turn out to be superior to every robust version of realism. 
 
4.2 The Explanatory Challenge 
 
In theorizing about morality, our aim in part is to systematize our deeply held moral 
judgments at various levels of generality.129 This includes both considered judgments 
about particular cases as well as the theoretical judgments that might help to explain or 
systematize these. As I will soon explain, each of (i)-(iii) is initially quite plausible 
and arguably represents a commitment that we should be concerned to accommodate 
in our moral theories. Hence, a theory with more explanatory power than another with 
respect to these commitments is better, other things being equal.  
                                                
129 Again, the method of theory construction I have in mind here is reflective equilibrium. Every major 
defender of constructivism accepts this method (see Chapter 3). Hence, it is fair to assume it here. 
Again, I say the aim is only in part to systematize considered moral convictions since one might also be 
concerned to bring one’s moral theory into line with one’s considered theoretical commitments about 
other topics – e.g., one’s commitments in metaphysics, epistemology, or the philosophy of language. 
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Commonsense Morality includes all of those other-regarding duties that 
potentially make being moral so difficult. According to Common Sense, you have a 
duty, amongst others, not to harm or take advantage of others, as well as a duty to 
keep your promises, give others what is owed to them, and aid others when the threat 
to them is great and the cost to you insignificant. Now, it may turn out on occasion 
that certain features of one’s particular situation are such that the obligation that 
usually attaches to these principles of action is outweighed or cancelled. But, in 
general, I take it as a platitude of our everyday moral thinking that there are moral 
requirements that are other-regarding in something like this way and that the actions 
they require represent potential sources of sacrifice.  
A quick qualification: One need not think that Common Sense is infallible. We 
may discover, after much reflection and inquiry into the relevant sort of facts, that 
certain commonly held beliefs about what our duties are turn out to be mistaken – i.e., 
that certain so-called “duties” are not in fact moral requirements.  For example, we 
might not have a duty to keep our promises per se; rather, it might turn out that we 
only have a more general duty to show respect for ourselves, and others – and this 
usually involves the keeping of promises, but it needn’t in every case. Or it might turn 
out that there is no demanding duty of aid to others with whom we share no significant 
bonds or relations, even if the threat to these others is significant and the cost to us of 
giving aid insignificant.130  
However, it would also appear as if there is a limit to how much is revisable. 
Although Common Sense is compatible with some revision, it does not seem 
                                                
130 This is a view that might appear especially plausible when the question is whether, or the extent to 
which, we have a demanding duty of aid to the global poor or distant future generations. 
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compatible with the kind of wholesale revisionism that many see in certain kinds of 
challenges to morality: e.g., ethical egoism, or say a view that committed us to the 
rejection of justice as a general moral requirement.131 There might be compelling 
arguments for these views. But, nevertheless, they would still lack one feature that 
Common Sense has in abundance: viz., intuitive appeal. What makes Common Sense 
plausible is simply that the kinds of duties it enumerates are just the kind of moral 
requirements that people would commonly accept after minimal, sober reflection on 
morality.  
As we know from Chapter 3, moral rationalism is the view that moral 
requirements necessarily provide the agents to whom they apply with some reason for 
action.132 It is a consequence of this view that if an action is morally wrong, we have 
at least some reason not to perform or promote it.133 Moral rationalists take this to be a 
                                                
131 According to ethical egoism, morally right action for any agent is one that would produce certain 
good consequences for the agent performing the action. One worry is that this sort of view is incoherent 
in some way. However, another – and the one that concerns us in this context – is that egoism is 
incompatible with Commonsense. Whatever duties we have to others, on this view, are always 
derivative. That is, they only count as duties to the extent that they contribute to the conferral of good 
consequences for the agent. This view arguably does not capture the importance of impartiality in our 
moral thinking. Commonsense, by contrast, states that these duties are impartial – i.e., more than merely 
derivative – even if they could be justified by reference to the agent’s own good or interests, as well. 
One might also worry that utilitarianism or other versions of consequentialism pose a similar threat to 
Commonsense. However, by contrast with egoism, the threat is less clear. Although defenders of these 
views are often open to significant revision of our moral commitments – consequent on the what the 
outcomes turn out to be, utilitarians (or consequentialists) are concerned to accommodate impartiality, 
as well as a good deal of Commonsense. Perhaps an exception to this last claim would be the scalar 
consequentialism advanced most prominently by Alastair Norcross (2006) – see also Howard-Snyder, 
Norcross (1993). According to this view, we ought to jettison the deontic vocabulary that informs our 
Commonsense talk of duties and restrict ourselves to the notion of relative value – i.e., the idea of an 
action producing outcomes that are better or worse than those produced by another available action. 
Such a view would appear to conflict with Commonsense. 
132 See, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2003) and Finlay, Schroeder (2008). Brink (1989) refers to this view as 
internalism about reasons (see, pp. 39ff). I opt for moral rationalism to avoid confusion with a different 
thesis that bears the same name: Bernard Williams’ (1979) view that what reasons an agent has depend 
on the elements of her motivational set. 
133 Sometimes it is claimed that morality necessarily provides overriding reasons for action. However, 
this strong claim is difficult to accommodate theoretically. See Brink (1997). It is also less clearly a 
deep feature of our ordinary moral thinking and practice. It looks as if there can be genuine conflicts 
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necessary truth.134 Anti-rationalists deny this. They think that what reasons we have 
and what moral truths obtain are independent questions, overlapping only 
contingently, if ever.135  
Moral rationalism is not uncontroversial but it commands a good deal of 
intuitive support. Consider the judgment that torturing suspected terrorists is morally 
wrong. When we deem this kind of behavior morally wrong, we imply that people 
who torture suspected terrorists are in violation of a standard of appropriate conduct. 
But, if moral rationalism were false, these standards would not themselves supply 
reasons for action. In other words, torturing suspected terrorists may be immoral, or 
morally unjustified, or inappropriate, but nevertheless there may turn out to be no 
reason not to perform this kind of action. And this seems confused. It seems mistaken 
to claim that the government, for example, ought not to torture suspected terrorists – 
and is morally wrong to do so – while also claiming that there is no reason at all for 
the government not to torture. What’s more, it might seem unfair to criticize someone 
who attends to all of her reasons for action, gives them their appropriate weight in 
                                                                                                                                       
between moral reasons and reasons of other kinds – e.g., reasons that relate to art, or the particular 
allegiances one has to one’s family or country – and that the moral ones are not always guaranteed to 
win out. This is in part why some moral decisions prove so difficult. Korsgaard recognizes this 
possibility herself. See Korsgaard (1996): 125-6. For this reason, I restrict myself to a weaker 
formulation of moral rationalism, one that states that moral claims necessarily provide some reason for 
action, even if these reasons ultimately fail to win out in deliberation. 
134 Sometimes moral rationalism is also understood as an a priori conceptual claim. Brink (1989) 
presents the view this way. It says that the nature of our justification for believing statements like the 
one above is a priori. The necessary connection between morality and rational authority is something 
that we come to understand through reflection on the nature of our moral concepts, not by discovering 
facts out in the world or through experience. This is because it represents a conceptual truth. Someone 
who judges that it would be wrong for an agent S to φ but denies that S has any reason to avoid φ-ing is 
not guilty of possessing a mistaken moral belief. That is, she does not merely fail to apply the concept 
of wrongness correctly. Rather, she fundamentally fails to grasp what wrongness is; she does not 
possess the concept. However, these further specifications turn out not to matter for the debate I present 
here. As Korsgaard presents the challenge, it is the necessity claim that realists fail to explain. For 
simplicity, I restrict my focus to the necessity claim.  
135 Foot (1972); Brink (1989) 
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deliberation, and acts accordingly. If the government acts on all of the reasons 
available to it and has no reason not to torture, it seems morally inappropriate to 
criticize it. These aspects of our everyday moral thinking appear to support the truth of 
moral rationalism.136  However, moral rationalism does not itself explain why we 
should care about conforming our actions to rational demands. Rather, this is 
something that is addressed by the next thesis. 
Rational Force states that a good ethical theory must provide some explanation 
for thinking that we should care about conforming our actions to rational demands that 
does not simply involve supplying another reason. Reasons for action, unlike brute 
desires and impulses, have a special authority that is supposed to matter to our 
deliberations. They ought to grip us and command our assent. But if our reasons bore 
no particular relation to the conditions of our actual deliberations or the kinds of 
considerations that in fact matter to us, it would be difficult to see why these rational 
demands should in fact grip us or command our assent. What we want is an account of 
what a reason is and why we have them that explains why rational demands matter – 
why we (should) care. 
Now, as we are going to see, it is very difficult to say exactly what this all 
means or how this explanatory condition constrains theory. Specifically, what do we 
mean by care here? And, once we get clear on this, how strong is this requirement? 
Must an account explain why we will necessarily care in the relevant sense? Or will 
                                                
136 In short, if moral rationalism is true, then one cannot be held in violation of a moral standard unless 
one has at least some reason not to perform or promote a particular action. There seems to be some 
confusion involved in supposing that one who violates a moral standard need not act contrary to any 
reason she has. Conversely, if someone has no reason to refrain from an action, it seems unfair to blame 
her for performing it. See Shafer-Landau (2003), 192-3. 
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merely some account of the connection between reasons and an agent’s concerns and 
interests satisfy this condition? 
Let this statement of the condition serve as something like a first pass (one that 
we will revisit as the discussion unfolds). Even if it still needs refinement, as I think it 
does, it is clearly in the neighborhood of a genuine and legitimate ethical concern that 
someone might raise. If someone tells you that you morally ought to do something, I 
think it is reasonable to ask why we should care? The extent to which a view of 
morality or reasons for action can address this kind of question will thus matter to its 
plausibility on the whole. 
So far, I have been concerned to explain and motivate (i)-(iii). From this brief 
sketch of the theses, I hope it is clear why many philosophers have found them 
plausible. Although a view that can accommodate each of these three theses is 
preferable, other things being equal, it turns out that it is very difficult to 
accommodate all three. 
 
4.3 The Argument from Moral Reasons 
 
As I’ve already mentioned, Korsgaard thinks that moral realism is incompatible with 
all three of these considerations and that, at best, it can accommodate only two of 
them. The problem with realism, on her view, is exactly that feature that distinguishes 
it from her own brand of constructivism: viz., the realist’s commitment to the stance-
independence of all moral principles. She argues that if we take this realist 
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commitment together with Moral Rationalism, the pair turns out to be incompatible 
with an account of Rational Force.  
Although it is widely agreed that Korsgaard presents this argument in several 
of her works, it is difficult to find a concise or precise statement it.137 What follows 
here is my own reconstruction of what I take her argument to be, one that I think 
represents both a fair and compelling interpretation of at least one of the many things 
that she finds troubling about moral realism. This presentation will also prove useful 
insofar as it should help us to identify and isolate the claims that are doing the heavy 
lifting and, consequently, put us in a good position to see what the most plausible 
route for a realist response will be. 
 
Argument from Moral Reasons 
1. All true moral principles are essentially stance-independent. [Robust Moral 
Realism] 
2. Moral requirements necessarily provide agents with some reason for action. 
[Moral Rationalism] 
3. If the nature of morality were essentially distinct from the nature of practical 
reason, there could be no necessary connection between the two. [Hume’s 
Dictum] 
4. So, the nature of morality and the nature of practical reason are not essentially 
distinct. [2, 3] 
5. So, the truths of practical reason are also ultimately stance-independent. [1, 4] 
                                                
137 For the fullest treatment see Korsgaard (1996). 
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6. If the truths of practical reason are stance-independent, they bear no immediate 
or necessary connection to an agent’s deeply held concerns. [Korsgaard’s 
Assumption] 
7. So, realism cannot account for the Rational Force of moral reasons. [5, 6] 
 
If the conclusion of this argument is correct, moral realism fails to satisfy Rational 
Force, an important constraint on our moral theorizing. What’s more, if Korsgaard is 
justified in claiming that her own view can satisfy this constraint, it would appear as if 
constructivism bears an important comparative advantage over realism. I should add 
that I think that this argument is a valid one – i.e., if the premises are all true, we have 
no choice but to accept the conclusion. This means that if we are going to reject the 
conclusion we must show that at least one of the premises is false.  
As I’ve presented it, the argument includes four independent assumptions – 
viz., 1, 2, 3, and 6. The rest of the premises – viz., 4, 5 – are supposed follow from 
them. Hence, if we are going to show that one of the argument’s premises is false, this 
is ultimately going to come down to one of these assumptions being mistaken.  In 
what follows, I’d like to make a few comments about each of these and provide some 
reasons that might be thought to support them before moving on to discuss my own 
strategy of response. 
The first assumption, in premise 1, is just supposed to follow from a 
commitment to moral realism.138 It represents a constitutive feature of the view that 
Korsgaard intends to target. As I mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, 
                                                
138 See Chapter 1, sections 5 and 6. 
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philosophers disagree about whether to include a stance-independence condition as 
part of realism, as well as whether it should take this particular scope. But, without 
this assumption, it does not appear as if Korsgaard has an opponent in this debate. It 
should also be noted that there are self-proclaimed realists (e.g., Russ Shafer-Landau, 
Derek Parfit, William Fitzpatrick) who insist on something like the view expressed in 
premise 1. What’s more, these realists think that it is because of this commitment to 1 
that they are able to lay claim to Commonsense Morality. They think that because 
morality is independent of us and our minds in this particular way, there is no special 
worry about how moral requirements could be other-regarding in the way that 
Common Sense suggests. 
Korsgaard, however, thinks that this commitment of realism is what leads to 
the argument’s troubling conclusion and, consequently, what counts in favor of her 
own constructivism. Recall that constructivism entails that at least some moral 
principles are stance-dependently true. Importantly, Korsgaard thinks that her own 
view avoids the argument’s conclusion because it entails the rejection of premise 1. 
The second assumption, in premise 2, is one that we have already had some 
occasion to discuss. It is just Moral Rationalism. As we have seen, this thesis would 
appear to be well supported by our everyday moral thinking and practice. Of course, 
one might worry that it might not be possible to accommodate all of the kinds of 
considerations that appear plausible to us in the everyday. Perhaps one of the main 
reasons we engage in philosophical reflection about morality is to help us decide how 
to best revise our moral commitments so that they in fact cohere with each other. If 
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this is right, then we might imagine a realist deciding to reject premise 2. In fact, some 
do. 
Some realists (including, e.g., David Brink) reject moral rationalism because 
they take morality and reasons for action to be so different.139 Although they think that 
realism presents the best account of morality, they deny that moral claims necessarily 
provide us with reasons for action. One of their motivations for rejecting the doctrine 
is that it does not take one popular and historically important type of skeptical 
challenge seriously enough.140  
Specifically, they think that it is an open question whether performing the 
morally right action is always or often in an agent’s best interests.  The worry is that 
reasons for action are plausibly considered egoistically. That is, what reasons an agent 
has are to be understood in terms of some function of her interests. Morality, by 
contrast, often requires that an agent sacrifice her interests for the sake of others. Since 
morality will sometimes require self-sacrifice, it would appear as if there is a conflict 
between morality and self-interest, or prudence. The moral skeptic challenges the 
realist to show that the nature of morality and the nature of reasons for action are such 
that we have reason to be moral. A realist might respond to this challenge with an 
account of why, in the actual world, it works out that agents usually have reason to be 
moral. But because she thinks that this is kind of skeptical challenge is a genuine one, 
she rejects the view that the connection between morality and practical reason is 
                                                
139 See, e.g., Brink (1993). 
140 For example, this kind of sceptical challenge is voiced by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book ii of 
Plato’s Republic. 
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necessary. In other words, this kind of realist accepts Common Sense and Rational 
Force but rejects Moral Rationalism. 
Although these kinds of considerations might give a realist good reason for 
rejecting premise 2, we will see that there are some strong considerations on the other 
side. What’s more, Korsgaard herself accepts this premise. Her commitment in itself 
doesn’t provide any special reason for thinking that premise 2 is true. But if we can 
show that it is possible to get everything she claims to care about without rejecting 
realism, we will have given her an especially strong rebuttal. In other words, we will 
have shown that the argument fails on her very own terms. 
The third assumption, in premise 3, is a metaphysical claim. It finds support in 
a principle that David Hume is supposed to have maintained in the Treatise.141 
Because of this connection, it is sometimes referred to as Hume’s Dictum. In it’s more 
general form, very roughly, it says that there are no metaphysically necessary 
connections between distinct types of entities. 
I take it that the basic idea here is that for a metaphysically necessary 
connection to obtain between two things, there has to be some kind of explanatory 
basis for that connection. But if the things belong to distinct types of entities, there is 
no such explanatory basis. So, there are no metaphysically necessary connections 
between such distinct types of things. 
Now, this is a principle that has been widely accepted. But it turns out that very 
little has been said in its support.142 Some philosophers have claimed that it is directly 
                                                
141 Hume (2000), Book I, Part III, § VI. 
142 For discussion of some the standard justifications that have been given, as well as a novel approach, 
see Jessica Wilson (2010). 
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justified – either in virtue of following analytically from the concepts involved or as 
simply “…expressing intuitions we have no good reason to question.”143 This kind of 
justification is not going to satisfy anyone who doesn’t already intuitively appreciate 
the force of the principle. But as there is also nothing particularly problematic about 
this assumption for realism per se, I will ask that we simply take it for granted as a bit 
common ground. Korsgaard herself does not explicitly appeal to it, but she also 
doesn’t say anything that would count against it. In any case, I think we need to supply 
it in order to make the argument go through. This leaves us with one last assumption 
to target. 
The fourth assumption, premise 6, is what I have called Korsgaard’s 
Assumption. I take it that this conditional statement is supposed to present a necessary 
condition for accommodating Rational Force, one that realism allegedly fails to 
satisfy. But why should we accept this condition?  
Our earlier discussion of Rational Force does appear to support the claim that a 
successful account of practical reason will be one that shows how reasons are 
immediately or necessarily connected to an agent’s deeply held concerns and interests. 
This much is uncontroversial. But what is not clear is why this requires that the truths 
of practical reason not be stance-independent. In order to justify this claim we must 
take a closer looks at Rational Force. If what we have said on behalf of the other 
assumptions has been convincing, then premise 6 would appear to be the only 
vulnerable assumption in the argument. Hence, if we want to reject the argument’s 
conclusion, we had better be able to find a problem with Korsgaard’s Assumption. 
                                                
143 Wilson (2010), 596. 
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In what follows, I will start off by canvassing some things that Korsgaard has 
said about Rational Force that might be thought to support this assumption. However, 
as I will argue, the refinements to Rational Force that they suggest are also ones that 
Korsgaard’s own view (viz., constructivism) itself fails to satisfy. This result would, of 
course, also undermine her claim that constructivism enjoys a comparative advantage 
over realism. This failure prompts me to search for some further refinement of 
Rational Force that might do the trick. Although I think that I have found just such a 
view – or at least one that would appear to give constructivism a comparative 
advantage over some versions of realism, it is not clear in the end that even this 
version will serve to support Korsgaard’s Assumption. This is because there would 
still appear to be other versions of realism that can similarly satisfy this 
characterization of Rational Force. 
 
4.4 Rational Force: A Second Pass 
 
Korsgaard talks about the requirement of Rational Force in different ways. On the one 
hand, she sometimes talks about it as the requirement that an account of practical 
reason explain the apparent connection between an agent’s having a reason and that 
agent’s motivation to act accordingly. On the other hand, she also talks about it as a 
requirement that the view be able to block a certain kind of skeptical challenge – one 
in which the skeptic responds by asking “But why should I care about reasons like 
that?” But, as I will argue, Korsgaard’s own view fails to satisfy Rational Force when 
it is construed in either of these ways. 
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Let’s first consider the construal of Rational Force in terms of some kind of 
motivational requirement. Here the basic idea is that when we ask why we should care 
about conforming our actions to the requirements of practical reason, the relevant 
sense of care is one of motivation. In other words, on this view, we might construe 
Rational Force in the following way: 
 
(iv) A conception of practical reason should be able to explain why an 
agent will necessarily be motivated to act according to the reasons she 
has. 
 
A few comments here: First, it is important that the connection between reasons and 
motivation be a necessary one. Anything less would make the condition too weak to 
be interesting. If the condition merely required an explanation for why an agent might 
be motivated to act according to the reasons she has, there would be no great challenge 
for realism (or any other view of morality). People might be motivated by all kinds of 
considerations. There is no reason to think that the moral should be any different. 
Second, however, (iv) does not say that the account must explain why an agent will 
necessarily be moved to action on the basis of her having a particular reason; rather, it 
should be read to say that she will have some motivation to perform the actions her 
reasons prescribe. This qualification is important, since – on at least some views – an 
agent might have a great many pro tanto reasons (i.e., reasons that count to this or that 
extent, but ones that might equally fall short of all-things-considered reasons for 
action). Of the many pro tanto reasons that apply to an agent in any particular 
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situation, some will prescribe practically inconsistent courses of action. This would of 
course be problematic if each necessarily moved her all the way to action. But so long 
as we take (iv) to say that the agent will only be necessarily motivated to some extent, 
no such problem arises. 
This understanding of Rational Force helps support the conclusion of our 
initial argument against realism. That is, it appears to lend some support to 
Korsgaard’s Assumption. If realism commits us to the view that the truths of practical 
reason are independent of our intentional stances, it also commits us to the view that 
these truths will be independent of an agent’s motivational stances. This is because 
motivational stances (e.g., desires, plans, commitments…) are a kind of intentional 
stance. So what an agent has reason to do and what she will be motivated to do may 
come apart. In fact, it is at least possible, on this view, for an agent to have a reason 
but be in no way motivated to perform the action it prescribes. If one, however, is 
committed to there being a necessary connection between reasons and motivation, the 
realist’s view of practical reason will turn out to be a disappointment. In short, the 
realist cannot satisfy (iv). 
In this respect, one might think that Korsgaard’s view bears an advantage over 
realism. But a quick inspection reveals that her constructivism can do no better with 
respect to motivation – even though it does not commit one to the allegedly 
problematic first premise of the argument. Whereas a rejection of the first premise is 
sufficient to block the conclusion to that argument, it turns out that there is another 
argument that starts with (i) and (ii) and forces us to reject (iv). 
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Here’s the argument. Suppose we accept Common Sense and Moral 
Rationalism. That is, we accept that moral requirements include universally 
applicable, other regarding duties and that these requirements necessarily provide the 
agents they apply to with some reason for action. From this it follows that some moral 
reasons are universally applicable and other regarding. But if our reasons (including 
these moral reasons) depended on agent’s desires or contingent motivational set, a 
particular agent might not turn out to have such reasons. But we just said that we do 
have such reasons (per stipulation). So, our reasons (including our moral ones) do not 
depend on an agent’s desires or contingent motivational set. So, it would appear as if 
someone who accepts (i) and (ii) – like Korsgaard – is unable to also coherently accept 
(iv) or Rational Force when it is construed in terms of motivation. We might say that 
(i) and (ii) commit one to the view that moral reasons are categorical – in the sense 
that they are not contingent on an agent’s desires or motives.  
Of course, to the extent that one finds (iv) a plausible way of cashing out the 
requirements of Rational Force, one might conclude that this gives us some reason to 
reconsider our commitments to (i) or (ii). Earlier, I mentioned Brink and Foot as those 
who reject (ii). But there are also those who go the other way and reject (i). 
For example, a moral relativist – like Gilbert Harman – might accept (ii) and 
the motivational construal of Rational Force in (iv) but reject (i).144 A relativist might 
try to account for the force of practical rationality by reducing claims about reasons to 
claims about an agent’s motivational states.  On this view, we care about the demands 
of practical reason because these demands are just a function of our caring about 
                                                
144 Harman (1975). 
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certain things in the first place (i.e., our antecedent motivational states). In fact, this 
reduction of facts about reasons to facts about motivation is what one might think 
Hume’s Dictum requires in order to explain the necessary connection described in (iv). 
However, since different people start off with different concerns and priorities, the 
demands of practical reason might differ across agents. In fact, on this view of 
practical reason, it might turn out that an agent has no reason whatsoever to aid, 
forbear, or cooperate with others in the way that Commonsense morality dictates. For 
example, on this view of practical reason, we might assume “…that, for Hitler, there 
might have been no reason at all not to order the extermination of the Jews.”145 
Together with moral rationalism, we would then have to conclude, as Harman in fact 
does, that “…it sounds odd to say that Hitler should not have ordered the 
extermination of the Jews, that it was wrong of him to do so.”146 But I think that, for 
many, this is a bullet that is just too big to bite. What’s more, the stronger rebuttal 
involves showing that Korsgaard fails on her own terms. And, importantly, Korsgaard 
accepts Commonsense Morality. 
Insofar as Korsgaard accepts (i) and (ii), she is also committed to the view that 
moral reasons are categorical in the sense that they are not contingent on an agent’s 
particular desires or motives. But then we have not vindicated her claim to 
accommodate all three of our considerations; we have, as of yet, no reason to think 
that her own constructivism betters moral realism. Either her own constructivism fails 
to meet the challenge she presents or we must understand Rational Force in some 
other sense. 
                                                
145 Harman (1975), 9. 
146 Harman (1975), 7. 
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4.5 Rational Force: A Third Pass 
 
So the motivational construal of Rational Force asked us to provide an account of 
reasons for action that could explain why someone who has a reason will necessarily 
be motivated to conform her actions to them. But – as we just saw – it is not just the 
realist who has a problem with this condition. Rather, any view that commits one to (i) 
and (ii) will fail to satisfy this kind of motivational requirement – and this importantly 
includes Korsgaard’s own view. 
But there is another way of characterizing Rational Force that we should 
consider – one that Korsgaard also appeals to at times.  
 
(v) A conception of practical reason should make any skeptical challenge 
unintelligible. 
 
This condition states that a successful account of practical reason will be one that 
explains what a reason is (and why we have them) in such a way that one cannot 
intelligibly ask why reasons like that should matter. In other words, once one is 
presented with the account, the question “But why should we care about that?” should 
not have an open feel to it; it should not express an intelligible question or one that any 
person who had a command of the relevant concepts could reasonably ask. If, 
however, the account may be met with open questions, it fails to satisfy this condition 
for Rational Force. 
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This approach represents an attempt to excavate the core truth out of G.E. 
Moore’s famous Open Question Argument.147 Although it is now generally 
acknowledged that Moore’s own version of the argument (one which relies on a 
controversial synonymy test for property identities) fails in one respect or another, 
some philosophers – including Korsgaard – nonetheless take Moore to have been onto 
a deeper objection against certain reductive views of normativity and Rational Force. 
If fact, Korsgaard herself has said that her argument against realism “is the ultimate 
extension of [Moore’s] open question argument.”148 
Korsgaard argues that any substantive realist account of practical reason fails 
to meet this condition. Take, for example, a paradigmatic yet admittedly caricatured 
view of moral reasons – a view we might call Unrefined Platonism. On this view, let’s 
say that what moral reasons we have are determined (in some fashion) by the relation 
our actions bear to certain supersensible entities – the forms. Korsgaard thinks that this 
kind of account of moral reasons does not satisfy the open question test. Here’s why. 
Suppose I tell you that it’s wrong to torture suspected terrorists and that you 
have reason not to perform actions of this type. You might just respond, “So what? 
Why should I care about conforming my actions to these reasons?” At this point, our 
Unrefined Platonist might reply, “Because, if you consult the forms, you will see that 
you have such reasons.” To which you respond, “But why should I care about that?” – 
“Why should I care about what the forms say I should do?” 
On the one hand, Korsgaard quite plausibly thinks that these last two questions 
remain open and that, as a result, the view fails to satisfy (v). Not only do they express 
                                                
147 Moore (1903). 
148 Korsgaard (2003), 112. 
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intelligible questions, it is also not clear how any realist could satisfactorily block this 
line of questioning. In this respect, (v) would also appear to support Korsgaard’s 
Assumption. One might think that a view counts as immediately or necessarily 
connected with an agent’s deeply held concerns and interests only if it successfully 
withstands an application of the open question test. But since no stance-independent 
view satisfies the test, it follows that no such view counts as satisfying the constraint 
of Rational Force.  
But, on the other hand – and far less plausibly – Korsgaard takes it that her 
own constructivist account does block this kind of skeptical rejoinder. But it is not 
clear that it can. Again, as with the last candidate, the condition expressed by (v) 
appears too strong for Korsgaard’s own view. 
Here, the relevant question is something like the following: “But why should 
we care about conforming our actions to the results of procedurally sound 
deliberation?” – “Why should we care about reasons like that?” 149 These last two do 
appear to be open – at least in the sense that they appear intelligible. Someone who 
responds to the constructivist’s account in this way does not appear to be guilty of any 
kind of obvious confusion. 
But this should not be surprising. The condition expressed by (v) would appear 
to be one that is very difficult to satisfy. Just think of how easy it is to generate 
intelligible instances of this question form. In fact, this kind of argument is sometimes 
                                                
149 We might grant that the question “But why do we in fact have reason to perform actions that we 
would decide to perform as a result of sound practical deliberation?” is not open. But this would not 
count as a relevant application of the test. The test is intended to support the claim to Rational 
Force.Some philosophers – notably those non-naturalists I will mention in a moment – would not grant 
this. 
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employed to show that no substantive account of reasons is plausible and that the very 
demand for an explanation of Rational Force is confused. 
Defenders of non-naturalist versions of realism – e.g., Enoch (2007), 
Fitzpatrick (2008), Parfit (forthcoming), (2006), (1997), Shafer-Landau (2003) – 
accept both Commonsense and Rationalism but reject the idea that we can or need to 
explain the force of practical reason – i.e., they accept (i) and (ii) but reject (iii). They 
do this because they think (iii) would involve something like (v), and as we’ve seen it 
is not clear that any substantive view of practical reason will be able to satisfy the 
open question test. These realists think that moral requirements necessarily provide us 
with reasons for action – and that these reasons matter. But they argue that any attempt 
to explain the force (i.e. normative significance) of these reasons ultimately threatens 
to rob practical reason of the very force one sets out to account for.150 Although they 
think that we may put ourselves in a position to appreciate the rational force of moral 
requirements by attending more carefully to certain considerations or working through 
moral arguments, they do not think that we can provide any satisfactory explanation 
for why they have this force.151 Rather, on their view, moral reasons matter because 
the kinds of demands they present have intrinsic (and unexplainable) rational force. 
                                                
150 It is common for these realists to support this claim by appeal to something like G.E. Moore’s Open 
Question Argument – see Fitzpatrick (2008), 175-8; or Parfit (forthcoming), esp. Chapter 26, “The Fact 
Stating Objection”. Although these philosophers generally acknowledge that Moore’s exact version of 
the argument fails in one respect or another, they nonetheless take Moore to have been onto a deeper 
objection against reductive views of normativity. For criticism of Moore’s original argument see Prior 
(1949), Brink (1989), (2001), and Sturgeon (2003). Attempts to excavate a deeper insight from Moore’s 
failed version of the argument have also been made by non-realists, like Gibbard (2003) and Korsgaard 
(1996). 
151 Parfit (2006):  
 
Non-reductive realists, as I have conceded, do not give helpful answers to these questions. 
According to them, we can explain some normative concepts, but only by appealing to others. 
… But normative concepts cannot be explained in non-normative terms. Nor can we say much 
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Perhaps these non-naturalists are correct and no substantive view of practical 
reason – including Korsgaard’s constructivism – satisfies (v). Nevertheless, this might 
not be a problem that Korsgaard should be concerned with.152 We might worry that the 
kind of open question test that (v) involves is too strong and that this provides some 
reason for rejecting it.153 As I established in section 2, Rational Force expresses a 
plausible constraint on our ethical theorizing. But the open question test shows that 
those who accept this constraint are mistaken or somehow confused. To the extent that 
we find this conclusion surprising, we might just think that we haven’t yet settled on 
the right understanding of Rational Force. 
One conclusion to draw from this discussion and the one in the previous 
section would be that Korsgaard cannot secure Rational Force. Another – and one I 
will soon develop – is that that we should understand Rational Force in yet another 
way. After discussing what this might amount to and how Korsgaard’s own view 
might satisfy it, I will entertain the further question of whether there might be some 
version of realism that can similarly satisfy it.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
to explain how we understand these concepts, or how we recognize normative truths. …We 
can ask what normative concepts, such as ought and reason mean. But there are no answers to 
these questions that are both interesting and true. (pp. 330-1). 
 
152 It is for this reason that I will forgo a detailed reconstruction and evaluation of Korsgaard’s response. 
153 Surely, the mere fact that a candidate explanation of practical reason is subject to doubt does not 
militate against our eventual acceptance of this explanation on holistic grounds. I will not attempt to 
settle this complicated issue here. 
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4.6  Rational Force: A Last Pass 
 
Although I think that Korsgaard fails to accommodate all three of our initial 
considerations when Rational Force is understood in terms of motivation (as (iv) 
characterizes it) or as a response to a potentially open question (as (v) characterizes it), 
I think that a closer look at her own account helps to shed light on what other kind of 
requirement she could have in mind. What’s more, I think that such a requirement 
enjoys some independent support.  
 
(vi) A conception of practical reason should explain the nature of reasons in 
a way that avoids the threat of normative alienation.  
 
In order to understand this constraint and how it contributes to an account of Rational 
Force, we need to address the following questions: What is normative alienation? Why 
is it something to be avoided? How might an account avoid it? 
Before we ask what normative alienation amounts to, we might start out asking 
what we mean by alienation in general. The concept I am concerned with here is 
complex but not ultimately technical.  Like many of our concepts, alienation might 
end up capturing a variety of related but ultimately distinct ideas. I won’t presume 
here that I will be able to give it any precise formulation. Following Peter Railton, we 
might just say that “…at a perfectly general level alienation can be captured very 
roughly as a kind of estrangement, distancing, or separateness (not necessarily 
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consciously attended to) resulting in some sort of loss (not necessarily consciously 
noticed).”154 Common examples might include the following kinds of cases:  
 
Relocation 
You move to a new country and find, after initial attempts to assimilate and settle in, 
that you are just not at home with the customs and habits of your new community. 
You feel like an “alien”… like nobody understands you. You feel as if you lack the 
kind of emotional support you enjoyed back home. Consequently, you feel worse off.  
 
Intemperance 
You’ve had a bad day at work. You feel exhausted, underappreciated, and -- as a result 
-- quite irritable. As you stand waiting in the checkout line at the grocery store, 
someone cuts the line in front of you. But this is just too much. You let loose a torrent 
of angry epithets, reducing the queue cutter – who is caught quite unaware – to a 
muttering puddle. But once you’ve finished you too stand there equally surprised and 
shocked. “How could I have done that?” you ask. You think, “That’s not who I am.” 
You feel as if you’ve compromised your integrity by letting your anger get the better 
of you.  You can’t identify with this kind of person. We might say that you feel 
alienated from yourself. 
 
Normative alienation shares with these cases the idea of loss as a result of 
estrangement, distancing, or separateness. In this case, however, the cause is not a 
                                                
154 Railton (1984), 134.  
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relocation or an outburst of anger, but a set of alien demands. 155 And the related loss 
does not involve community or integrity; rather, it is the loss of what I have been 
calling Rational Force.  More specifically, one might worry that a view that offered no 
explanation of the connection between an agent’s reasons for action and the agent’s 
concerns or interests – i.e., the kinds of considerations that actually appear to figure in 
an agent’s deliberation – would appear to alienate the agent from the reasons that are 
supposed to obtain for her.156  
I take it that a characterization of Rational Force in terms of normative 
alienation, as I’ve sketched it here, enjoys a couple of advantages. First, normative 
alienation is something that is intuitively very bad and to be avoided. Although there 
might be cases where a bit of alienation could turn out to be a good thing (e.g., a case 
where a bit of distance from yourself and your peer group might help you see that you 
need to reform your ways or find new friends), it does not appear to be a good thing 
when we are considering rational demands -- especially if this also includes moral 
demands. Second, this means that normative alienation provides an independently 
plausible way of characterizing the kind of constraint Korsgaard might be after with 
Rational Force. According to (vi), at least one necessary condition for Rational Force 
is that an account of practical reason avoid alienating an agent from the rational 
demands that apply to her.  If normative alienation is intuitively bad, (vi) would 
appear well supported – independently of whether it suits Korsgaard’s own account. A 
view that satisfies the explanatory demand expressed by (vi) would appear preferable, 
                                                
155 See Fitzpatrick (2004) for discussion of normative alienation as an objection to realist views of 
practical reason. He argues that a Neo-Aristotelian, externalist view of reasons for action is able to 
avoid the threat of such alienation. 
156 Fitzpatrick (2004), 288. 
 127 
other things being equal. And, as I will now show, constructivism does appear to do a 
better job of satisfying this condition than some versions of realism.  
For example, compare how our Unrefined Platonist fares with respect to (vi). 
The Platonist account of reasons is not connected in any obvious way with the agent’s 
concerns or the kinds of considerations that figure in her deliberation. On this view, 
reasons are “out there” in the Platonic heavens. This doesn’t mean that such a view 
necessarily results in normative alienation; rather, it just can’t rule this out. To this 
extent, it does not appear to satisfy the condition in (vi). 
Moral constructivism, by contrast, makes reason the outcome of the exercise of 
our deliberative capacities. Clearly, if reasons are to be explained in terms of 
deliberation they have a connection to the kinds of considerations that actually figure 
in an agent’s deliberation. What’s more, constructivism goes some way toward 
explaining why someone should cultivate a concern for moral reasons. If moral 
reasons are the kind of thing that would result from an agent’s own sound deliberation, 
there is a sense in which these reasons are her own. 
Now, if all versions of realism accounted for practical reason similarly to an 
Unrefined Platonism, I do think that (vi) would provide some support for Korsgaard’s 
Assumption. One might think that a view of morality counts as immediately or 
necessarily connected with an agent’s deeply held concerns and interests only if it 
successfully withstands the threat of normative alienation, but that – as in the case of 
Platonism – no stance-independence view is able to do that. So, if a view is stance-
independent, the account of practical reason it provides is not immediately or 
necessarily connected with an agent’s deeply held concerns and interests. The problem 
 128 
with this justification is that not all realist accounts of practical reason work like 
Platonism. 
 
4.7 Objection: Deliberation Without Construction 
 
In the last section, I suggested that we might understand Rational Force as demanding 
a satisfactory response to the threat of normative alienation. In this case, Korsgaard’s 
view of practical reason does appear especially successful – and this because of the 
role it assigns deliberation. But one might ask why constructivism is essential to this 
kind of response if deliberation is really doing the work. What about the threat of 
normative alienation requires a specifically constructivist account of practical reason? 
Compare, for example, two ways in which an appeal to deliberation might 
figure in an account of Rational Force understood as (vi): 
 
A. What it is to be a reason is constrained by facts about us and by the role 
of deliberation in our lives. 
B. What it is to be a reason is determined by the exercise of our own 
deliberative capacities. 
 
The second clearly amounts to a constructivist account of practical reason, but the first 
is compatible with realism. For example, here we might compare the views held by 
people like Aristotle, Aquinas, Joseph Butler, or T.H. Green. Although there are 
important differences in the way that each of these philosophers accounts for practical 
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reason, there are also important similarities. On the one hand, each would appear to 
endorse something like the realist’s commitment to stance-independent moral truth. 
They think that moral truth is determined in part by facts about our rational nature, and 
this nature is not ultimately up to us. On the other hand, each would appear to accept 
something like the view expressed by A. If a commitment to A is sufficient to satisfy 
(vi), we have no reason to accept Korsgaard’s assumption.  
So, why isn’t a view that incorporates A sufficient as a response to the threat of 
alienation? According to A, reasons are intimately connected with an agent’s capacity 
for rational deliberation. This is because they are grounded, at least in part, in the very 
facts that make us what we are and, importantly, this includes facts about our 
deliberative capacities. But, in this case, reasons don’t present us with alien demands – 
quite the contrary! What could present a more immediate connection with our 
concerns and interests than the very features that make us what we are? But if this is 
right, there is a kind of stance-independent view of practical reason that can avoid the 
threat of normative alienation and, consequently, present an immediate or necessary 
connection with an agent’s deeply held concerns and interest. If this is correct, then 
Korsgaard’s Assumption is mistaken and The Argument from Moral Reasons unsound. 
It would appear as if realists as well as constructivists can get (i)-(iii). 
In response, Korsgaard would, of course, reject the claim that A alone is 
sufficient to satisfy (vi). The argument she would give for this claim might go 
something like the following: Although alienation is surely part of the story, she might 
say, it is not the entire story! In order to account for Rational Force one must not only 
avoid the threat of normative alienation but also provide some positive account of why 
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we identify with our own practical reason. An appeal to A might help us get some of 
the way, but it is not enough. Rather, what we need is an account of practical reason 
that is compatible with autonomy. And autonomy, importantly, requires that we self-
legislate the very demands that apply to us. This is what explains the fact that we are 
not alienated by them. This is something that B addresses, but not A alone. But since 
self-legislation is incompatible with a stance-independent account of practical reason, 
no such account will satisfy autonomy. Consequently, no such view does enough to 
secure an immediate or necessary connection between an agent’s reasons and her 
deeply held concerns and interests. 
In Chapter 5, I will argue at length that this argument from autonomy does not 
end up working. This is because it relies on what I show to be a suspect claim – viz. 
that autonomy requires self-legislation. But, the success or failure of this argument 
notwithstanding, I think that we can see that we are getting pretty far afield of our 
three initial considerations and the Argument from Moral Reasons. 
What I’ve tried to show in the last part of this discussion is that there is at least 
a prima facie case to be made that Korsgaard’s Assumption is mistaken.  This is 
because a realist can secure an intimate connection with deliberation in the way that A 
describes and, without further argument to the contrary, this looks as it might just be 
enough to satisfy (vi). If this is right, (vi) alone is too weak for Korsgaard’s needs. It is 
a condition that her own view satisfies. What’s more, it’s also one that rules out some 
versions of realism – viz., an Unrefined Platonism. But it does not rule out all versions 
of realism. Hence, it does not support premise 6 of our original argument. In this case, 
we have no good reason to think that constructivism bears a comparative advantage 
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over realism when it comes to accommodating Common Sense, Rationalism, and 
Rational Force. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
In section 1, I started out with three very plausible considerations that one might take 
as constraints on our moral theorizing. I then presented Korsgaard’s argument for the 
claim that moral constructivism does a better job of accommodating these 
considerations than realism. I showed that premise 6, what I’ve called Korsgaard’s 
Assumption, looked like the most vulnerable point in this argument. The rest of the 
discussion then involved presenting various conditions for Rational Force that might 
support this assumption. But these refinements either turned out to be too strong (i.e., 
Korsgaard’s own view failed to satisfy them) or too weak (i.e., in this case, the 
condition did not obviously rule out all versions of realism). Consequently, it would 
appear as if the argument against robust moral realism fails. Despite this failure, 
however, I think that this discussion reveals an important consideration, one – if 
nothing else – that should influence intramural debates amongst realists. This is that 
the success of particular species of realism should be evaluated against the threat of 
normative alienation. As we’ve seen, this is harder to square with the morality of 
Common Sense than one might have thought. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AUTONOMY AND THE NATURE OF MORALITY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
What implications, if any, does an adequate conception of moral autonomy hold for a 
metaethical theory? Some philosophers have argued that the centrality of autonomy to 
moral thought entails a rejection of robust forms of realism – e.g., Rawls (1980) and, 
in particular, Korsgaard (1996), (2009). This is because, on their view, robustly realist 
views cannot accommodate the conception of agent-centered control that a plausible 
account of autonomy requires.  This argument, I claim, depends on an account of 
autonomy that is either question-begging (since the account itself appears to rest on 
the assumption that there are no choice-independent moral standards) or mistaken 
(since otherwise it turns out to rest on an important equivocation).  I argue, more 
generally, that the failure of this argument casts significant doubt on any attempt to 
draw anti-realist conclusions from an adequate conception of autonomy. 
Autonomy, it is widely agreed, is essential to the way we conceive ourselves as 
moral agents.  Much of this chapter will be concerned with making this claim more 
precise, but, very roughly, the understanding of autonomy I have in mind is a Kantian 
one.  On this view, autonomy is not merely a psychological characteristic that we may 
possess or lack.157  Nor is it simply a right we may claim in our interactions with 
                                                
157 Here I have in mind the notion of autonomy as a descriptive property had by some or most human 
beings. For example, I take it that debates about whether a wife who defers to her husband in all 
decisions counts as autonomous concerns autonomy in this sense. It is a debate about the conditions one 
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others (though it might imply such a right). Rather, autonomy on this view is an 
essential characteristic of moral agency.  As I shall understand it, to be autonomous is 
to have and exercise the kind of control over who we are and what we do that is 
required to be a moral agent.   
The question I want to pursue, in particular, is what is supposed to follow from 
this.  One thought is that the notion of autonomy, properly understood, constrains the 
reasons and obligations that apply to us as moral agents.  I’m going to assume with a 
number of commentators that a minimal requirement of a good moral theory is that it 
at least be compatible with this widespread idea about autonomy.  I’m going to 
assume, further, that a moral theory that actually supports and explains these claims 
about autonomy will be attractive as such.158   
If some moral theories have better resources for accounting for autonomy than 
others, then, to the extent that they do, this will matter to an overall evaluation of their 
success. Some philosophers have argued that moral realism has a particular problem 
accommodating autonomy and that this gives us reason to reject it. This line of 
                                                                                                                                       
must satisfy in order to count as exhibiting the psychological condition of self-government. For the 
origin of this particular example see Hill (1973). Importantly, the notion of autonomy at play in debates 
between constructivists and realists is not this one. For discussion of these distinctions see Christman 
(1989), 6ff; see also Feinberg’s essay in the same volume (1989), 28ff. 
158 Although the debate between constructivists and realists concerns whether realism is compatible 
with a specific requirement of autonomy, viz., self-legislation, the second point about explanation has 
also featured in constructivist arguments against realism. In these other arguments, the issue is not so 
much any particular requirement of autonomy but, rather, the idea that a general characterization of 
agency and moral personality should play an essential role in a moral theory. John Rawls (1980) 
concedes that a realist, specifically a rational intuitionist, may admit a role for agency and moral 
personality in her theory, but only an instrumental one. For example, the intuitionist may assign certain 
features of moral personality – e.g., impartiality, a disposition to cool-headed reflection, sensitivity to 
certain features of a situation – a heuristic role. So, the issue is not whether realism is compatible with 
an account of agency or moral personality. But, Rawls argues that this is not enough. On his view, 
moral personality is central to our understanding of obligation and moral concern. Hence, a theory, like 
constructivism, that assigns a characterization of moral personality a central role in the theory will do a 
better job of accounting for the data. 
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argument, or something like it, is at least implicit in the work of John Rawls and 
Christine Korsgaard.  We might reconstruct it as follows:  
 
Argument from Autonomy 
(1) Autonomy is essential to the way we conceive of ourselves as moral agents. 
(2) Autonomy requires self-legislation [SL]. 
(3) SL is incompatible with robust moral realism. 
(4) So robust moral realism is false.159 
 
Here we have an argument that begins from the conception of autonomy I have 
sketched.   
Premise (2) states that, so understood, autonomy requires that we self-legislate the 
terms of morality. In what follows, I will sometimes refer to this as ‘the self-
legislation requirement’. It says we stand in an appropriate relation of control to our 
actions only when we create or construct (in some sense) the standards which 
determine whether we act well or badly. It is not easy to find a precise formulation of 
self-legislation in the literature on constructivism.   Rawls sometimes describes it as 
                                                
159 I am simplifying things a bit here to help focus the discussion in this paper. Constructivists present 
the Argument from Autonomy as part of a package of considerations that allegedly count against realism 
and in favor of their own view. They then argue on holistic grounds that realism should be rejected. 
Even if realism can accommodate some of these considerations to some extent, the constructivist argues 
that her view does a better job on the whole. Hence, it may be more accurate to reword the conclusion 
to read: other things being equal, we have good reason to reject realism. Of course, whether this is the 
case depends on whether other things are equal. For example, a realist might concede that her view 
loses out to constructivism with respect to autonomy but still insist that other features of realism give it 
an advantage on the whole. Constructivists might agree that other things are not equal – but contend 
that this is because constructivism may claim a series of explanatory advantages with respect to other 
putatively deep features of morality. Adjudicating between these claims will require us to look at each 
area of claimed comparative strength in turn. This is the task I set out for myself in my dissertation. 
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the idea that rational agents are “self-originating sources of valid claims.”160 
According to Korsgaard, SL is the view that “…nothing is a law to you except what 
you make a law for yourself.”161 Neither formulation, however, is as precise as one 
might hope.  Let us understand SL as the claim that all moral standards are ultimately 
created by us. As I will soon explain, this gloss has the advantage of making the 
argument valid. The challenge I wish to press is whether (2), as such, is true, and the 
argument sound. 
The reason this matters is that, if true, (2) has surprising consequences for the 
nature of morality. As premise (3) states, SL is incompatible with robust moral 
realism. Recall that what distinguishes robust realists is their commitment to condition 
(4). They think that the moral standards that fix our moral principles are not made true 
by virtue of their ratification from within any actual or hypothetical perspective. In 
other words, true moral standards are not of our own making. That is, they don’t 
depend on our choices, or beliefs, or desires, etc. But according to premise (2) moral 
standards must ultimately be of our own making if we are to count as autonomous. So, 
robust moral realism turns out to be false. 
Constructivists, like Korsgaard and Rawls, present this conclusion in the 
framework of a larger argument that is supposed to support their own considered view. 
Whereas realism allegedly fails to satisfy the self-legislation requirement, these 
constructivists contend that their own views succeed. On the one hand, it is easy to see 
why they would draw this conclusion. Constructivists think that there are many moral 
principles whose truth is stance-dependent. To the extent that these truths depend on 
                                                
160 Rawls (1980), 331ff 
161 Korsgaard (2009), 7.5.1 
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the outcomes of our autonomous deliberation, constructivism may be said to satisfy 
the self-legislation requirement. On the other hand, the fact that substantive 
constructivisms, like the ones that Rawls and Korsgaard defend, rely on some small 
number of stance-independent ethical truths to characterize the moral standpoints 
which generate these outcomes, one might still ask whether these views are not 
themselves subject to the objection embodied in the Argument from Autonomy. This 
is because the stance-independent truths that they appeal to in their characterizations 
of the moral standpoint are not themselves self-legislated. Although there are moves 
available to the constructivist in response to this kind of objection, they need not 
concern us here.162 For, as I will argue, there is no good reason for us to accept the 
conclusion to the first stage of the argument.  
Of the argument’s three premises, (2) is the one that is most vulnerable to 
criticism. It would also appear to be doing much of the work in the argument. In what 
follows, I will present and evaluate an argument that Christine Korsgaard has given in 
defense of premise (2).  Besides representing perhaps the only explicit, worked-out 
defense of the self-legislation requirement in the vast literature on autonomy, 
Korsgaard’s argument appeals to commonly held and quite plausible views to generate 
a surprising conclusion. This makes her argument both important and interesting. 
 However, I will show that Korsgaard’s argument ultimately rests on a mistake. 
That is, some of the premises in this argument only make sense if we take them to be 
referring to autonomy in some other sense than SL. What’s more, in order for these 
                                                
162 For example, the constructivist might respond that even if her view does not fully satisfy the self-
legislation requirement, she still does better than the realist. The fact that, according to constructivism, 
most moral truths are the outcomes of autonomous deliberation is still better than a view like realism, 
according to which very few moral truths work this way. 
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claims to come out true, SL has to be false. Hence, there is no good reason for us to 
accept premise (2) and with it the conclusion to the Argument from Autonomy. 
 
5.2 Some Preliminaries 
 
As I stated in the beginning, I’m going to assume that premise (1) is true. I’m also 
going to stipulate a reading of SL that is incompatible with realism. There is the option 
of leaving the proper interpretation of the term ‘self-legislation’ open.163 For example, 
this is the line that is sometimes taken in the Kant literature. I’m not doing this; rather, 
in the interest of simplicity, I will stipulate that we understand SL in the sense that 
precludes realism. If SL is stipulated in this way, premise (3) is uncontroversially true. 
This means that the real question to ask is whether premise (2) is true. Does autonomy 
require SL?  
By contrast with other views of autonomy (e.g., autonomy as integrity, 
authenticity, or self-command), self-legislation, arguably, does not wear its plausibility 
on its face. Although it clearly bears some connection with the notions of control and 
self-governance that are at the core of our concept of autonomy, it also represents a 
sophisticated philosophical claim that would appear to operate at some level of 
remove from it. In fact, it is very difficult to see what the argument for premise (2) is 
supposed to be.  
                                                
163 In this case, we allow that on certain readings of ‘self-legislation’ premise (3) might turn out to be 
false.    
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Some philosophers have interpreted Kant as providing such an argument.164 
But, this is extremely controversial. Within Kant scholarship, people have argued that 
SL cannot be Kant’s view of autonomy – on the basis of textual evidence and internal 
coherence.165 For the purposes of this paper, I am not interested in what Kant said; 
rather, I wish to examine independent arguments for SL. 
I want to identify an argument for premise (2) that may be extracted from the 
Kantian apparatus, one that stands on its own. The following methodological 
consideration will guide my approach: a moral theory that achieves a certain 
explanatory power with the fewest substantive commitments is preferable, other things 
being equal. If our acceptance of SL depended on our acceptance of Kant’s 
complicated account of transcendental idealism or transcendental freedom, this would 
be an unattractive result. This is not because we must assume that Kant is wrong – but 
rather because Kant’s systematic philosophy involves many controversial, substantive 
commitments (many of which are subject to deep interpretive dispute). 
There are considerations that speak both in favor of and against this approach. 
On the one hand, Karl Ameriks (2003) suggests that interpetations which attribute SL 
to Kant are driven more by the attractiveness of the substantive view than the 
evidence. This suggests that it may be possible to find an argument for SL that is 
independent of the commitments of the Kantian project as a whole. On the other hand, 
                                                
164  See, e.g., John Rawls (1980), (2000); Christine Korsgaard (1989), (1996), (2009); Jerome 
Schneewind (1991), (1998); and Andrews Reath (1994). 
165 See, e.g., Karl Ameriks (2000), (2003); Patrick Kain (2004), (2006); Allen Wood (1999); and 
Terence Irwin (2004). 
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Onora O’Neill (1989) appears skeptical that such an extraction is possible.166 If 
Ameriks is right, it would seem as if we should bear a good chance of finding 
independent arguments for premise (2). If O’Neil is right, this task may prove 
difficult. But, even if this is the case, the result would still be interesting. For it would 
reveal a weakness of arguments for SL. 
 
5.3 What is Korsgaard’s argument for SL? 
 
Christine Korsgaard has presented the most sophisticated, sustained defense of the 
self-legislation requirement that exists in the literature. Though she presents it in a 
number of her works, the clearest statements of this argument appear in two of her 
books, The Sources of Normativity (1996) and Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and 
Integrity (2009).167 Although Korsgaard does not name the argument as such, I will 
refer to it throughout as the Argument for Self-Legislation. Here I cite a passage from 
each book that provides a sketch of the entire argument. 
 
The reflective structure of human consciousness sets us a problem. Reflective 
distance from our impulses makes it both possible and necessary to decide 
which ones we will act on: it forces us to act for reasons. At the same time, and 
relatedly, it forces us to have a conception of our own identity, a conception 
                                                
166 Cf. O’Neill (1989): “Those who want to show that autonomy is integral to morality and rationally 
justified may find that in the end they cannot duck the larger systematic and metaphysical issues” (p. 
77). 
167 In her most recent book, Korsgaard is occupied with the issues of personal identity, agency, and 
action. However, it is clear that she intends the views she presents there to be continuous with, and 
supplementary to, her earlier work. 
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which identifies us with the source of those reasons. In this way, it makes us 
laws to ourselves. When an impulse – say a desire – presents itself to us, we 
ask whether the maxim of acting on it can be willed as a law by a being with 
the identity in question. If it can be willed as a law it is a reason, for it has an 
intrinsically normative structure. If it cannot be willed as a law, we must reject 
it, and in that case we get obligation.168  
 
Self-consciousness opens up a space between the incentive and the response, a 
space of what I call reflective distance. It is within the space of reflective 
distance that the question whether our incentives give reasons arises. In order 
to answer that question, we need principles, which determine what we are to 
count as reasons. Our rational principles then replace our instincts – they will 
tell us what is an appropriate response to what, what makes what worth doing, 
what the situation calls for. And so it is in the space of reflective distance, in 
the internal world created by self-consciousness, that reason is born.169  
 
Simplifying greatly, the idea is just this. Unlike non-rational animals, which are 
guided immediately by their instincts (or as Korsgaard puts it at one point, whose 
instincts constitute their wills),170 we – as moral agents – are faced with the problem of 
self-consciousness. Our rational nature allows us to stand back from the flow of 
impulses that rise up in us and see ourselves as something over and above them. This 
                                                
168 Korsgaard (1996), 113 
169 Korsgaard (2009), 6.1.7 
170  Korsgaard (2009): “A non-human animal acts on what I called ‘instinct.’ Her instincts are her 
principles, and they constitute her will” (10.2.1). 
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capacity to see ourselves in this way poses a problem. It requires that we choose what 
to do, a need that does not exist prior to reflection.  
However, in order for our movements to count as actions, we cannot just 
choose to follow one of our impulses. If we did that, we wouldn’t be acting; rather, the 
impulse or part would be operating on us. And, in this case, one would be a mere heap 
of impulses, not an agent.171 Instead, we must formulate principles of action that both 
unify these disparate parts and give us direction. Hence, self-legislation is our 
response to the task that reflection presents us with. If the problem is that our 
reflection creates a need for principles or standards to guide us in action, the solution 
is that we must create these principles or standards for ourselves.  
In short: Reflection creates the conditions for moral agency. Moral agency 
requires that we unify ourselves by giving ourselves standards that make us into 
someone rather than some thing, standards that do not exist prior to the choices we 
make in the face of reflective self-consciousness. Hence, in order to act, we must 
create our own moral standards – i.e., we must self-legislate. Although I think this 
argument is ultimately flawed, it is not obviously flawed. 
Part of the appeal of Korsgaard’s account of self-legislation comes in the way 
that it incorporates an independently plausible view of autonomy: integrity. Integrity 
arguably represents a core notion of autonomy. Continually developing or even 
sometimes reinventing oneself may be good or even required, but someone who 
reinvented herself from day to day, or moment to moment, or who committed herself 
                                                
171 As Korsgaard puts it, “to regard some movement of my mind or my body as my action, I must see it 
as an expression of my self as a whole, rather than as a product of some force that is at work on me or in 
me. Movements that result from forces working on me or in me constitute things that happen to me” 
((2009), 1.4.1). 
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to radically conflicting and incommensurable ends would fail to be a person, to be a 
someone. What’s more, we think integrity matters morally. We sometimes think that 
people of deep conviction should act with integrity even if we think they are wrong. 
We think, for example, that the pacifist should not go to war even if it turns out that 
the war is just. This view of autonomy may be attractive and the problem of reflective 
consciousness a real one. But must we think that this requires self-legislation? 
 
5.4 My Strategy for Evaluating the Argument 
 
For the purpose of argument, I will grant that self-consciousness has this destabilizing 
or fracturing effect on the agent and that this creates a practical problem, one whose 
solution requires – in some sense – that we construct coherent practical identities that 
we make effective in our actions. However, I will argue that, even if this is all true, it 
needn’t follow that action or agency requires SL. That is, moral agency does not 
require that we make our own moral standards. This is because there is a basic 
problem with Korsgaard’s Argument for Self-legislation.  
One initial problem is that, as stated, the argument is invalid. There is an 
obvious way of fixing this. However, as I will argue, it would require presupposing 
that moral realism is false. And this is not something that Korsgaard is in a position to 
do, not if this same claim is the conclusion to the Argument from Autonomy. Although 
Korsgaard suggests an expansion of the original argument for SL that avoids this 
objection, I will show that this new piece to the argument ultimately rests on an 
equivocation. In short, if the Argument for Self-legislation is to support premise two of 
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the Argument from Autonomy it must conclude that autonomy requires SL. But the 
crucial step in the former argument turns out to rest on a different notion of autonomy, 
one that supports our judgments about moral responsibility, not SL.  
Again, I should point out that I don’t think that Korsgaard’s argument is 
obviously flawed. Rather, its problems are obscured by the many details and steps 
involved. In order to make my objection clear, my approach will be to work 
backwards. I will start by highlighting a claim that Korsgaard cannot be making. I will 
then work towards the claim that I think she actually holds. Although there is some 
distance between these claims, it will be instructive to see how Korsgaard might 
maintain this distance. Once I have established this much, I can begin to explain where 
the problem lies – specifically, where she equivocates. 
 
5.5 Reconstructing Korsgaard’s Argument 
 
It is important to note a basic distinction: one between (a) choosing what to do and (b) 
choosing what the moral standards are. These things are clearly different. But might 
the one entail the other? In other words, does the fact that an agent chooses what to do 
entail that she also chooses what the moral standards are? 
In order to answer this question, let us consider a view on which it is true that 
an agent chooses what to do but false that she chooses what the moral standards are. 
Since it is only (b) that causes a problem for the realist, such an alternative would be 
compatible with moral realism. To illustrate this, let’s consider what the story of 
reflective self-consciousness looks like when we keep this distinction in view. On this 
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account, when presented with the need to act in reflective self-consciousness, we are 
forced to find a principle of action that speaks for all the parts of us operating as a 
whole; it must be a principle of integrity that we think will give our lives meaning and 
make them worth living. So far, we are working with the same picture that Korsgaard 
describes. But here’s where things diverge.  
Unlike Korsgaard’s picture, this one allows that there are some important facts 
about our nature as moral agents – i.e., facts about what kind of practical identities we 
may coherently form and which may give value to our lives – that exist prior to and 
independent of our choice. According to this view, the facts might support certain 
kinds of lives over others. A life of a teacher or a devoted parent might better suit us 
than the life of a grass-counter or an addict.172 Autonomous action – that is acting as 
an agent – requires the appropriate understanding of these facts and the reasons they 
give us. However, these are facts that we must not only recognize but also act on. 
These facts might determine the standards by which we evaluate whether we act 
rightly or wrongly, or live good or bad lives. But, nonetheless, we still have to act and 
live our lives. The moral facts don’t live them for us. So, moral agency may require us 
to choose what to do and who we will be, but this does not require that we create our 
own moral standards. So, (a) alone does not entail (b).  
But perhaps there is some premise that we could add to (a) that, together with 
it, would entail (b). One obvious candidate is the claim that there are no moral 
standards prior to choice. If we had to choose, but there were no standards available 
to guide us, our only choice would be to create them, to self-legislate. 
                                                
172 However, the facts needn’t be fully determinant. For example, they needn’t determine whether the 
teacher’s life or the parent’s life is better. 
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But, of course, this is a claim that is not available to Korsgaard. Recall that, in 
the Argument from Autonomy, SL is employed to secure the claim that moral realism 
is false, or at least incompatible with autonomy. The argument is supposed to show 
that autonomy is incompatible with prior, or choice-independent, moral standards 
because autonomy requires SL. But if this is right, the Argument for Self-legislation 
cannot itself rely on the premise that there are no prior moral standards. This would 
make her overall argumentative strategy circular. 
Is there some independent reason to think that moral agency or autonomy is 
itself incompatible with the prior existence of moral standards? Here is where the 
details of Korsgaard’s more recent work becomes relevant.   
Korgaard’s view is not merely that there are no moral standards prior to 
choice; rather, it is that there are no fixed facts about our nature that may serve to 
determine these standards. If Korsgaard simply stated that there were no choice-
independent moral standards, she would be guilty of the circularity I’ve just described. 
But she makes two further claims: moral standards must be grounded in standards of 
agency, but there are no choice-independent standards of agency to guide us. And, as 
I’ll explain in a moment, this is supposed to make a difference. 
I just described a case where self-consciousness forces us to choose what to do 
and what kind of person to become but this does not force us to accept SL. The reason 
it does not is that it might still turn out that moral standards are grounded in choice-
independent standards of agency. These standards are choice-independent because 
they are determined by facts about our nature as human beings. Here the facts 
determine whether a particular practical identity is good or worthwhile, but they don’t 
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live our lives for us. If there were such facts, the realist could claim that the standards 
they determine provide us with guidance in how to act. The constructivist, however, 
might simply deny this. She could claim that there are no such facts about our nature 
that could serve to underwrite choice-independent standards of agency. This would 
appear to be Korsgaard’s response to my proposed alternative.  
The view I described earlier states that there are facts about our nature as 
agents that are substantive enough to guide choice and underwrite morality, but, 
according to Korsgaard, there are no such facts.  
 
For movement to be my action … it must result from my entire nature working 
as an integrated whole… Now this is where things get complicated. You might 
suppose that this requires an action to be the effect or result or expression of a 
prior unity in the agent, an integrity already achieved… But I will argue that 
this cannot be how it works. This is where the problem of personal identity 
comes into the picture. I am going to argue that in the relevant sense there is no 
you prior to your choices and actions, because your identity is in a quite literal 
way constituted by your choices and actions.173 
 
                                                
173 Korsgaard (2009), 1.4.2.See also,  
 
… according to the above argument it is the claim to universality that gives me a will, that 
makes my will distinguishable from the operation of desires and impulses in me. If I change 
my mind and my will every time I have a new impulse, then I don’t really have an active mind 
or will at all – I am just a kind of location where these impulses are at play…The active will is 
brought into existence by every moment of reflection, but without the claim to universality, it 
is no sooner born than dead. And that means that it does not really exist at all. ((1996), 232). 
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Simply put: she thinks that there are no prior facts about our nature that could serve to 
guide our choices in reflective self-consciousness. According to Korsgaard, this could 
only be the case if there were “some prior unity in the agent, an integrity already 
achieved”, but “there is no you prior to your choices and actions.”  
It is important to note that ‘self-legislation’ is meant quite literally. The picture 
here is not of an agent, a self, standing around thinking about what to do and then 
coming up with principles to guide herself in action; rather, the picture is one of self-
making through lawgiving. Korsgaard claims that we not merely give ourselves laws 
through acts of willing; rather, we create ourselves – we legislate the self into 
existence.  
 
The function of the normative principles of the will in particular is to bring 
integrity and therefore unity – and therefore, really, existence – to the acting 
self.174 … It is a law that I give to myself, and its function is to bring unity to 
myself.175  
 
In her most recent work, she refers to this process as one of self-constitution.  
 
The task of self-constitution involves finding some roles and fulfilling them 
with integrity and dedication. It also involves integrating those roles into a 
                                                
174 Korsgaard (1996), 229 
175 Korsgaard (1996), 230 
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single identity, into a coherent life…The principles of practical reason bind us 
because, having to act, we must constitute ourselves as unified agents.176  
 
Korsgaard claims that we only act well when we stand in the appropriate relation of 
control to the principles on which we act.177 But, importantly, what counts as acting 
well depends on what one is. In other words, moral standards are grounded in 
standards of agency. But there are no standards of agency prior to choice in the face of 
reflective self-consciousness. Facts about us independent of our choices cannot 
determine such standards. Rather, in creating, or constructing, a coherent system of 
action-guiding principles, we – in the very same act – create or construct a practical 
identity, and with it the integrity and command over ourselves that is essential to our 
agency. 
Before presenting Korsgaard’s reason for thinking that there is no standard-
bearing sense of you prior to your choices and actions, I should first point out how this 
general type of response improves on the last one. One might worry that this response 
runs into the same problem I described in the previous section: it merely ends up 
                                                
176 Korsgaard (2009), 1.4.8 
177 One will note that surprising things follow from this conclusion. For example, on this view, the 
addict does not count as performing actions. Korsgaard not only recognizes this consequence, she 
embraces it. On her view, the addict fails to perform actions because she fails to be an agent; in making 
herself a slave of one or more of her desires, the addict makes herself into a mere thing, an object – not 
an agent. Here, one might worry that this means that the addict is not responsible for what she does or 
the abominable condition she is in. However, this is not Korsgaard’s view. She thinks that we are 
responsible for making ourselves into agents. This is something that we can do well or poorly. Insofar 
as one fails at making herself into an agent or fails to do this well (and, importantly, external conditions 
didn’t make it impossible for one to do so – e.g., brainwashing), one is subject to blame. The connection 
between autonomy and responsibility turns out to be central to my objection to the argument. I will 
discuss it in more detail later in this chapter. 
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presupposing what Korsgaard must prove. But this worry turns out to be misplaced in 
this case. 
 To see what I mean, consider a further distinction: one between (c) choosing 
what kind of agent to be, and (d) choosing what the standards of agency are. As in the 
case of the first pair, these two things are also clearly different. And as my example 
has already shown, (c) alone does not entail (d). The case I have described is exactly 
one where moral agency may require us to choose what to do and who we will be, but 
this does not require that we choose what the standards of agency are.  
Again, there is a premise that we could add to (c) that, together with it, would 
entail (d). Here, the obvious candidate is the claim that there are no substantive 
standards of agency that exist prior to choice. If we had to choose what kind of person 
to be, but there were no prior standards available to guide us, our only choice would 
be to create them. This appears to be the line that Korsgaard in fact takes, as evidenced 
by the passage I’ve cited. But does this commit Korsgaard to the same kind of 
circularity that was the subject of the previous objection?  
In this case, the objection does not appear to hold. The worry in the earlier case 
was that the Argument for Self-legislation tacitly relies on the assumption that there 
are no choice-independent moral standards, in which case an appeal to the self-
legislation requirement in the Argument from Autonomy would be circular. However, 
in this case, the claim assumed is not that there are no choice-independent moral 
standards; rather, it is that there are no choice-independent standards of agency. It is 
only in conjunction with the independent claim that the moral standards are grounded 
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in standards of agency that we get the claim that there are no choice-independent 
moral standards.  
To deny that there are prior facts about our nature that may serve to guide 
choice is not obviously to deny that there are choice-independent moral standards. 
This conclusion only follows if we accept the claim that the moral standards are 
grounded in standards of agency. Although the version of realism I sketched out above 
follows Korsgaard in grounding standards of morality in standards of agency, a realist 
needn’t do this. So, to deny that there are such facts about agency is not the same as 
denying choice-independent moral standards. The charge of circularity is averted. But 
why should we think that there are no choice-independent standards of agency?  
 
5.6 Moral Agency and Responsibility 
 
Korsgaard argues that if there were choice-independent standards of agency we could 
not rightly be counted responsible for our actions. In other words, moral responsibility 
requires that we determine the standards of our own agency. 
 
Sometimes you hear philosophers say that the idea of responsibility is 
incoherent, because we could not be responsible for what we do unless we are 
responsible for what we are, and we could not be responsible for what we are 
unless we created ourselves. I think it is true that we could not rightly be held 
responsible unless we created ourselves, but false that that makes the idea of 
responsibility incoherent…. But the sense in which we must create ourselves in 
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order to be responsible is not that we must literally bring ourselves into being. 
Rather, we are responsible because we have a form of identity that is 
constituted by our chosen actions. We are responsible for our actions not 
because they are our products but because they are us, because we are what we 
do.178 
 
The argument expressed in this passage is compressed. But it appears to go something 
like this. If there were choice-independent standards of agency, we couldn’t freely or 
autonomously create ourselves. And if we couldn’t freely or autonomously create 
ourselves, we could not rightly be held responsible for our actions. But we can be 
rightly held responsible for our actions! So, we can autonomously create ourselves. 
So, there are no choice-independent standards of agency. 
 After briefly justifying my reconstruction of the argument, I will entertain 
possible objections to it. Ultimately, however, my evaluation of it will matter less than 
what the argument shows about Korsgaard’s overall conception of autonomy. I will go 
on to argue in the next section that Korsgaard’s appeal to responsibility reveals an 
                                                
178 Korsgaard (2009), 6.4.7. These claims are repeated at different points in (2009). For example, see 
also the following passage from an earlier chapter: 
 
When you deliberately decide what sorts of effects you will bring about in the world, you are 
also deliberately deciding what sort of a cause you will be. And that means you are deciding 
who you are.  So we are each faced with the task of constructing a peculiar, individual kind of 
identity – personal or practical identity – that the other animals lack. It is this sort of identity 
that makes sense of our practice of holding people responsible, and of the kinds of personal 
relationships that depend on that practice.  
You will already see that I think those who claim that judgments of responsibility don’t really 
make sense unless people create themselves are absolutely right – only unlike most people who 
believe this, I don’t think it’s a problem. It is as the possessor of personal or practical identity 
that you are the author of your actions, and responsible for them. And yet at the same time it is 
in choosing your actions that you create that identity. What this means is that you constitute 
yourself as author of your actions in the very act of choosing them. (1.4.3) 
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equivocation in the sense she assigns to SL. However, it turns out that this 
equivocation cannot be reconciled by merely reassigning terms and disciplining how 
they are used; rather, it reveals a deep confusion in Korsgaard’s argument. But before 
we get this far, let me first say a few words about my presentation of the argument and 
possible objections that one might level against it. 
 One will note that I have supplemented the argument in various ways. First of 
all, the passage I have cited does not explicitly make the connection between the 
standards of agency and autonomy, or autonomy and responsibility. Rather, what we 
get is just something like the claim that if we did not create ourselves, we could not 
rightly be held responsible for our actions. It is a common, though not 
uncontroversial, consideration that responsibility requires that we be free or 
autonomous in some sense. I take it that this is the kind of consideration behind the 
above conditional. Specifically, the claim is that responsibility requires autonomy in 
the sense of self-creation, or what Korsgaard calls self-constitution in other places. In 
other words, if we did not self-constitute, we couldn’t rightly be held responsible for 
our actions.  
But if one accepts this claim, one might also think that choice-independent 
standards of agency would somehow infringe on or preclude this kind of freedom or 
autonomy. Clearly, if there are choice-independent standards of agency, then we do 
not create these standards ourselves by choosing them. This is just what it means for a 
standard to be choice-independent. This leaves unresolved, however, the question of 
whether self-constitution requires that we make or create these standards. Korsgaard 
makes it clear here and elsewhere that she takes self-constitution to require this. It is 
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not merely her view that we choose practical identities and what kind of roles we will 
organize our lives around; rather, it is that in doing so an agent determines the 
standards of her own agency – i.e., standards which determine whether she succeeds 
or fails as an agent.179 In other words, on her view, if there were choice-independent 
standards already there, we could not be said to self-constitute in the sense she takes to 
matter for moral responsibility. Although Korsgaard does not spell these claims out 
explicitly, they are consistent with her presentation and would appear to enjoy support 
in this context. 
Furthermore, nowhere in the passage above does Korsgaard explicitly state that 
we can rightly be held responsible for our actions.180 I take it that this must be a 
suppressed premise. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how the argument goes through. 
Again, this is not an uncontroversial assumption, but without it we could only 
conclude that if there were choice-independent standards for our agency, we could not 
rightly be held responsible for our actions. But if this is all that the argument shows, 
and the realist view I described above were correct, the conclusion to draw would be 
that we are not rightly held responsible for our actions. So much the worse for us! But 
it is clear that Korsgaard wishes to block this conclusion.  
                                                
179 She presents an interpretation of this claim against the background of what she takes to be Aristotle’s 
view of the human form: “But the form of the human is precisely the form of the animal that must 
create its own form” ((2009), 6.4.3). It is clear from what she goes on to say in this context that a form 
constitutes the standards of agency for the being in question. 
180 One could argue that it is entailed by the claim that “...we are responsible because we have a form of 
identity that is constituted by our chosen actions.” But it is not clear how we are to read this. Earlier in 
the passage Korsgaard talks about the conditions that must obtain in order for the idea of responsibility 
to be coherent. In light of this, it may be more accurate to rephrase the above claim as the idea of 
responsibility (i.e, the claim that we are responsible) is coherent only if we have a form of identity that 
is constituted by our actions. But from this conditional formulation it would be illegitimate to infer that 
we are in fact responsible. 
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She introduces the topic of responsibility in order to support the claim that 
there are no such choice-independent standards of agency. In other words, on her 
view, the realist picture I have described is mistaken. And in order to secure this 
claim, she must assume that we can in fact be rightly held responsible for our actions. 
Some might wish to deny this. But I am happy to grant it. If we can’t rightly be held 
responsible, this would mean attributing massive error to our everyday moral thinking. 
Perhaps this is a conclusion that argument forces upon us. But the burden is arguably 
with the person who wishes to attribute massive error to our moral thinking, not with 
the person who assumes that we can rightly hold people responsible for their actions. 
In any case, this assumption is probably the least controversial premise in the 
argument.  There is much else in this argument that is also controversial. For example, 
one might also object to either of the argument’s other two premises. In fact, both 
would appear suspect.  
On the one hand, one could deny that if there were choice-independent 
standards of agency, we couldn’t freely or autonomously create ourselves.  Of course, 
Korsgaard stipulates that self-constitution (i.e. self-creation) is incompatible with 
choice-independent standards of agency. Again, self-constitution is a technical term 
for her. But we might ask whether there is some other non-technical sense in which we 
might be said to “create ourselves” that does not stand at odds with choice-
independent standards of agency. Consider the case I presented earlier. There the point 
was that even if prior standards of agency exist, we still have to live our lives and 
decide what kind of people we will be. The standards cannot live our lives for us. One 
might think that deciding what kind of person to become counts as a kind of self-
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creation, even if it is not self-creation in the technical sense that Korsgaard has in 
mind, and that this suffices for autonomy. In other words, the mere presence of prior 
standards would not appear to preclude autonomy – that is, unless we are assuming 
that autonomy requires SL. And Korsgaard cannot be assuming the self-legislation 
requirement at this stage in the argument.  
Recall that this claim about the standards of agency is supposed to figure in an 
argument for SL. That is, the reason provided for thinking that we must self-legislate 
is allegedly that there are no prior standards of agency to guide us. This means that we 
cannot rely on the self-legislation requirement to argue that there are no prior 
standards. Barring this assumption, there is no reason to think that the existence of 
such prior standards precludes autonomous self-creation in some other important 
sense.  
On the other hand, one could also deny the claim that if we couldn’t freely or 
autonomously create ourselves, we could not rightly be held responsible for our 
actions. Korsgaard remarks that some philosophers maintain this view. But she does 
not reveal their identities or their reasons for thinking this to be the case.181 Again 
much would appear to depend on how we understand autonomous self-creation.  
The sense of autonomy or self-creation in the antecedent cannot be SL for the 
same reason that it cannot be in the previous premise. The reason Korsgaard is 
concerned to defend the claim that there are no standards of agency prior to choice is 
that she takes it that this will somehow help her defense of SL. So, again in this case, 
                                                
181 Perhaps she has in mind the kind of argument presented by Galen Strawson in “The Impossibility of 
Moral Responsibility” (1994). 
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she cannot rely on the view that autonomy requires SL in a lemma that is supposed to 
ultimately support that very conclusion.  
One could object that responsibility only requires that we have some freedom 
in choice about what we do, not who we are. The claim that responsibility requires 
freedom in choice about what we do is very plausible. But the claim that freedom in 
choice about what we do requires freedom in choice about what we are is much less 
plausible. Further to the point, it is not clear that responsibility for what we do requires 
responsibility for what we are. There might be certain extreme cases where this seems 
right.182 But surely I can be responsible for what I do even if I am not responsible for 
who I am. I am the son of Arrigo and Sandra. This is not an identity that I chose. 
Additionally, let us suppose that if I had had the choice, I would not have taken this 
identity; rather, I would have chosen to be born to some other set of parents.183 This 
counterfactual choice notwithstanding, I think that I would still be responsible for 
whether I make good on my filial obligations to them, my actual parents. Along the 
same lines, we think that one can be a rotten kid to rotten parents. By this I mean that 
you can be rotten for failing to live up to your filial obligation even if your parents are 
                                                
182 For example, if someone is born into a life of extreme poverty and crime this might attenuate our 
willingness to hold them morally responsible for certain actions.  
183 Mom and Dad, if you are reading this, don’t worry! I love you guys. This is just a thought 
experiment. 
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rotten, sorry excuses for parents.184 Families are tough, but you are still responsible for 
your obligations to them – even if you don’t get a choice about this.185  
As this last point and the previous one illustrate, Korsgaard’s argument for the 
claim that there are no choice-independent standards of agency appears vulnerable to 
criticism in different ways. Of course, for all I have said, it might still turn out that 
there are good responses available to my objections. But even if there are, this will not 
save Korsgaard’s overall argumentative strategy. This is because Korsgaard’s 
arguments ultimately rely on an equivocation. 
We are now in a position to see the entire argument for SL. Let us quickly 
review. According to Korsgaard, we are autonomous only if we act on self-legislated 
principles that unify us as something over and above our impulses. In other words, we 
are autonomous insofar as we live up to our own chosen standards. But the reason for 
thinking that we must self-legislate these principles, or standards, is that moral 
standards are grounded in standards of agency, and there are no standards of agency 
prior to choice. So we have to make our own. Furthermore, the reason that there are no 
choice-independent standards of agency is that if there were we would lack the kind of 
                                                
184 I admit that there may be circumstances in which these obligations are cancelled out by other 
features of one’s situation. For example, if a child is the victim of parental abuse this may cancel her 
obligation to care for her parent in certain ways – in fact, perhaps this would cancel any kind of filial 
responsibility to them. But I reject the idea that one’s merely failing to identity with one’s actual 
parents, or counterfactually deciding not to be born to them, would count as such a feature. 
185 Korsgaard rejects my claim about filial obligations. She thinks that “...you can walk out even on 
factually grounded identity like being a certain person’s child or a certain nation’s citizen, dismissing 
the reasons and obligations that it gives rise to, because you just don’t identify yourself with that role. 
Then it’s not a form of practical identity anymore: not a description under which you value yourself” 
((2009), 1.4.7). I think that she is mistaken, but I do not have the space to fully argue for this point. My 
point here is simply to provide some initial reasons for thinking that her argument for the claim that 
there are no choice-independent standards fails. However, as it turns out, I am less concerned to show 
the failure of this argument than to highlight what it shows about Korsgaard’s general conception of 
autonomy. Insofar as she appeals to claims about moral responsibility to defend self-constitution, 
Korsgaard cannot be talking about autonomy as SL.  
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autonomy required for responsibility. We are responsible only if we are autonomous in 
the sense that we choose our own standards of agency. But if responsibility requires 
that we freely choose our own standards of agency, these same standards cannot 
ground morality as Korsgaard claims. 
 
5.7 Two Incompatible Senses of Autonomy 
 
Now that we have the entire argument before us, we can see how Korsgaard 
equivocates. Consider these two claims: 
 
(i) You realize autonomy only if you act according to your self-legislated 
standards – i.e., insofar as you act well.  
(ii) You realize autonomy in acting badly just as much as acting well – 
that’s why we rightly hold you responsible for your actions. 
 
Claim (i) follows from the claim that autonomy requires SL. Claim (ii), however, is a 
natural way of expressing our reason for thinking that responsibility requires 
autonomy. We want to be able to legitimately impute blame to people for wrong 
actions. But in order to do this, so the thought goes, they must be responsible. And, as 
Korsgaard argues, responsibility requires autonomy. But there is a problem. If 
‘autonomy’ is to be read univocally, claims (i) and (ii) are inconsistent. It can’t be the 
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case that you realize autonomy in acting badly AND only if you act well.186 Either one 
of these claims is false, or ‘autonomy’ does not have the same meaning in both of 
them.  But either way Korsgaard’s argument fails. 
If one of them is false, then Korsgaard’s argument turns out to be unsound. If 
(i) is false, autonomy does not require SL. In this case, we ought to reject the second 
premise of the Argument from Autonomy, along with its conclusion that realism is 
false.  
If (ii) is false, this is presumably because one is not autonomous in acting 
badly; rather, as (i) states, it’s only in those cases in which we act well that we realize 
our autonomy. But, in this case, we have no reason to accept the claim that there are 
no prior standards of agency to guide us in choice.  
Korsgaard’s reason for thinking that we must create our own standards is that 
if we didn’t we couldn’t rightly be counted as responsible for our actions. But if you 
aren’t autonomous in those cases where you act badly, then you aren’t responsible for 
them. This just follows from Korsgaard’s own view that responsibility requires 
autonomy. But then there is no problem for prior standards. Prior standards might 
determine that your actions are wrong. But since you are not responsible for them 
anyway, there is no reason to think that there couldn’t be such choice-independent 
standards of agency. In other words, this allows room for my realist alternative 
according to which we still must decide what to do and what kind of person to be even 
if there are standards of agency prior to choice. This is a counterexample to the claim 
                                                
186 This is the very same problem that Henry Sidgwick finds in the work of Kant. See “The Kantian 
Conception of Free Will”, originally printed in Mind, 1888, Vol. XIII., No. 51; partially reprinted as an 
appendix in Sidgwick (1966). 
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that choosing what to do requires creating your own standards of agency. Now that 
there is no reason not to accept this realist picture, it would appear as if a crucial 
premise in Korsgaard’s Argument for Self-legislation is false. In this case, her 
argument for SL is unsound. Again, this also means that there is no good reason to 
accept the conclusion presented in the Argument from Autonomy.  
If ‘autonomy’ had a different meaning in (i) and (ii), then both of these claims 
could be true. But in this case Korsgaard’s argument would turn out to be invalid.  In 
order to get the conclusion that realism is false in the Argument from Autonomy, one 
must suppose that autonomy requires SL in the sense that we create our own standards 
of morality. But the kind of autonomy we get from her Argument for Self-legislation is 
merely autonomy in a sense that is required for responsibility and, importantly, this is 
a kind of autonomy that is compatible with choice-independent standards of agency. 
Despite its namesake, this argument does not secure SL. This equivocation means that 
Korsgaard cannot legitimately rely on the results of the latter argument to support her 
conclusion in the former. 
 This is a deep problem for Korsgaard’s argument, one that cannot simply be 
avoided by reassigning terms and regimenting their use. If this is not already clear, it 
will become so when we consider Korsgaard’s own response to the objection and why 
it fails. 
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5.8 Why Korsgaard’s Response Fails 
 
Korsgaard is aware that there is something like this problem for her overall view. She 
takes it be the same problem that Kant and Plato face given that, on her reading of 
their works, both of them accept that we are autonomous only insofar as we realize our 
“true” selves. But her response ultimately fails to address the objection that I have 
presented. This is because it only explains how we can be responsible for defective 
actions, not how we can be responsible for defective characters or practical identities. 
There is no way of extending her account of defective action to defective character 
without also rejecting SL in the sense required for the Argument from Autonomy.187 
On Korsgaard’s view, an unjust or wrong action is one that fails to make one 
into an agent. This follows because she thinks that moral standards are grounded in 
standards of agency. Korsgaard recognizes a problem here: “But if this is so, then it is 
hard to see how we can be held responsible for bad or heteronymous action, or indeed 
why we should regard it as action at all.”188 She then devotes an entire chapter of 
(2009) to addressing it.189   
Part of her response is that actions come in degrees, depending on how well 
they unify an agent. But responsibility is an all or nothing affair. Insofar as you have 
some practical identity or other, you can be held responsible for failing to live up to it. 
                                                
187 Importantly, my version of the objection would only count as a problem for Plato or Kant if these 
philosophers also accepted SL. Plato, of course, would reject SL. On his view, whether or not we act 
well in harmonizing the parts of our souls depends on whether, and the extent to which, one’s principles 
share in the forms – and whatever disputes there might be about what this all involves, it is clear that it 
does not involve something like SL. However, it is matter of deep scholarly dispute whether Kant 
accepts SL. See notes 7 and 8 for some of the relevant literature on this point. 
188 Korsgaard (2009), 8.1.2 
189 See Chapter 8, “Defective Action,” in (2009). 
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And this makes sense. Consider, for example, the case of G.A. Cohen’s idealized 
Mafioso: 
 
This Mafioso does not believe in doing unto others as you would have them do 
unto you: in relieving suffering just because it is suffering, in keeping 
promises, because they are promises, in telling the truth because it is the truth, 
and so on. Instead, he lives by a code of strength and honour that matters as 
much to him as some of the principles as I said he disbelieves in matter to most 
of us.190 
 
Let us suppose, as Cohen does, that this Mafioso has the practical identity he does 
because he has self-constituted himself in a particular way. That is, he meets all of the 
formal conditions that Korsgaard describes for making oneself into an agent.191 But 
this doesn’t mean that he only has this practical identity in those moments where he 
lives up to his standards. Presumably, we can only speak of someone having a 
particular practical identity against the background of many actions. Self-created 
standards are not born in a single act, nor can they be extinguished by a single act. 
They enjoy stability and provide a backdrop against which we may judge someone to 
act well or badly. That is, because of this backdrop, we can judge someone to act 
                                                
190 Cohen in Korsgaard (1996), 183 
191 It should be noted that Cohen has a somewhat different aim in appealing to this case. He takes it to 
be a direct counterexample to Korsgaard’s view that constructivism can guarantee something like our 
common-sense morality (i.e., a set of moral standards that include the usual duties of aid and 
forbearance).  It is a supposed to be a case where all of the formal conditions of reflective endorsement 
are satisfied but the resulting moral code is not one that lines up with the morality of common sense. By 
contrast, I am using this example to draw out the ways in which Korsgaard can explain defective action, 
but not defective character. Both Cohen’s point and mine are related but they are employed to slightly 
different ends. 
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badly and – at the same time – hold them responsible for this failing. It is because our 
Mafioso has a stable and enduring practical identity that we can judge him to act badly 
when he fails to live up to his own standards – e.g. when he backs down from an act of 
vengeful violence because he lacks resolve. On this view, the more an agent’s actions 
conform to her own self-created practical identity, the more she can be said to realize 
autonomy. However, in order to be held responsible for one’s actions, all that is 
required is that one have self-legislated at all. So, Korsgaard’s account would appear 
to allow both that defective action is possible and that we may be rightly held 
responsible for such actions. 
 The problem with this response, however, is that it only explains how we can 
be responsible for defective actions, not defective characters or practical identities. 
And, importantly, Korsgaard’s argument that there are no choice-independent 
standards of agency relies on the claim that we can only be responsible for what we do 
if we are responsible for who we are. If you are responsible for who you are, we 
should be able to impute blame to you for the kind of character you have created for 
yourself. And this cannot be the case if SL is true in the sense needed to rule out 
realism.  
 To say that the Mafioso is responsible for choosing the particular identity he 
has and not another is to say that we may legitimately praise or blame him for this 
choice. For this to be the case, however, there would need to be some prior standards 
of agency against which we could judge him to be blameworthy or not – i.e., some 
standards that he might fail to live up to. But if SL is true, there cannot be. So, either 
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the Mafioso is not responsible for choosing who he is, or SL is false. Either way, 
Korsgaard has failed to adequately respond to the objection I have presented.  
If he is not responsible, this would again undermine the case against choice-
independent standards of agency. Korsgaard’s argument for the claim that there are no 
such standards assumed that we can rightly be held responsible for who we are. If this 
is false, then the conclusion that there are no choice-independent standards of agency 
does not follow. In this case, we have no reason to think that we must create our own 
standards. Instead, we may accept that the realist picture I have provided is correct. 
We might be forced to choose who we will be, but this does not require that we choose 
the very standards which determine whether we succeed or fail as an agent. On the 
other hand, if SL is false, the Argument from Autonomy is again unsound. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
I started out this discussion with an initial claim: Autonomy is essential to the way we 
conceive of ourselves as moral agents. My guiding question throughout has been 
whether there is anything interesting about the nature of morality that is supposed to 
follow from this.  
Although Korsgaard maintains that considerations from autonomy provide 
reason for thinking that moral realism is mistaken, I have argued that the Argument for 
Self-Legislation does not secure the necessary premise. Korsgaard must provide some 
good reason to think that autonomy requires SL. But it turns out that her argument for 
SL relies on a different sense of autonomy, one that is required for legitimate 
 165 
attributions of responsibility.  And, as I have shown, this kind of autonomy stands in 
deep tension with SL. 
Although part of her argument appeals to a plausible view of autonomy in 
integrity, I have argued that there is a way of accommodating this without SL. Even if 
we accept that the problem that reflective self-consciousness presents us with is a real 
one, one that requires that we construct coherent practical identities that we make 
effective in our actions, this much may be accommodated without its being the case 
that we create our own moral standards. Autonomy might require that we choose what 
to do, but this alone does not entail that we make our own moral standards. It does not 
require SL. Hence, the argument provides no reason to think that robust moral realism 
is false; there is no reason to reject condition (4). This also means that there is no 
comparative advantage to be had by a view that grounds most moral truths in the 
outcomes of autonomous deliberation. The Argument from Automomy provides no 
reason for thinking that a substantive constructivism, like the kind that Rawls or 
Korsgaard defend, is preferable to a robust moral realism. 
We are now at the end of our journey. Although I hope it is clear how we 
might understand the various ways in which constructivism poses a threat to realism, I 
also hope to have shown that none of these threats proves fatal.  
Many have dismissed constructivism on the grounds that it does not appear to 
present a new or interesting view. This is because they have assumed, quite 
reasonably, that constructivism is supposed to offer a free-standing alternative to 
existing metaethical views. But this assumption turns out to be mistaken. I argue that 
constructivism is better characterized, more restrictedly, as challenge to either the 
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nature or scope of the realist’s conception of ethical objectivity. It is only once we 
have accepted this characterization that we can see how powerful the constructivist’s 
challenge can be. 
Contra current consensus, I hope to have shown that the most powerful version 
of this challenge is not represented by formal presentations of constructivism; rather, it 
is to be found in the traditional presentations and arguments one encounters in the 
works of John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and T.M. Scanlon. Substantive 
constructivism may not possess any significant metaphysical or epistemological 
advantages over realism, but there are good initial reasons to worry that the ethical 
considerations they marshal in The Argument from Moral Reasons and The Argument 
from Autonomy do support constructivist claims to a holistic explanatory advantage 
over realism.  
Although I argue that each of these arguments ultimately proves unsound, they 
turn out to reveal interesting things about what the right version of realism might look 
like. For example, the importance of autonomy and the connection between morality 
and reasons for action suggests that a realist should assign practical reason an 
important role in the human good – though this should be construed in realist terms, 
not constructivist ones. It also prompts important yet difficult questions about the 
extent to which a realist may incorporate or accept constructivist elements in her 
theory.  
Much of the preceding discussion has rested on the assumption that condition 
(4) captures what many defenders of realism are after. Although I have provided some 
reason for thinking that this condition is what distinguishes realists from substantive 
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constructivists, there is certainly more work to be done. My aim throughout has been 
to provide a sketch of a framework that might serve to advance our understanding of 
the debate. I hope that the arguments in this work mark a step, however small, in this 
direction. 
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